FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1959

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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NEW TESTS FOR NATO

By Paul-Henri Spaak

I DO not intend to set forth once again the historical and political considerations which necessitated and to this day justify the existence of the Atlantic Alliance. At the most I should like only to state that NATO today seems to me to be every bit as essential as it was in 1949, and perhaps more so. During the ten years which have elapsed, the Communist world has not grown weaker. The threat which it represents to the free world has, indeed, been aggravated in that it is now economic as well as military and is spreading far beyond the borders of Europe to Asia and Africa. With each passing day I am more convinced that the surest and perhaps the only way to resist it successfully is to develop among the countries belonging to the Alliance a sense of oneness based on mutual understanding and loyalty.

Fortunately NATO is not, as some people think, in a state of crisis. On the contrary, it is flourishing.

No one can deny that the Alliance has been wholly successful in its essential purpose of halting the expansion of Soviet imperialism in Europe without the need to resort to force. Soviet imperialism, which chalked up one conquest after another in the period from 1939 to 1948, has made no further progress in Europe since the day the Atlantic Alliance was formed. Only a confirmed skeptic could regard this as fortuitous. The fact is that it constitutes the direct and very logical outcome of what we in the West have accomplished. Small wonder that the Soviet Union has been persistently and rabidly hostile to NATO.

If this is true, then surely it would be the utmost folly to dissolve or even weaken the Alliance. To do so would be simply to restore the conditions which made the gains of Soviet imperialism

Author's Note: Let it be clearly understood that this article can in no way be regarded as expressing the official NATO opinion. It is simply my personal contribution to the study of certain problems. I am not at all sure that it reflects the common views of the 15 governments which are signatories to the Treaty of Washington, and for that reason I speak only for myself.

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possible. This consideration should be a signal to the policy-makers to proceed with caution.

It would be a serious mistake, however, to think that the great success achieved by the Alliance is definitive or even sufficient. As is always true in politics, the future is much more important than the past. Nothing is more dangerous than to take too much satisfaction in what has already been accomplished. Fortunately the statesmen of the West are aware that attention should be directed rather towards what remains to be done, and they have been endeavoring since 1956 to strengthen the Alliance's political structure through greater coördination of the foreign policies of the 15 member countries. Important progress has been made along these lines during the past year, although the public generally is not yet aware of it.

Certainly it is not an easy thing to coördinate the foreign policies of the 15 countries comprising NATO, widely separated geographically as some of them are and in many cases differing considerably both in power and historical experience. At first glance the odds would seem to be against the possibility that the foreign policies of such countries as the United States and Luxembourg, Turkey and Norway, could ever be coördinated.

Nevertheless, I maintain that we have almost succeeded in doing so. In any case, the present experiment is worth continuing. If it is successful, the posture of the free West will be profoundly altered.

The Permanent Council of the Atlantic Alliance is today an important and extraordinarily active body. It met more than 70 times during the first nine months of 1958 and gave serious consideration to almost all the world problems which have arisen. It was, of course, more successful in dealing with some problems than with others. While substantial policy agreement was reached regarding relations between the West and the Communist world, differences persist with regard to the policy to be followed in the Middle and Far East. They have unquestionably been narrowed, however, and the exchange of views in the Council has led to greater understanding and closer coöperation. Little by little, without fanfare or useless publicity, a sort of collective diplomacy is taking the place of the individual diplomacy that was for so long traditional.

The constructive results of this unremitting activity became apparent when the Foreign Ministers met last December. Faced

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with the grave and difficult problem of Berlin, the Ministers took less than three hours to reach agreement on a position which, although in no way provocative, is none the less firm and courageous. Such speed in reaching a unanimous decision would have been impossible had it not been for the constant joint effort made during the preceding months, as a result of which each government was able to keep itself thoroughly informed and to follow, through the record of the discussions, the development of the ideas and attitudes of the other members of the Alliance.

II

The decisions taken with regard to Berlin and Germany were wise. The Ministers were right in affirming that unilateral denunciation of international undertakings cannot be permitted; such practice inevitably destroys confidence and makes it impossible to achieve a stable peace. They were also right in stating that the party which unilaterally denounces a treaty does not thereby cease to be bound by the obligations to which it is committed, and even less does its illegal action nullify the rights which the other contracting parties enjoy.

Nevertheless, we must not delude ourselves that, because all of this is perfectly true, it offers any solution to our problems. The certainty that we have right on our side can serve to reassure our consciences and strengthen our resolve, but it will not bring us any nearer to a solution. We must face the facts: as long as the Soviets are our opponents, we cannot solve the problems of Berlin and Germany by having recourse to the texts of treaties. Political questions are involved and only political solutions will avail.

The Ministers showed logic and wisdom in asserting that the Berlin situation must be examined against the background of the German problem as a whole and that once the latter is solved the former will cease to exist. They were also right in expressing their willingness to negotiate on this basis.

It is here that the situation becomes more complicated. The Soviets were well prepared for their latest manœuvre and they have made the most of their opportunity. Since the beginning of the year they have been sending the Western countries more and more detailed notes on the German problem and in their eagerness, or apparent eagerness, to settle it they have even submitted a draft peace treaty with Germany to 27 governments. All this

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diplomatic literature is interesting and even useful, for it enables us to take our bearings.

In my opinion, two conclusions are inescapable. Both are of major significance and both are fraught with consequences. The first is that in the present state of affairs—and I stress the word "present"—an agreement on Germany appears almost impossible. The second is that the proposal for a peace treaty with Germany throws us into a real diplomatic hassle. I am convinced that the Soviets will never accept the West's terms for the reunification of Germany, while we on our part will find it impossible to agree to theirs. The West says, "Let us organize free elections throughout Germany—free according to our understanding of the word. The government so chosen shall be free to adopt its own policies. If it opts for the Atlantic Alliance, we shall offer the U.S.S.R. a European security treaty which will make it safe from all aggression." The Soviet Union replies, "Recognize that there are two Germanys. Decide that they must confederate and that this confederation is to be neutralized and demilitarized."

I repeat that I think there is no possibility that the Russians will ever agree to reunification through free elections. We would not be able to reach an understanding with them on the way in which such free elections should be conducted; indeed, the very term "free elections" as used by the two sides has completely different meanings. In any case the Soviets would not accept as valid the results of elections in which 50,000,000 inhabitants of West Germany would participate with less than 20,000,000 East Germans. An election which resulted in the disappearance of a Communist state and was tantamount to a rejection of the Communist system would have enormous repercussions throughout Eastern Europe and beyond. It is inconceivable that the Soviets, recognizing the importance and the dangers of such a test, would expose themselves to it. We, on the other hand, could not agree to a situation created in violation of international undertakings and in effect condemning millions of human beings to live under a régime which they detest. That mistake we have committed before. Having seen what it leads to, we cannot repeat it.

What, then, must we do? First of all, we must take stock of the impasse in which we find ourselves. The two sides have adopted courses of action—each with its own logic—which can never be fused, because they are based on two irreconcilable points of view.

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I see only one possibility of compromise. We must convince the Russians that once Germany was reunified our concept of European security would be wholly different from what it is today. For purposes of this hypothesis it would matter little how reunification was brought about, whether by free elections, a joint decision or a process involving several stages. Many of the things which the Russians are either protesting or proposing and which today are difficult or impossible to accept—a qualified disengagement, a controlled demilitarized zone, a non-aggression pact between the NATO powers and the members of the Warsaw Pact—all these would then become conceivable and practicable. Having once agreed in principle to the reunification of Germany, the Russians might be willing to discuss European security. Perhaps the offer we could make them along these lines would be sufficiently attractive to persuade them to alter their basic position. This, at any rate, is the direction in which negotiations ought to move.

III

The draft peace treaty with Germany drawn up by the U.S.S.R. is an extremely interesting document. It takes us on a remarkable journey into the past, offering us an uncanny glimpse of what we would doubtless have been led to do in 1945 if we had wanted to sign a peace treaty with vanquished Germany immediately after the war. With bewildering intellectual agility, the Russians obliterate 12 years of international life and unabashedly propose that we treat Germany today as we would have treated the Germany of Hitler.

This is obviously out of the question. How is it possible in 1959 to imagine the Soviet Union, the United States and all their allies of the Second World War ranged on one side of a conference table and Germany alone on the other—the victors imposing a *diktat* on the vanquished in the manner of the Treaty of Versailles? It would be exceedingly dangerous to resuscitate so many ghosts. We must resolutely refuse to be drawn into this diplomatic imbroglio. Other ways must be found to settle the problems which have been pending since the end of the war.

Yet we must realize that if we do not reach a solution of the German problem as a whole we will again be confronted with the problem of an isolated Berlin. We must understand, further, that it is a matter of the utmost gravity.

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The reasons which prompted the Soviets to raise the Berlin issue are not easy to understand. Whatever they may have been, our resolve must not be shaken. The lesson of Hitler must not be forgotten. The world's great mistake prior to 1939 was not Munich. Its great mistake was to allow the Rhineland to be reoccupied by Germany in 1936 in violation of treaty provisions. At that time it would not have taken much to nip all Hitler's ambitious plans in the bud, thereby altering the course of history and in all probability sparing the world the tragedy of the Second World War. We lacked foresight and perhaps courage as well. It required much more courage later to make up for our mistake.

We must not allow Berlin to become the first act of a tragedy whose final act is a third world war. It is true that the West's rights in Berlin had their origin in wartime agreements, but this is not the essential consideration; what is essential is the existence of more than 2,000,000 Berliners who a few weeks ago gave evidence of their will to live in freedom, who have rejected Communism, its rules and its laws. If we were to abandon them today, on what grounds could we claim to defend other free men, to defend our very selves, tomorrow?

West Berlin cannot be abandoned. It cannot be left isolated—an island which could all too easily be submerged in the Communist sea. Whatever the solution envisaged, it must be accompanied by genuinely effective guarantees, the surest of which is obviously the presence of Western troops. It is ridiculous to maintain that such troops, numbering a few thousand, are a threat to the security of the Communist world. Their presence means only one thing, but that one thing is essential—namely, that in the event of aggression the beleaguered inhabitants of the city can count on the effective support of NATO. Only the continued presence of these troops can guarantee that vital requirement of West Berlin, its freedom of communication. No verbal guarantee, no treaty provision can take the place of this physical presence. On this point we must be unyielding. Such a presence can, however, be based not on the principle of occupation but on a new agreement or on a mandate from the United Nations.

Our firmness on the basic issue will enable us—if the Russians really feel that they can benefit from a change in the status quo—to explore compromise formulas for bringing such a change into effect.

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IV

We cannot, however, let the diplomatic problems confronting us at the moment cause us to lose sight of what might be called our "perennial worries." Among these can be included everything relating to atomic armaments.

One segment of European public opinion, though it is progressively weakening, continues to oppose the idea of equipping the armies of Europe with atomic weapons. Those who take this position are wrong. They are wrong not only because such a position is indefensible from a military standpoint, but also because it does not, as they suppose, serve the cause of peace.

From the military standpoint it is profoundly illogical to acknowledge the need for an army yet refuse to provide it with effective weapons. How, indeed, could European armies which were denied atomic weapons fight an enemy who possessed them in every size and kind and who did not intend to refrain from using them? Such forces simply would not have a chance. And that settles the argument. In the absence of an agreement on general and controlled disarmament we must either adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament, which would most certainly ensure Soviet supremacy throughout the world, or we must make up our minds to take the military measures which, by enabling us to restore the balance between the Communist forces and those of the free world, will deter aggression and strengthen peace.

What many people today apparently fail to realize is that the problem for an aggressor is not how to drop a certain number of atomic bombs on enemy territory. That is possible and relatively easy. The real problem an aggressor faces is how to destroy at one and the same time all bases from which possible retaliatory attacks might be launched. For if he cannot be sure of doing this, he can be certain of the punitive action that will be taken against him. This being the case, it is obvious that the more bases there are from which reprisals could be launched, the less will be the danger of aggression. In short, if balanced disarmament cannot be achieved, a balance of terror is better than no balance at all.

Nevertheless, equipping Europe's armies with atomic weapons raises some new problems. During these past years the responsibility for atomic retaliation has rested primarily on the United States and to a lesser extent on the United Kingdom, the members of the Atlantic Alliance which alone possessed atomic weap-

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ons and which, moreover, still kept them under government control. Of late, however, the situation has been changing as European armies, or at least some of them, have been receiving tactical and, more recently, strategic nuclear weapons. Continental Europe's ability to play an effective part in atomic retaliation is now a fact. Would it not be legitimate, then, to give Europe some share of the responsibility for the conduct of this kind of warfare?

Common sense dictates an affirmative reply. It is difficult to see how a member of the Alliance can agree to have long-range atomic missiles based on its soil without having some share in the responsibility for their use. This in turn raises the whole problem of determining what authority is to decide for the Alliance whether atomic weapons will be used in a particular situation. I have the impression that up to now this problem has not been clearly stated and that it is for this reason that we have become involved in lengthy and needless controversy.

It seems to me that there are only two conceivable hypotheses and that in either case the answer is easy. On the one hand, we may be the victims of a surprise atomic attack, in which case there will be no question of hesitating, for atomic counterattack must be automatic. Consultation will be neither necessary nor possible. On the other hand, it may be that the aggression against us will not be launched suddenly and will not involve the use of atomic weapons. In other words, we may be faced with a so-called "conventional" war. Although our military authorities have been telling us for years that in such a war we would have to use our atomic weapons in order to restore the balance of forces, consultation within NATO would not only be perfectly possible but imperative. It should not be difficult to decide now on the procedure for such consultation.

Nevertheless, these common-sense solutions seem to be running head on into stubborn forces of nationalism and individualism within the Alliance. Despite what I should have thought was the dazzlingly clear lesson of history, the governments of the free peoples are not yet ready to seek security and salvation through integration. The most they will agree to is coördination and coöperation.

Yet is it not contradictory to say to an ally, "I insist on sharing all your secrets, knowing your innermost thoughts, but I intend to keep my own freedom of action; I agree to consult with you but I retain all my rights to do as I see fit?" Here we are faced

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with the real weakness of the Atlantic Alliance in every sphere—the lack of unity. This is the problem which we are up against whether we are dealing with scientific research, armaments production, aid to underdeveloped countries, military organization or the conduct of diplomacy. We still jealously guard our individuality. I fully appreciate the very genuine values which this encompasses; yet I realize, too, what it is costing us in duplicated effort, both intellectual and financial, what it means in terms of wasted energy and how difficult it makes it for us to get results.

Let us take the example of France, which is doing all over again in the atomic field, alone or almost alone, what has already been done by the United States and the United Kingdom. France is spending and is being obliged to spend billions of francs and a wealth of intellectual energy on the task of discovering for itself what its allies already know.

It will succeed, but at what a sacrifice! Would it not be wiser to spare France such effort and thus free it to devote its energies to the common good? This would imply, of course, the conviction that there exists today a real community of interest among the members of the Alliance which must be served with the same energy, love and pride that for centuries have been put at the service of each individual country. I know that at present this is a dream. Yet the dream must one day become a reality, for it is on this reality that our future depends. Of that I am convinced.

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SOVIET AIMS AND GERMAN UNITY

By Franz-Josef Strauss

WHOEVER undertakes to write about today's besetting problems of world politics would do well to be on his guard against two errors in particular. He should not lose sight of the larger context in which selected facts and events are set. And he should not confuse what may be his own wishful thinking with what is real or possible. For us Germans, that means that we must not consider the German problem, difficult and important as it is, to be the only problem.

The present tension between East and West cannot be seen as something separate from historical events since 1917. Nor can one examine the facts and consequences of the cold war apart from the political repercussions of the technical revolution of our time, or apart from the ideological principles of Soviet policy.

There is no doubt that Germany has occupied a key position in the eyes of all the Bolshevik rulers since Lenin's day. That was true for the Weimar Republic and the Hitler régime, and it was well demonstrated by the Russo-German pact of August 1939. For Hitler, that pact opened the way to aggression against Poland and consequently to the Second World War, but the price of Soviet neutrality demanded of Hitler was a considerable part of Poland, all the Baltic states, a free hand against Finland, a large sphere of influence in the Balkans and other concessions. Indeed, Stalin hoped to be the real victor in a war which he felt was bound to lead to the exhaustion of Germany and the other Western powers. According to Soviet ideology, it was a war of imperialists—the last manifestation of the struggle of capitalist against capitalist—and thus a decisive stage on the way to capitalist suicide and Communist victory throughout the world.

If war does not come of itself, said Lenin in 1920, it must be provoked and abetted. "If we are obliged to tolerate such scoundrels as the capitalist thieves, each of whom is preparing to plunge a knife into us, it is our direct duty to make them turn their knives against each other."[1] Stalin was a prominent exponent of this thesis, holding that the Soviet Union could not ignore a war between non-Communist nations, but that it would interfere only at the finish, in order to throw decisive weight into the

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Selected Works" (New York: International Publishers, 1943), v. 8, p. 288.

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scales and so shift the balance of power. In Lenin's case, such an attitude was perhaps understandable in view of the circumstances prevailing at the time, but it is an attitude that is central to the Bolshevik doctrine of world revolution.

After the battle of Stalingrad the Soviet Union was the greatest land power in Europe, and could be certain of victory. It is extremely interesting to see how Stalin, unlike the Western statesmen, saw his actual goal not merely in a military victory over Germany, but in the acquisition of strategic positions which would reinforce postwar Soviet policy. As the Red Army advanced, it conducted its operations in such a manner that military objectives became political springboards to greater power.

What were the aims of Soviet policy in Germany before and after the German capitulation? The answer may help us to avoid reading into Soviet proposals or notes what we would like to see there.

The Western powers had no uniform conception of what should be done with Germany after its defeat. Dismemberment or a unified administration—that was the question. Initially, Stalin agreed to dismemberment, which would have given the Soviet Union about 40 percent of the 1937 Reich territory in accordance with the plans drafted by the European Advisory Commission in January 1944 for the demarcation of the zones of occupation. At that time, the German armies were still deep in Russia. At both the Tehran and Yalta Conferences, the predominant idea was to split up Germany and create several German states, although the final solution was deferred to a postwar conference. But when the Soviet armies stood at the Elbe in May 1945, Stalin's interest in carving up Germany had dwindled considerably. He held not only all the eastern and southeastern countries, with the exception of Greece and Turkey, but also most of that part of Germany that was to fall to him. From that time on, he turned his attention more to gaining influence over all of Germany, including, for instance, the Ruhr, which was economically and strategically so important to him. German unity was suddenly an important political weapon to be used towards his own ends.

Thus it is that we find three Soviet demands included in all postwar conferences intended to find a common solution to the German problem: 1, reparations in the sum of $10 billion, partly out of current production; 2, Soviet participation in the control of the Ruhr; and 3, the "democratization" of Germany in the

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Western zone in the same manner as in the Russian zone. These demands clearly reflect the aims of Soviet policy in Germany, especially as set forth at the Paris, Moscow and London Conferences of Foreign Ministers in 1946 and 1947. Their objective was Soviet control of the whole of Germany and increased influence in all of Western Europe.

In February 1946, Mr. James Byrnes, then Secretary of State, laid before the other Foreign Ministers the draft of a four-power treaty providing for 25-year control and disarmament of Germany. That plan envisaged the rehabilitation of one German state, without arms and militarily neutral. Mr. Byrnes said that a disarmed Germany would never run the risk of refusing to obey an order from allied headquarters, knowing that such disobedience would bring the air forces of one or more of the four powers over its territory within a few hours. Molotov called for an extension of the control period to 40 years. Mr. Byrnes agreed. It was only when Molotov demanded the reparations cited above and Soviet participation in the control of the Ruhr that he refused.

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers saw a re-play of the same scene between Mr. George Marshall and Molotov. Obviously the neutralization and disarmament of Germany were not the paramount Soviet aims at the time. What they wanted was something else—an open door to the West. Herein lay the decisive conflict of interests, the reason that none of the postwar conferences succeeded in reaching agreement.

Even as late as May 1949 Mr. Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, made one last endeavor. On May 23, there was published what was later to become the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany—the statute for the fusion of the three Western zones of occupation into one state. On the very same day, the four Foreign Ministers met in Paris. Mr. Acheson proposed that the Basic Law be made valid throughout Germany and invited the Soviet Union to join the Allied High Commission. He declared that the powers reserved in the Occupation Statute should not be exercised in such a manner that the German government was prevented from enjoying growing liberty. The German government must be accorded the opportunity of allying itself peacefully with other nations politically and economically but not militarily.

Vyshinsky, who represented the Soviet Union at the time, emphatically declined to accept this proposal. On the other hand,

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the Western powers were no longer willing to wait. They put all their energies into founding the state known today as the Federal Republic of Germany.

Quite naturally, the Soviet refusal to agree to a unified Germany on reasonable terms led to increasing economic distress and human misery as a result of the conflicting measures introduced by the occupying powers and the fact that the four zones of occupation had been hermetically sealed off from one another. Economic paralysis and the necessity of accommodating millions of German refugees and expellees—the Federal Republic, with an original population of 40 million, absorbed about 10 million—were bound to create a dangerous state of affairs. Radicalism was bred by despair. Throughout the world, the Soviet Union has made a good thing out of radicalism growing from bad social and economic conditions; it cherished the same hope in Germany.

The failure of the Foreign Ministers Conferences at Paris and Moscow resolved the Americans and the British to fuse at least their two zones of occupation. Mr. Byrnes called this step the "last way out." The effect on the Soviet Union was unmistakable. At the London Conference, Molotov ascribed to the Anglo-American plan "the tendency to build up the Western part of Germany as a base for the expansion in Europe of American imperialistic influence" and "as a strategic stronghold for the adventurous and aggressive plans of American imperialism."

II

This background to the division of Germany should be borne in mind when we examine ways and means of solving the problems confronting us today. The origin of all our problems can be traced back to the Hitler years and to the initial period following Germany's capitulation. A careful historical analysis of Soviet policy in Europe, and especially in Germany, is particularly important for those who are trying to make intelligent proposals to overcome the split in Europe, and who sometimes fall into the error of regarding the present political tension and the conditions existing in Europe as a natural consequence of the conflicting interests of two major powers. An analysis of this kind should be an easy matter for those who played an active part in the political decisions taken during the latter years of the war and the initial postwar period.

Soviet policy towards Germany has not changed in substance

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in the ensuing period. All the Russian proposals and notes reiterated the same aim again and again: not only to prevent any political alliance between Germany and the West, but to extend Soviet influence to the whole of Germany. That also applies to the Soviet draft of a German peace treaty, presented in January of this year.

It is true that in the years since the founding of the Federal Republic, the Soviets have made two new proposals and have dropped some demands which no longer seemed to conform to the times. When the E.D.C. agreement was about to be signed in 1952, they proposed that Germany be allowed to maintain national forces for her self-defense. Anyone studying the Soviet provisions regarding the strength and armaments of these forces must reach the conclusion that it was not a military defense force that was meant, but a police force, which would be hopelessly inadequate if the Americans withdrew from Europe as the Soviet leaders hoped. Second, playing once again on the desire for German unity, the Russians suggested forming a confederation of the two German states. The demand for reparations was dropped.

Now, the inter-relationship between the German problem and that of European security is often stressed. It is said that German unity must be reëstablished in conformity with European security or within a European security system. But first we must try to see what the term European security means. In a world that has shrunk and become indivisible, there is no such thing as a specifically European security. Historical experience and modern technology deny its reality. Both world wars started in Europe and ended by encompassing the globe. A European security pact, no matter what its provisions or safeguards, would be meaningless without complete agreement by the two major powers. The mere physical existence and proximity of the Soviet Union, as the chief protagonist of the doctrine of world revolution and the strongest military power in Eurasia, would have irrevocable consequences if the United States forces were withdrawn. They would leave a weak and militarily disintegrated Europe composed of more than 15 small states cramped together in a very narrow area.

In this situation it would be a dangerous illusion to rely on American intercontinental missiles, a weapon intended to maintain the balance of power and to act as a deterrent. Those who speak of the atomic stalemate should be the first to admit that the threat of deterrence by megaton weapons is no longer a pana-

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cea. The strategy of deterrence is, after all, contingent upon three factors: 1, the possession of the weapons; 2, the determination to use them; and 3, the existence of a cause strong enough to justify their use in the eyes of public opinion at home and to make the probability of their use appear reasonably certain to the other side. If any one of these factors is missing, then the strategy of deterrence loses all sense and value.

Now, one of the characteristics peculiar to Communist aggression is the fact that the use of force is always accompanied by political measures. "The use of force must always be ushered in, accompanied, and continued, by non-aggressive techniques of conflict (agitation, propaganda, elections, infiltration, sabotage, and other methods), partly to lessen the risks involved in the use of violence (terror, unrest, armed sabotage, uprisings, guerrilla war, blackmail by the threat of war, war itself, and so on), and partly to achieve a more telling effect when using violence."[2] Therefore, we can expect that the justification for our employing thermonuclear weapons will be made as obscure as possible by a Communist aggressor.

In the light of these considerations, I should like to warn my readers against the misconception that a specifically European security is possible as long as the present world tension continues. Security has become just as indivisible as the peace of the world. This means that regional security pacts can be effective only if the security of the region concerned is guaranteed against aggression from outside. And even formal guarantees are very difficult to achieve in the absence of some measure of trust.

Whenever the German question is discussed, the security requirements of the Soviet Union are always stressed as a factor of particular importance. I cannot try to determine here to what extent Soviet concern for security against Germany is genuine and to what extent it is being exploited as a political weapon. But in the face of the menacing Soviet statements that the whole of Europe could be razed within the course of a few hours and that any place on earth could be devastated by intercontinental missiles, it is difficult to believe in the sincerity of their security demands. Soviet propaganda, as always, continues to operate with two completely different arguments, depending upon the

[2] "Methodologie der Eroberung und des Herrschens," by John S. Reshetar, Jr., Stefan T. Possony and W. W. Kulski, in "Handbuch des Weltkommunismus," compiled by Joseph M. Bocheński and Gerhart Niemeyer (Munich: Alber, 1958), p. 171–172.

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recipient. It warns the world at large about the dangers of German militarism and attempts to turn the former anti-Hitler coalition into a present anti-German coalition. Mr. Mikoyan made wide use of this argument during his visit to the United States. At the same time, Soviet propaganda beamed to Germany warns the Germans about the dangers of letting themselves be used as cannon fodder by the American imperialists, and recalls the glorious and fruitful period of the Russo-German military alliance.

What is the Soviet Union afraid of? A German militarism that could once again threaten and subjugate all Germany's neighbors? If so, the Soviet Union should welcome the integration of the German forces in Europe or in NATO, since this means that they are not under German national command and that they are incapable of independent action in the absence of ordnance and supply bases of their own. Or perhaps the Soviet Union is afraid that the Western powers might misuse Germany's military potential to support an attack against Russia. If so, the problem is not fear of German militarism, but distrust of its wartime allies. The interpretation placed by Khrushchev on the 1938 Munich agreement and the 1939 Russo-German pact would seem to indicate the latter. In that case, however, Russia's security problem is neither German nor European; it is universal. And it is further proof that there is no such thing as a specifically European security problem, but only a world-wide and indivisible problem.

As for the extent to which the Soviet's alleged security requirements are being used as a propaganda weapon to further Russian expansion, we would do well to keep in mind Trotsky's words in his history of the Russian Revolution: "The attacking side is nearly always interested in appearing to be on the defensive. The revolutionary party is interested in the camouflage of legality." And Stalin echoed him: "The revolution veiled its offensive actions with the cloak of defense in order to attract to its banner undecided or vacillating elements."

III

For many people, the magic formula by which it is believed that the European security problem, the cold war and German reunification can be solved is disengagement. In this field, there is an abundance of plans and planners. The Rapacki Plan is a kind of disengagement, although one may well ask whether it was hatched in Moscow or in Warsaw.

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I do not wish to say anything against planners or plans. Their efforts are doubtless well meant. But the publication of plans for solving difficult problems is open to the danger that we may become hobbled by them, giving the other side a tactical advantage in negotiations. And so far, all the plans we have seen have had the fatal disadvantage of being completely one-sided in a double sense of the word. Either the Soviet Union does not react to them at all, so that their life and success are mere figments of the imagination of those who drafted them, or they deal with only part of a problem without heed to its relation to other questions involved. For instance, the Soviet statement that the Rapacki Plan is conducive to promoting reunification (*i.e.* an agreement between the two German states in a confederation) means absolutely nothing, or sounds hollow in view of the fact that in any negotiations the rulers of the so-called German Democratic Republic would be following to the letter instructions issued by Moscow.

Disengagement is not an end in itself. Military disengagement alone would achieve nothing unless it contained the prerequisites for solving other questions. The one-sided disengagement in Korea, for instance, culminated in war. In Europe, where the two major powers, equipped with the most modern weapons, face one another across the Iron Curtain, the danger of war has been least. But at other points around the world, where a vacuum has created a playground for the pursuit of adventurous politics, the danger of war has several times been acute. Assuredly, a state of military engagement is no ideal, but it is better than a false disengagement.

I do not by any means intend to suggest that disengagement is a useless idea, but only that we must guard against ascribing to it a magical quality that is not justified by our experience in Europe and elsewhere. We must candidly recognize the danger that words or concepts may become fetishes and acquire a life of their own which contradicts reality. Military disengagement can be regarded as a solution only if both sides are prepared to enter into *political* disengagement.

Let us be clear about cause and effect. The existence of NATO is not the cause of Soviet forces being in Eastern Europe; it was the policy pursued by the Soviets after the Second World War that led to the creation of NATO and, later, to the inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany. If it had not been for the acute

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problem of defending Europe, which critically requires the participation of Germany, and if it had not been for the fact that the Soviet Union had started as early as 1950 to establish military organizations in her zone with the aim of promoting civil war, there would not to this day be a single German soldier in the Federal Republic.

The engagement of the Soviet Union in Central Europe led to the re-engagement of the Western powers, especially of the United States, and not vice versa. This must be clearly stressed once and for all. It is strange that the very people who always consider strategic thinking to be antithetical to political solutions, and who warn people not to make political solutions more difficult by introducing military considerations, should be the very ones to consider military disengagement the only solution, without taking account of the need for political disengagement.

Now, I do not mean that NATO is an end in itself, or that its continued existence should become dogma, with eternal validity. I do, however, believe that NATO is a necessity born of the situation. We can and must reëxamine it from time to time to determine whether the conditions that made it a necessity still exist. If the Soviet Union is prepared to normalize political conditions in Europe—and this includes German reunification with free elections—then naturally we should provide the opportunity to negotiate. Indeed, we should offer the U.S.S.R. proposals which recognize its need to avoid losing face, which do not prejudice the stability of its rule, and which give it certain political and economic advantages. But any form of argument that places the blame for the present situation on the West's unwillingness to accept disengagement surely puts things upside down. It is true that we should be prepared to run certain military risks for the sake of reaching agreement, but not until both sides are ready to accept political disengagement.

All the most hopeful measures for increasing world security—reduction of forces, control and inspection to lessen the danger of surprise attack, and eventual disarmament—all these depend on a certain measure of confidence, since the value of technical controls alone is limited. Such confidence can never be created without a willingness to disengage politically. And this includes the willingness to restore to the German people the right of self-determination. Even if it is assumed that the political status of Germany and the extent of its armament are to be determined by

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the major powers with the consent of the German people, the point must come when free elections have to be held. The decisive question here is not whether free elections should constitute the very first step, but that they should take place while they can still be free.

It is a truism to say that the West and the Soviet Union mean entirely different things by the term free elections. At the end of World War II, statesmen in the West were highly gratified when Stalin, by signing the joint declaration on liberated Europe, agreed to set up democratic institutions and to hold free elections in Central and Eastern Europe. They were very much surprised at the form those free elections took under Soviet management. So, wherever the Soviet Union holds military preponderance and can consequently play her two-sided game of political pressuring accompanied by the threat of force, there are no longer any elections involving a genuine choice.

IV

I do not think much of the overly clever proposals designed somehow to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces and thereby the gradual liberation of the inhabitants of the area without, as it were, the Soviets noticing. Anyone who champions this view must add one illusion to another: namely, that the Soviet Union would be deterred by world opinion from sending her troops back into the area concerned.

It is not merely Communism's "socialist achievements" which are at stake. State ownership of the means of production is one of the essential features of the Communist social order, but not the only one. It is certainly not the main concern of the Soviet Union to establish what is already quite common in democratic countries. Rather, the U.S.S.R. aims to gain a degree of control which will make it possible to eliminate the rights and liberties of the citizen and to render each nation increasingly dependent upon Moscow.

The Soviet Union may do nothing for a considerable time to come; after all, it has time to await a favorable opportunity. But when it comes, nothing on earth will stop the Russians from giving their armies the order to march. We can be sure that if this happens, it will occur at a moment when the attention of the world is diverted or when the Western democracies are rendered incapable of decisive action because of political or economic diffi-

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culties. That is why a military balance of power in Europe is mandatory. A military balance of power does not mean arithmetical equality, but it does imply comparable forces such that each side can adequately defend itself.

I do not share the opinion that the West should not or cannot negotiate with the Soviets because their conception of faithfulness to an agreement in practice is different from ours. On the contrary, we must negotiate with them wherever, whenever and on whatever subject possible. But in reaching decisions involving life and death or bondage or liberty for entire nations, it would be wrong to be satisfied with one-sided Soviet interpretation of treaties or to waive effective guarantees and the physical ability to take counter-measures if agreements are broken. While distrust must not be allowed to go so far as to render negotiations impossible, trustfulness must not be so strong that we rely on signatures alone.

Yet, even with a military balance of power in Europe, we have cause to be alarmed. Europe is split in two, Germany is divided, and politics cannot continually be balanced on the point of a bayonet. With all caution and in spite of all mistrust, solutions must be sought enabling humanity to live together side by side, so that both individuals and communities can develop their abilities in freedom and without fear.

The aims of Western policy in Europe might be outlined as follows:

1. To halt any further expansion of Soviet influence in Europe.
2. To create stable conditions by ending the partition of Germany.
3. To reduce the danger of military conflict by controlled disarmament.
4. To create conditions conducive to economic stability by reducing expenditure for armaments.

How can these necessary aims be reached? Politics is the art of the possible. The question, then, is how the necessary can be made possible.

Negotiations should be conducted on the basic principles and aims of the policies pursued by both sides. Misinterpretation of past policies might be quashed, distrust removed and the cold war gradually brought to an end. Such negotiations would serve not only to create the right atmosphere for political solutions, but also to offer points of departure for such solutions. Possibly

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the Soviet Union could convince the West that world revolution is no longer the motive behind its actions, while the West could persuade the Soviet Union that our aim is to uphold and protect a free social order, not to eliminate Communism by military force.

Once discussions have produced points of contact, it should be possible to proceed with better hope for success in the areas of nuclear testing, surprise attack and disarmament. We might also find out at last on what conditions the Soviet Union would be willing to restore the right of self-determination to the German people. Hitherto we have always had to content ourselves with hearing that this or that "might be conducive" to the restoration of German unity. But the Soviets have never said precisely how the unification of Germany could be brought about.

To be sure, it would have to be something more than their concept of confederation, which implies that the problems of Central Europe can be solved by a solo trip of German leaders to Moscow. For such a course would be inconsistent with the real distribution of political power in the world. We can solve the German problem only in community with the West and in the certainty that the members of this community can depend on one another. The requirements are patience, persistence and good will.

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TOWARD MORE STABLE MONEY

By Per Jacobsson

THE last days of 1958 provided the most spectacular move that has occurred in the monetary sphere since the end of the war; no less than 12 European countries simultaneously introduced "non-resident" or external convertibility of their currencies. The essence of this move is that non-resident holders of these currencies can now use them freely to purchase any other currencies, including dollars. At one time it was thought that such a degree of convertibility would be feasible only if rates were allowed to fluctuate within fairly broad margins. That idea has now been abandoned; rates in the exchange markets will fluctuate only within narrow margins—maintained if necessary by the intervention of central banks or exchange funds. As a result of this development, the basis has been laid for currency stability over a very wide area.

One of the countries, namely Western Germany, has gone further, and has extended to its own citizens the same freedom to purchase foreign currencies as is granted to non-resident holders, although it has not dismantled its system of exchange control. In practice, other countries, too, may go beyond the limits of external convertibility, and in certain circumstances extend the right of convertibility to their nationals. Although external convertibility of sterling does not apply to residents of the sterling area, in practice the monetary authorities in that area have been allowed great freedom to change their sterling holdings in London into other currencies.

When these 12 European countries introduced external convertibility, the European Payments Union lapsed and was replaced by the European Monetary Agreement. The former has done a great deal of good work over the ten years it has been in operation, but it was technically so constituted that it could not continue to operate under a system of external convertibility. The European Monetary Agreement was drawn up in 1955 when the introduction of external convertibility was first envisaged; it was to become operative in place of the E.P.U. the moment that external convertibility was established. However, adverse circumstances then and in the following three years delayed the taking of this major step. A suitable opportunity presented itself toward

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the end of 1958 when the French authorities were anxious to adjust their currency system before the Common Market came into effect on January 1, 1959, and while the de Gaulle government was still in possession of full powers in the financial field. For the British, the approach of the seasonally strong period in the balance of payments, which covers the first five months of the year, also made the end of 1958 an appropriate moment to take a step that they had been contemplating for some time. It was very important that the opportunity should be grasped, for any further postponement would have meant still further delay in moving toward full convertibility.

With the introduction of external convertibility, multiple exchange rates in Europe have virtually disappeared together with the need for official permission for a number of transactions; not the least important aspect of this step has therefore been the elimination of a great deal of red tape in relation to foreign payments. External convertibility does not in itself imply greater freedom of trade, but the very fact that so many countries in Europe could agree on these currency steps at a time when discussions on the future of their trade relations were distinctly acrimonious may be expected to have a very useful psychological impact. In these matters there is a close interaction: the genuine value of a currency cannot really be known before trade moves freely, and, conversely, the strengthening of currencies, of which convertibility is a sign, invalidates many arguments which are often advanced in favor of trade restrictions. Now that countries can, if they wish, convert their earnings in all the main currencies into dollars, they no longer have any reason to be specially concerned about their balance in relation to the dollar area as such. In other words, the famous "balance of payments reasons," so often brought forward in the GATT negotiations, have lost a very great deal of their validity.

Moreover, the greater freedom in payments has already in fact been accompanied in some countries by the further relaxation of restrictions on imports, and in other countries moves in this direction have been announced for the near future.

At the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in Montreal last September, the British Government announced the removal of virtually all remaining restrictions on dollar imports of raw materials, basic foodstuffs and industrial goods, and declared its intention of making a start this year in freeing dollar

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imports of consumer goods and remaining foodstuffs. In France, the devaluation of the franc, the move to external convertibility and various internal measures, including budgetary economies, permitted a relaxation of the severe import controls previously in force; from the beginning of this year imports have been liberalized up to 90 percent for France's European partners, and by more than 50 percent for the dollar area.

When we try to answer the question what developments made these currency moves possible, and whether the moves are likely to be successful in the future, we must look back upon the monetary position in the years immediately after World War II.

A great war cannot be conducted without inflation, but the techniques of control adopted during the Second World War were remarkably effective in keeping down costs and prices. The result was that at the end of the war, in 1945, most countries were left with excessive liquidity—with more money in the form of notes, deposits and other liquid assets than was warranted by the supply of goods and services available at the prices then applying; a situation commonly referred to as too much money chasing too few goods. Faced with such a situation the authorities had open to them two alternative lines of action. One was to cut down the money supply by a sudden harsh measure; this was the course taken in Western Germany where, in the summer of 1948, 90 percent of the value of notes and bank deposits was cancelled overnight—a painful but in its way very effective remedy. The other course, adopted in most countries, was to achieve balance more gradually by combining increased output of goods and services and higher prices with the enforcement of firm credit measures which would prevent the money supply from increasing at the same pace as the gross national product. In most countries it was not easy to give up cheap money policies, and to restrict credit through higher interest rates and other measures; but public opinion has become increasingly tired of inflation, and this change in the attitude of the public has made it possible for the authorities almost everywhere to take steps which a few years ago would have seemed out of the question.

In Great Britain, for instance, the bank rate was raised in 1957 to 7 percent—the highest rate ever applied in peacetime. Similarly, the government's firm attitude at the time of the bus strike in the summer of 1958 did much to persuade public opinion that continuous cost increases on a large scale would, and should, no

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longer be tolerated. Over the whole period 1946 to 1958, the gross national product of the United Kingdom rose by 131 percent, while the money supply increased by only 19 percent and, over the last five years, has in fact been kept almost constant. For Western Europe as a whole, total output rose in *volume* between 1947 and 1957 by 70 percent; prices rose by 67 percent, and in recent years the increase in the money supply has on the whole been kept within narrow limits. These results could not have been achieved without cautious fiscal and credit policies, and due attention to the movements of wage costs.

It is not surprising that those countries which after the war were the first to discard cheap money and to adopt, instead, flexible credit policies included several which, like Italy and Germany, had suffered most from inflation in the past. When the official discount rate in Germany was raised to 6 percent in 1950, and 8 to 11 percent had to be paid for bank credits, there were many who feared that such high interest rates would greatly curtail the volume of investment—and thus reduce the rate of expansion. But it was soon found that the cautious monetary policies had just the contrary effect; they helped to improve monetary confidence and, indeed, to increase the flow of savings which formed the basis for a high volume of investment. In that way it was proved that economic expansion could not only be combined with, but was in fact stimulated by, monetary stability. Example being more effective than precept, other countries began to take heed, and within a few years a flexible monetary policy had regained its proper place as an indispensable part of the general economic and fiscal policies of most countries.

That these European countries have been able to make this recent step forward in the monetary field is due in the first place to their own efforts; but they have also been greatly helped by some important external factors. In addition to Marshall aid, which was so helpful in the period of postwar reconstruction, these countries have recently benefited from the decline in the prices of primary products, from the favorable repercussions of certain policies in the United States, and from the activities of the International Monetary Fund.

II

A consideration of these factors gives an opportunity to review their impact in a wider context, and to take into account their

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influence on general monetary issues. The decline in the prices of primary products has had the effect of improving the balance of payments position of industrialized countries, since they have been able to import more cheaply, while the prices of the finished products they export have been maintained, and even in some instances risen. It has also made it easier to keep down the general price level and the cost of living in these countries; in many cases it has also eased the task of the authorities in applying restrictive credit policies, since the lower level of raw material prices reduced the need for working capital to finance inventories and, hence, reduced the demand for credit from the banking system.

For the primary producers themselves, the effect of these price movements has, of course, been quite the opposite. Even when the volume of their exports could be increased or maintained, the amount they received in foreign exchange was generally reduced. These reductions were the more difficult to bear as these countries often had heavy fixed obligations in the form of debt service, etc. The primary producing countries have naturally sought international help to arrest the decline in the prices of their products; and there is a general feeling that the industrialized countries ought to do what they can to help bring about somewhat better conditions. With the improvement in the world business trend, it may be expected that the demand for primary products will increase again, and this should give some support to prices and in any case make it easier to dispose of accumulated stocks.

However, this is not a problem that arises only in connection with general cyclical fluctuations in world business conditions. The statistics show that the decline in raw material prices had already begun during the boom of 1956–57. This seems to indicate that we are also faced with some deep-seated structural changes. Wool and cotton—and especially cotton—have had to meet increasing competition from synthetic fibers; natural rubber has in the same way had to compete with synthetic rubber; the prices of several light metals, particularly copper, have felt the effect of competition from the growing output of aluminum; and the coffee producers of Latin America must cope with the increasing production of coffee in Africa, as well as the shift to instant coffee, which uses fewer coffee beans. These are all changes which have, in different degrees, affected individual primary producers, and, whatever may be the helpful influence of general measures of monetary policy, the structural difficulties require

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something more. Many primary producers are in fact faced with a long-term problem for which the only proper solution is probably a diversification of their own production, and for this they will need new capital and also better technical knowledge.

It is unfortunate that this decline in the prices of raw materials should have occurred just at the time when several primary producing countries have obtained their political independence. Their reduced earning capacity weakens their balances of payments and their increased economic difficulties accentuate their need for investment, not only for the diversification of their production but for the general expansion of their economies.

It is now increasingly recognized that the search for solutions to the problems of the less-developed countries requires action in many fields. For these countries, too, however, it is certain that sustained growth will best be ensured by monetary stability. Experience has shown that inflation does not for long produce any fresh internal resources to sustain investment. Moreover, it impairs the creditworthiness of the countries concerned and thus discourages the flow of foreign capital which they so badly need.

III

United States policies—the second outside factor which has influenced recent monetary developments in Europe—may usefully be considered against the background of Europe's fears with regard to the impact of fluctuations in the U.S. economy on the rest of the world. It has often been said that the American economy is prone to vacillate between extreme booms and depressions, or is, in other words, so volatile that it would be dangerous for other countries to link themselves too closely to the United States—an argument that has often been advanced in favor of fluctuating exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar. There is no doubt that this particular fear has greatly diminished in recent years. The fact that the postwar recessions have on the whole been rather mild, and in any case short-lived, has been taken to indicate that the U.S. economy has developed a considerable capacity to resist contracting influences. Moreover, the flexible monetary policies followed in the United States since 1951 have inspired confidence in the willingness of the United States to take the measures appropriate to each phase of the business cycle. The fact that the recent moves to convertibility in Europe have been made on the basis of stable exchange rates in relation to the dollar reflects this

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increased confidence in the stability of the American economy.

Another fear, of which much less has been heard in recent months, concerned the dangers of a persistent dollar shortage. This fear was based on a variety of arguments, not always impressive for their consistency. The most widely held opinion was that a recession in the United States would inevitably be accompanied by a scarcity of dollars for other countries. Now in this last recession of 1957–58, the contrary happened. In 1958, the outflow of gold from the United States amounted to about $2.2 billion and, at the same time, foreign holders increased their dollar balances by about $900 million. Those who have refused to believe in the inevitability of a structural or long-term dollar shortage (or whatever it has been called) have generally argued that the relatively high level of wages and living costs in the United States would, in the long run, make it easier for other countries to compete with American products. They also believed that the United States, for its own good reasons, was likely to pursue a policy of credit expansion at as high a rate as in other industrialized countries. As a matter of fact, in 1958 credit expansion in the United States was at a higher rate than that in Europe generally, and this has been of very great importance for developments here and elsewhere.

A careful examination of the situation in mid-1957 showed cause for some apprehension about the trend of affairs in the United States, and even elsewhere. The decline in raw material prices, the reappearance of surplus capacity in several lines of business, and the fact that for nearly two years there had been virtually no change in the total amount of demand deposits and currency outside of banks, resembled rather too much the situation which had prevailed in 1927–28, immediately preceding the Great Depression.

It could well be argued in 1957 that there was need for increased liquidity—not so much in the form of reserves held by central banks or governments (what is generally called "international liquidity") as in the form of credits provided by the private banking system, which determine the amount of cash resources within the economy. By the middle of 1957, the excess liquidity inherited from the war had been worked off in quite a number of countries and a fresh impetus was thought to be required through an expansion of bank credit which could gradually be transformed into effective purchasing power. It was only natural

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that those countries which were in a strong position, such as the United States, should have to take the lead in any expansionist policy.

The occasion for such a lead was provided when recession set in in the United States during the second half of 1957. The Federal Reserve System then began to increase the cash of the private banking system, which was followed by an expansion of the credit volume at the rate of about $1 billion a month—$12 billion in all over the year. Together with an increase in the Government's defense orders, this credit expansion was one of the potent factors in bringing about a recovery of business activity in the second half of 1958; it also made it possible for the banks to grant foreign credits more readily, and for the economy as a whole to continue its foreign investments at a high level. Thanks to the large gold holdings of the United States, which still owns one-half of the monetary gold stock of the free world, the authorities could continue a policy of credit expansion, even after the gold had begun to flow out. This was a direct deviation from the traditional and sometimes too rigid rules of the old gold standard, which required the adoption of a restrictive credit policy whenever gold reserves declined. It is unlikely that without this credit expansion the other factors would have been sufficiently powerful to stage the recovery. Thanks to the resilience of the American economy, and the various measures taken, consumers' income was maintained, and with it the level of imports. Exports declined from the peak reached in 1957, when they had been exceptionally high as a result of the Suez crisis and the pronounced boom, which had forced Europe to buy more gasoline, coal and steel from the United States.

It was this change in the trade balance of the United States, together with the high level of U.S. investment abroad, both on public and private account, that led to the outflow of gold and the accumulation of larger dollar holdings by other countries. This redistribution of monetary reserves has been particularly helpful to the European countries, which were able on the basis of their increased reserves to make their moves toward external convertibility and greater freedom of trade. During 1958, the total monetary reserves of these countries increased by $3.6 billion, from $17.1 billion to $20.7 billion. This addition to reserves was not entirely due to the favorable balance with the United States, since gold was also acquired from current gold produc-

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tion, and from Russian sales; gold and dollars were also acquired as the result of favorable balances with other countries.

The outflow of gold from the United States has, of course, been reflected in a relative weakening of the dollar in the exchange markets. This has led to a remarkably quick shift in public opinion from one extreme to another; instead of anxieties about a dollar shortage, fears began to be expressed that the emergence of inflationary pressures in the United States might seriously affect the exchange value of the dollar. As often happens in such cases, certain of the arguments advanced have clearly been erroneous. There is, for example, no real basis for reports about "a flight from the dollar," since foreign countries today hold larger dollar balances than they did a year ago.

Better informed opinion has attached more weight to the deficit in the United States budget, to the pressures for higher wages, and to the inflationary sentiment in the country. The Administration did well to resist the widespread demands for a reduction in taxes in the spring of 1958. If these demands had been granted, the reduction of taxes could hardly have become effective early enough to contribute to shortening the recession—which in any case proved to be relatively brief; the reduction would rather have increased the deficit later when recovery had already begun, thereby adding dangerously to the inflationary pressures.

To obtain a balanced view of the situation, account must be taken not only of the existing inflationary pressures, but also of certain anti-inflationary factors that are operating in the American economy. In the first place, there is still a great deal of unused capacity, and there has been a considerable improvement in productivity. Secondly, there is a certain amount of unemployment, notably higher than the average for recent years, which—however undesirable in itself—is likely to exert a moderating influence on labor relations and wage movements. Third, the still relatively low prices of raw materials will help to hold down wholesale prices and the cost of living. Fourth, there is the increased foreign competition which is making itself felt in the American export trade, and also to some extent in the domestic market through the impact of imports; this, too, will tend to hold down prices. Finally, there is the more restrictive Federal Reserve policy which is designed to ensure that borrowing to cover the budget deficit in the current fiscal year will be made in the market, and not by an extension of bank credit.

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With business recovering from a recession, it is of course in accordance with the best modern theories of compensatory fiscal policies that the budget for the coming year should be at least in balance. A balanced budget is also called for from the point of view of debt management. The reception of the Treasury's conversion offer early in February is of considerable interest in this connection; holders of the maturing issues asked for cash payments of no less than $2.1 billion. Most of those who chose cash rather than conversion were probably corporations taking the opportunity to strengthen their cash positions in anticipation of higher expenditures and outlays on plant and equipment. The private sector of the economy is therefore beginning to use the liquid resources acquired during the recession, and temporarily invested in government bonds, in ways which will add to active purchasing power. In such a situation, it would in fact be desirable to have a surplus in the budget to offset this increased spending of liquid resources by the private economy. Far from impeding business expansion, a cautious budget policy would, at the present juncture, provide the proper basis for growth of the national product at a rate which can be sustained.

In the present recovery phase of the business cycle, it can safely be expected that all current savings will be readily invested, and there is then no need for increased public spending to ensure the maximum rate of sustained growth. A higher level of public expenditure would, indeed, be likely to provoke higher costs and prices which could easily lead to a distortion of the markets, and with it the danger of stagnation and increased unemployment. Such a situation would be particularly dangerous for an economy which already has a high cost level, and is meeting increased foreign competition.

Taking all the circumstances into account, including the inflationary psychology which still persists in some quarters of the American public, there seems to be a need for a clear demonstration that inflation will be resisted; for this reason, too, a balanced budget would serve a very useful purpose. Fortunately, the recent stability in the cost of living index has begun to impress the public, and there is a fair chance that, with appropriate fiscal and credit policies, the fears of continuing inflation will soon be abated.

In the field of foreign trade, American firms will more and more have to take account of the fact that other countries are now able to deliver fairly promptly and can often quote lower prices. It

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seems probable that U.S. export possibilities will be increasingly restricted to articles for which this country has long held a position of superiority, and to some new articles which have been developed here in recent years; but even in those lines, American firms will have to keep a closer watch on their costs and pay more attention to foreign tastes and requirements. When there is growing foreign competition on the home market, there is a temptation to grant increased protection to American industries. But that can easily become a double-edged weapon: protection will keep out imports, but at the same time, by making it easier to sell on the domestic market, it will tend to relieve U.S. producers from the necessity of having to adjust themselves to the requirements of the export trade.

It must not be forgotten that the United States is also a large exporter of raw materials, and that export prospects in this line are likely to improve as world trade expands again. This expansion has probably already begun under the influence of the recent recovery in the United States, and it seems likely to be given a further impetus by developments in Europe. It is of great importance that the recent convertibility measures in Europe were taken from a position of strength and not from weakness. This strength is revealed by the fact that convertibility has been introduced in an environment of falling discount rates. In the first six weeks of 1959, after the move to convertibility, the official discount rates of Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands were reduced. In the United Kingdom, restrictions on bank credit had already been relaxed in the summer of 1958, and the bank rate was progressively reduced from 7 percent at the beginning of the year to 4 percent in November 1958.

This easing of credits in Europe may well have an influence on the balance of payments between Europe and the United States. Until very recently the combination of restrictive credit policies in Europe and expansionist credit policies in the United States encouraged a flow of funds to Europe, both on current and capital accounts. Now that the European countries are in a stronger position and are adopting expansionist credit policies, including a reduction in interest rates, and now that the authorities in the United States seem likely to hold to tighter credit policies in conjunction with a balanced budget, the prospects are that the outflow of gold from the United States may be moderated, if not reversed.

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Much more could be said of the impact of the U.S. economy on monetary developments in other countries, but it is time to consider the third factor which has been of importance for the recent introduction of external convertibility in Europe, namely, the influence of the International Monetary Fund.

IV

While foreign aid was being received under the Marshall Plan and other arrangements, there was little or no need for European countries to turn to the Fund with requests for assistance. But such a need suddenly arose in connection with the Suez crisis, which primarily affected sterling. Nobody can tell what the consequences might have been in this emergency, not only for sterling but for other currencies, had not the International Monetary Fund in December 1956 been able to grant financial assistance to the United Kingdom in the total amount of $1.3 billion. At the height of the boom in the following year, when loanable funds became scarce, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands were also able to make use of the Fund's resources. Early in 1958, France obtained financial assistance from the Fund, supplementing credits obtained from other sources, and this enabled it to put into effect a comprehensive stabilization program. All in all, it is no exaggeration to say that without this timely assistance from the Fund the recent moves to external convertibility could probably not have been made. One might even go a step further: the proposal for a substantial enlargement of the Fund's resources through increases in quotas, initiated at the Fund's annual meeting in New Delhi last October and since approved by the Governors of the Fund, cast its shadow before it. There can be little doubt that the expected enlargement was one of the considerations which led the European countries to proceed to external convertibility.

The purpose of the International Monetary Fund is precisely to help its member countries to establish proper monetary conditions, and in that way to assist in laying the basis for expansion in world trade and production. The Fund is concerned with the par values of currencies, it conducts consultations with member countries regarding exchange restrictions and other matters, provides technical assistance to its members, and through the financial assistance which it is able to grant to countries in need, it can help to ensure the restoration and maintenance of balanced con-

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ditions. Gradually, over the years, the Fund has established certain principles which govern the access of member countries to the use of its resources. Each country has a quota which determines its contribution to the Fund's resources, its voting power, and the extent to which it may obtain financial assistance from the Fund. In the case of a request to draw against the first 25 percent of its quota, an amount normally equivalent to its own gold subscription, a member country has the overwhelming benefit of the doubt; for drawings within the next 25 percent of the quota, the member is required to show that it is making reasonable efforts to solve its own problems. Requests for drawings beyond these limits, however, require substantial justification: namely, that the drawing must be in support of a sound program likely to ensure enduring stability at realistic rates of exchange.

Access to the Fund's resources is therefore not automatic, but each case is considered on its merits. The Fund is not just another additional source of credit, but is recognized more and more as a source of credit that is available in substantial amounts only to member governments that have satisfied the Fund of their intention and capacity to restore balance. In this way the Fund contributes to the observance of monetary discipline, which is as important for the proper functioning of the international monetary system as for the restoration of monetary order in the particular country. One of the results of the breakdown of the gold standard during the Great Depression in the 1930s was that the rules of that standard no longer commanded the same allegiance as before. But rules of some sort there must be; and the Fund has helped to establish a set of rules which may be said to represent a synthesis between the old gold-standard rules and the need for more conscious management of monetary affairs in the increasingly complex world of today.

It has been the experience of recent years that countries are willing to discuss their affairs much more frankly with Fund officials than with representatives of individual governments; this is of particular importance when it comes to the elaboration of effective stabilization programs. When such programs have been elaborated and put into effect, the countries concerned have often arranged to have the assistance received from the Fund supplemented by credits from other sources, including the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. Treasury, the European Payments Union and, in some cases, commercial banks in the United States.

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In this way the Fund and the other financial institutions are complementary. To appreciate the role of credit in the international system which is being developed, it is useful to stress one particular feature relating to the replacement of the European Payments Union by the European Monetary Agreement. Under that Agreement, ad hoc credits may be granted to individual countries, but the automatic credits which were obtained by member governments under the rules of the European Payments Union have now disappeared. As a consequence, the financing which is necessary for the movement of goods is being transferred more and more to the regular channels of the market, to the private banks in particular for short and medium-term credits, and to them and other institutions for long-term issues. It follows that countries which need to borrow are increasingly having to pay attention to their creditworthiness, and to that end to observe the required self-discipline in their financial management.

Thus neither the new European Monetary Agreement nor the International Monetary Fund competes with private credit sources. On the contrary, they help to establish conditions under which private banking can operate more securely; in fact, these official institutions supplement the market forces in situations where the market cannot itself do the work that is needed. The private banking system would find it difficult, not to say impossible, to cope with the strains of an acute emergency such as that of the Suez crisis. At such a time substantial sums have to be provided promptly and at considerable risk, under conditions which are hardly suitable for institutions responsible for funds belonging to depositors and shareholders. In emergencies of this sort the Fund's assistance may well be indispensable in preventing a crack in the exchange structure. Experience has shown, as was learned very forcibly in 1931, that once a crack starts it may quickly spread to other markets, and make it very difficult to limit its effects. It may lead to a series of forced devaluations of both minor and major currencies—devaluations not dictated by the realities of foreign trade and competitive prices.

Moreover, private banks cannot negotiate stabilization programs. When a country is clearly in an unbalanced condition, private banks may properly be deterred by the risks involved from granting further credit facilities. It is only if a comprehensive program is adopted and put into effect that the risks will be reduced. But once the programs are agreed upon, and Fund assist-

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ance has been extended, the banks can give valuable support; and when the programs succeed, the banks obtain new opportunities for business.

Since the beginning of its operations, the Fund has made available about $4.1 billion to 36 countries, of which approximately two-thirds was provided during the past two years. At the end of 1958, the Fund held $2.3 billion in gold and U.S. dollars, but of this amount the uncommitted funds available were only $1.4 billion, as compared with $3.5 billion at the end of 1956. The proposed enlargement of the Fund's resources, which is now before the parliaments of the member countries, would increase the Fund's holdings in gold and U.S. dollars to about $3.7 billion; and the Fund will also be able to utilize more readily other currencies, especially after the recent introduction of external convertibility. In this way, the Fund's position will be greatly strengthened. Experience of recent years has shown how in an emergency, or even in a period of exchange tension, movements of funds from one market to another are likely to be on a large scale. It is for this reason, particularly, that members have to be assured that there are sufficient secondary reserves available in case of need. The hope is, of course, that no serious emergency will arise, and that the additional resources which the Fund is now to receive will not, therefore, need to be drawn upon. Their main purpose is to be potentially available as a second line of reserves; and this will, in itself, make countries more ready to take those constructive steps which will lead to a really stable monetary system. All this is not to say that the Fund does not expect to make financial assistance available to countries in the future. There are many occasions other than emergencies when the Fund's assistance can be of great help, not least in connection with stabilization programs; but if the European monetary situation continues to improve, the Fund's activities will probably be increasingly directed to member countries in other parts of the world, particularly to the underdeveloped countries.

These are in fact the countries which have made the most frequent use of the Fund's resources in recent years. While their major need is for capital for development purposes, these countries, like any other, may be exposed to the risk of temporary difficulties in their balance of payments. The justification for the Fund making its resources available must always lie in its conviction that, in each case, the need for assistance is in fact tem-

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porary, and that the resources which it provides will be returned to the Fund within a three to five-year period. For the underdeveloped countries, Fund assistance may have a particularly interesting advantage, since arrangements made with the Fund often open the way for the inflow of long-term capital from both official and private sources.

V

It is often said that the present generation lives in an age of anxiety and, looking at the political situation throughout the world, one finds much justification for such a statement. To a great extent, however, economic life pursues its course independently of political disturbances. The recent introduction of external convertibility in Europe is a case in point, especially as it has been followed by calm and steady exchange markets. In the 1930s there was much flight of capital from Europe seeking safety from political risks. In this age of nuclear weapons, the risks have spread so widely that fear of war has had little influence on capital movements, which are increasingly responsive to economic considerations.

The authorities are of course still faced with many difficult tasks: they must seek to alleviate the difficulties of primary producers; they have to resist inflationary pressures; and they must establish the proper basis for continued economic growth and an expanding world trade. But these difficulties should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there have been very real economic and financial achievements in recent years. Not only have several exchange crises been successfully overcome but the whole international exchange structure has been considerably strengthened. Recessions have been short-lived. Assistance has been provided to underdeveloped regions and effective stabilization measures are being taken in an impressive number of countries. The chances are that in many fields progress will continue, provided policies proper to the ever-changing economic conditions are pursued. As always, character, courage and conviction are needed, but there is no reason to think that they will be lacking.

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SUBSTANCE AND SHADOW IN THE SOVIET SEVEN YEAR PLAN

By Oleg Hoeffding

NIKITA Khrushchev's report on the new Seven Year Plan for 1959–1965, published last November and endorsed by the January Party Congress, is a package remarkable both for its content and its vivid wrapping. The hard content was provided by the data on past economic achievements of the Soviet Union which Khrushchev reviewed, as well as by what he revealed of his economic program for the seven years ahead. On both counts he had an impressive story to tell. In the 1950s, the Soviet record of industrial expansion, scientific advance and technological accomplishment has been a startling one. Even in agriculture, where the Soviet economic system had been failing badly, Khrushchev's own vigorous leadership has at last added a creditable page to the record by bringing about a striking expansion of output. This background of fast economic growth has also enabled the régime to let the consumer share increasingly in the fruit of his labor and sacrifices. Real incomes, however modest they still are by the standards of the richest Western countries, have been rising fast enough to give both workers and farmers a sense of measurable and continuous improvement. Moreover, Khrushchev has taken care in recent years to channel much of this improvement selectively into the worst areas of Stalinist neglect. He spearheaded a vigorous attack on the housing problem. His minimum wage and pension reforms brought some badly needed relief to the most underprivileged groups of Soviet society.

If Khrushchev's past economic record could well have spoken for itself, his preview of further advances to be made by 1965, and beyond, traced out a program also impressive enough, on its own merits, to cheer his followers and to force the West to take thoughtful notice of the dimensions which the Soviet economic challenge is likely to assume within the coming decade.

Yet Khrushchev was not content to let the record and the economic blueprint for the future speak for themselves. Instead, he turned his report into a political manifesto, and garnished it with propagandist embellishment unusually heavy even for Soviet documents of this kind. To the Soviet public, he represented the Plan as a decisive milestone of advance to the final "Communist"

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stage of social and economic development. To be sure, he was as careful as ever not to specify exactly when the Soviet Union might enter this promised land of superabundance and social harmony, but he tried to build up the impression that two or three seven-year strides would take it there.

To the world at large, he painted the Plan as an equally decisive step towards final victory in competition with capitalism. Here he was specific. He predicted confidently that 15 years hence the Soviet Union would "take the first place in the world not only in total output but also in per capita production."

The latter theme was heavily and exuberantly expanded by Soviet comments after publication of Khrushchev's report. "A plan that will shake the world" was one representative headline, over an *Izvestia* editorial which credited the Plan with "having captured the imagination of mankind," and having "illuminated, like a powerful searchlight, the perspectives of its historical development." This article, and many like it, reported gleefully that publication of the Plan had caused consternation in the capitalist camp.

Soviet economists, in a less lyrical but equally confident vein, proceeded to document Khrushchev's bold predictions with calculations that try to determine the precise point at which Soviet and American production curves will cross. One writer credited Soviet industry with a 1957 output volume half that of the United States—an exaggerated estimate, probably, but one which got the Soviets off to a good start in a projection that assumed for their industry an annual rate of output expansion of 8.6 percent (as the Plan requires for 1959–1965) and accorded its American opponent a modest 2.2 percent. Having duly noted that the American recession had given the Soviets a head start in 1958, he went on to conclude that Soviet industry would be producing as much as the United States in 1968, and then would need but two or three years more to surpass it in per capita production.

One would be paying too much respect to this kind of political arithmetic, which still substitutes for serious Soviet research on comparative economic growth, if one were to dwell on the various ways in which it stacks the cards in the Soviets' favor, ignores the tough technical problems involved in such comparisons and treats uncertainty as certainty. It would also be too obliging to Khrushchev to become infected with his sporting mood and to accept his challenge to the industrial race on his own terms, by

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which he himself picks the entries for both sides, matching fast-growing sectors of the Soviet economy against their American counterparts, while disqualifying all the large areas of gross Soviet backwardness, in industry and elsewhere. In some of these "races," indeed, the Soviet entry has hardly appeared on the track.

Yet Khrushchev's obsession with the Soviet-American economic race cannot be shrugged off as irrelevant byplay to his economic policy, nor can we take lightly his conception of the new Plan as a prelude to the defeat of capitalism. The calculations of his economists, however disingenuous and primitive, contain a hard core of disturbing fact, too important for American opinion to ignore with indifference, or to belittle with complacency, as it has largely tended to do so far.

In contrast to the easygoing industrial nations of the West, which expect economic growth to accrue fortuitously from uncontrolled or loosely directed activity in the marketplace, the Soviet Union has made expansion of output a dominant and direct objective of national policy. In 30 years of single-minded pursuit of this objective, it has developed economic and political institutions well designed to attain it. In the 1950s it succeeded in translating these advantages over the hedonist West into industrial growth rates markedly higher than those recorded by most free-world nations, and certainly the United States. The U.S.S.R. has now shown its determination to go on pressing for maximum industrial expansion in the 1960s. We have no comparable program.

Even if Soviet performance under the new Plan should fall short of its assignments, we should not mistake the fallibility of long-term planning for economic failure. No outside observer today can detect any economic problems serious enough to prevent industrial growth from proceeding at a pace which is likely to be rapid by any standards other than, possibly, the self-set and exacting standard of the Soviet leadership. Whatever discounts may be applicable to Khrushchev's arithmetic, the cold fact remains that, at current relative rates of growth, Soviet industry is steadily narrowing the gap between its output and that of its self-elected main rival. Any comfort to be drawn from the thought that the gap is still wide gets colder year by year.

II

Khrushchev's motives for presenting the Plan with so much pomp and bombast deserve examination—not as a source of com-

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fort, but as essential background. Two related reasons, probably, go far to account for his tactics.

First, in the eyes of his Party comrades, he must bear a goodly share of the blame for the Plan's embarrassing antecedents. Khrushchev dominated the Twentieth Party Congress which three years ago issued the Party's Directives on the Sixth Five Year Plan for 1956–1960. This document bore the stamp of Khrushchev's impatient nature. It demanded ambitiously fast rates of advance in every sector of production, combined with promises of rapid gains in consumption and housing. Before 1956 had ended, it became clear that these demands were overtaxing Soviet resources. In December the Party called the first retreat, by scaling down output and investment targets for 1957. In the course of that year, Soviet production policy concentrated on the acute bottlenecks experienced by industry in 1956. This required revision of earlier output and investment programs, and resulted in much slower expansion in many industries than the Directives had called for. In some, output was actually curtailed. In September 1957—when the pattern of industrial progress had come to bear but casual resemblance to that required by the Directives—the Sixth Five Year Plan was given a none-too-decent burial. A Party resolution that was a prize exhibit of equivocation instructed the planners to start preparing the present Seven Year Plan. To justify the vacuum in planning left by this fiasco, it was claimed that new possibilities for expansion had been found in the economy, through technological advances and the discovery of new mineral resources, and that only a new plan would do justice to the production gains expected from the drastic reshuffling of industrial administration in mid-1957. Much the same camouflage, with a few layers added, was used by Khrushchev to explain to the Twenty-first Party Congress why a fresh start in long-term planning had become necessary.

The other motive for applying an extra coat of propaganda is more important, as it bears on the Plan's substance and on the Soviet leaders' private views of their country's economic prospects. Although Khrushchev pictures the Plan as a program for an unprecedented spurt of industrial expansion, such claims are not borne out by his own figures. The growth rates implicit in the 1965 targets for industrial output as a whole, and for many major commodities, are distinctly below those claimed for the last few years. It appears that the vicissitudes of 1956 prompted a serious

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reappraisal of industry's long-range growth potential. The first result was a 15-year "perspective plan" of tentative output goals for 1972. A few selected data from this document were published in November 1957. They showed that, even then, the leadership was reconciled to a marked slowdown in the rate of industrial growth—compared, as must be stressed, to the outstandingly high rates of the first postwar decade and of the 1930s. This more conservative assessment of future production possibilities has carried over into the Seven Year Plan.

Its goal is to increase the volume of gross industrial output by about 80 percent over the 1958 level. Impressive as this is, it represents an annual growth rate of 8.6 percent, compared to the 10 percent per annum claimed by the Soviet production index for 1956–1958. An even more modest increase, by 7.7 percent, has been programmed for 1959. One should note, however, that the annual plans for 1957 and 1958 had also scheduled output increases of 7 to 8 percent only, and the 10 percent increases claimed for both years were attributed to plan overfulfillment. It is none too clear whether it is now Soviet policy to set easier output goals (to avoid high-cost production resulting from efforts to meet excessive targets) or whether the claims of above-plan production are a statistical illusion, reflecting the skill acquired by Soviet plant managers in manipulating production reports. That Soviet authorities suspect the latter is suggested by the findings of a recent investigation by the Planning Commission of plants which had claimed to have exceeded their production quotas. Much of the excess turned out to be due to expedients like valuing new products at inflated prices, producing items not called for by the Plan, or concentrating on products requiring little processing at the plant, but reported at their full gross value.

These and other uncertainties attaching to Soviet statistics preclude any appraisal of the exact degree to which the sights of industrial expansion have been lowered. However, the slowdown can be traced clearly for many commodities for which physical data on current and planned 1965 output are available, and the tendency is more clearly reflected in these data than in the ever-suspect index of total industrial output. There has been no discussion in Soviet sources of this implication of the Plan figures, a silence offset by the propaganda campaign that asserts sustained expansion at record pace. This silence, however, probably testifies to nothing more serious than a strong allergy of the political lead-

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ers to any admission of even the possibility of a slowdown in what they are convinced is the world's most dynamic economy.

Beyond this, they can have little cause for concern. The growth rates which are still deemed feasible by the Soviet planners are quite high enough to justify much of Khrushchev's exuberance. Moreover, with good reason, he has emphasized that, at the output levels now attained by Soviet heavy industry, the growth rates programmed for 1959–1965 signify very formidable additions to output in absolute terms. The prospect of having 30 to 35 million tons of steel added by 1965 to a present output of 55 million, with commensurate additions in other industries that spell national power, cannot be disheartening to Khrushchev, even if three years ago he had hopes of doing even better.

III

But have the planners carried realism far enough and are the industrial goals truly feasible? The meager published data rule out anything like an independent audit of the Plan. There can be little doubt, however, that this time the targets for industry—and this goes for the other non-farm sectors, too—are backed up by a serious attempt to balance output schedules with resource availabilities. Khrushchev's report, for all its 125 pages, is but a glossy publicity release abstracted from what must be many volumes of sober and technical calculations compiled over 15 months by *Gosplan* and the 30 special committees that worked in detail on every aspect of the Plan. Their joint product probably adds up to a much more thorough and critical assessment of the economy's growth potential than the ill-starred Sixth Plan benefited from. It would be strange indeed if the planners had not worked hard to save Khrushchev, and themselves, from a repetition of the recent error of overplanning, by drawing up a program that, in their best judgment, is feasible.

On the other hand, the planners' judgment was seriously constrained by Khrushchev's insistence that expansion be maximized, to "gain time," as he puts it, in the race with capitalism. They could not afford to turn in a soft plan, certain of realization in every detail. Khrushchev did not ease their task by also insisting on objectives distinctly in conflict with the goal of maximizing output. This planners' dilemma is best illustrated by their handling of the labor supply problem, perhaps the most serious resource bottleneck confronting them in the immediate future.

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The problem stems mainly from the harsh demographic fact that, for the next five years or so, the Soviet labor force will depend for its young recruits on the war-depleted age group born in 1942–1946. Recently the state labor force (which excludes collective farmers) has grown by about 2,000,000 workers annually. An increase of only 1,300,000 expected in 1959 shows that the lean years of labor supply have arrived. To make things more difficult, because of Khrushchev's energetic and badly needed measures to expand agricultural output, the non-farm sector cannot draw as freely as before on its traditional labor reservoir, the farm population. The Plan demands a formidable production effort from agriculture, and much of this effort is concentrated in branches of farming which, in the Soviet Union, are still extremely labor-intensive and have been barely touched by mechanization. Thus, the villages may not be able to spare significant reinforcements for the non-farm labor force.

Confronting these prospects, the Plan budgets for a seemingly modest 21 percent increase in the state labor force over the seven years, or by 1,600,000 workers per annum. Actually, this is quite an optimistic expectation, given the stringency of the demographic bottleneck. It suggests that the planners place considerable reliance on several measures built into the Plan and designed, in part at least, to ease the labor supply problem.

Wage policy is one: wage increases in the seven years will be largely reserved for the lowest-paid categories of labor, where they will be substantial. This measure not only effectively builds up Khrushchev as the friend of the underdog, but also may add to the labor force. Since women make up much of the low-paid labor contingent, it should draw more women into industry. At the same time, the virtual freezing of wages of the better-paid workers should deter their working wives and daughters from leaving employment. Similarly, the Plan's pension policy is designed to keep older workers at work. They have been warned not to expect increases in retirement pensions—still very low after the 1956 pension reform—until 1963, when the worst of the impact of low wartime birthrates on labor recruitment will have passed.

The school reform synchronized with the Plan is another timely device to assist labor supply, though this may not be its primary motive. In a move not without irony at a time when Americans, in the wake of sputnik, had started looking enviously at the high standards of Soviet education, the Soviet leadership decided that

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their youth was being over-educated. Students will now be encouraged to leave school and start work at 15 years of age. Those who stay on to compete for university admission will combine academic studies with training for industrial work. In contrast to the time-wasting "shop" courses of American schools, this training is evidently conceived as serious and systematic apprenticeship. Thus, Soviet industry will be able to recruit young workers already trained to some extent, and adolescents may be more willing to leave school and seek employment at the better starting wages now offered.

These measures may ease the labor problem, though to an extent that cannot be precisely predicted by the Soviet planners. At the same time, their efforts to back up the Plan with an adequate supply of labor came into conflict with Khrushchev's decision to yield to labor's desires for more leisure and to offer it psychological incentives on the long road to "Communism." After some reductions in working hours in recent years, the average work-week in non-farm employment is still in the neighborhood of 45 hours. Now the Plan promises to make a 41-hour week general by 1960 (with shorter hours for miners and juveniles) and to reduce it to 40 hours by 1962. Looking even further ahead, it envisages a gradual transition to 30–35 hours, starting in 1964—that is, again, once the lean years of labor recruitment have passed—and to be completed by 1968. This, Khrushchev claims, will give Soviet workers the shortest hours in the world, another long-range prophecy not capable of verification at this date. However, together with other long-deferred promises, such as pension reform, it illustrates the technique used to impress working-class opinion at home and abroad with Soviet concern for social welfare.

For the planners, however, the modest cutting of working hours scheduled for the next few years spells another important limitation on labor supply. Even if industry receives a little more than its proportionate share of the one-fifth increase in the state labor force hoped for by 1965, its output per man-hour, allowing for the shorter work-week, will have to rise by more than one-half if it is to realize the 80 percent output increase assigned to it. This means that productivity must increase at a rate even faster than the impressive 6 percent per annum claimed to have been maintained in recent years.

The planners evidently hope that such a spurt in productivity can be generated, but they cannot count on it. The surest way of

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raising output per man is to provide him with more and more equipment and power to work with. As far as can be judged from the fragmentary data on the Plan's investment program, industry —and heavy industry in particular—is once again due for the lion's share of investment, something like one-half of the total.

This means that industry can expect a massive influx of new equipment and new construction. But there are signs that the industrial planners have had to husband prospective investment resources very carefully in trying to satisfy all of industry's voracious needs, and make hard decisions in apportioning investment within industry. This much can be inferred, first, from the fact that published information on industrial investment is confined mainly to preferred sectors of heavy industry—such as metals and ores, chemicals, petroleum and natural gas—where investment is due to increase considerably faster than in industry as a whole. This necessarily implies that other sectors of industry will have to be content with much less generous investment programs.

Then there is heavy emphasis on the need to economize investment resources and put them to the best possible use. Stress will be laid on replacement and modernization of equipment in existing plants, to save on new construction—an indication that Khrushchev's housing program is impinging on industrial expansion. In power plant construction, there has been a switch from hydroelectric to thermal plants—explicitly to economize on investment. The new Plan has very little to say on the Soviet atomic energy program, which was announced with much publicity in 1956. This appears to have been heavily cut in response to the investment squeeze, although technological second thoughts, such as have also arisen in the West, undoubtedly had something to do with it.

These strenuous efforts to make the most of investment resources may bespeak the planners' uneasiness as to whether the inflow of new capital will be adequate to achieve the steep increase in industrial labor productivity that is required. One has the impression that they are banking to a large extent on other and less tangible sources of productivity increases, intractable to prediction and planning. Considerable faith is being placed, clearly, in the future fruits of technological advance in general and automation in particular. Probably there are similar expectations of improved productivity resulting from the better educational levels

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of the present industrial labor force, the ample supply of engineers and industrial scientists, and from organizational and managerial improvements. There is nothing reckless about making some allowance for these effects in a long-term program. Soviet industry, no doubt, still has large reserves of inefficiencies amenable to energetic treatment. Moreover, past experience of other industrial nations has shown that labor productivity often tends to increase faster than is accounted for by an increasing provision of physical capital per worker alone. These effects, however, are easier to observe *ex post* than to anticipate *ex ante*. Time soon will show whether the Soviet planners' judgment on productivity gains has not been pushed a bit too far by Khrushchev's insistence on "gaining time."

IV

In agriculture, too, the proof of planning is in the eating, and more literally so. The history of Soviet five-year planning of farm output contains a dismal record of setting grossly excessive and seldom-realized production targets. On the face of it, the Seven Year Plan suggests more of the same. There must be newspaper readers even in Moscow with memories long enough to compare the grain output target for 1965, 164–180 million tons, to the goal for 1960 of the Sixth Plan, 180 million tons. Actual grain production in 1956–1958 has averaged some 120 million tons, though last year's bumper crop may have been as high as 140 million tons. Striking increases are also scheduled for other farm products, including a doubling of meat output—a major benchmark toward Khrushchev's coveted and distant goal of surpassing the carnivorous standards of the United States.

What is one to make of these figures? On past form, one is tempted to write them off as another flight of wishful fancy. Yet one cause for hesitation, and a weighty one, is provided by the reforms and new policies instituted by Khrushchev since 1954. Apart from raising output to a significantly higher level, they have produced an atmosphere in Soviet farming greatly different from the stifling air of bureaucratic regimentation and short-sighted exploitation under Stalinism. These measures have probably not yet run their course in freeing the production potentialities of land and peasantry from the shackles of a system that could not have been better designed to discourage effort, thwart initiative and breed inefficiency. One is not surprised that Khru-

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shchev, at the remarkable meeting of the Party's Central Committee in December 1958, chose his farm policy record as the stick with which to beat his defeated opponents of the "anti-party faction." Possibly in order to counter skepticism evoked by the Plan's agricultural goals, he reviewed this record at great length, and spiced it with charges such as that against Malenkov, who was accused of having publicly exaggerated grain production in 1952 by more than 40 percent. By this performance Khrushchev may have sought to establish his unique competence for leading agriculture in another rapid upsurge of output, now no longer obstructed by the "faction."

On this occasion, as in his Plan report, Khrushchev acknowledged that this surge will be no easy task. The production gains since 1954 have rested very largely on *extensive* additions to output, through the daring "virgin lands" drive which has added 50 million acres sown in grain. Now, as Khrushchev has stressed, further expansion of crop production will have to come from more *intensive* cultivation, by raising yields per acre rather than bringing more land under the plow. The need is no longer to produce more food grain to assure the people's daily bread; Khrushchev can take much of the credit for this comforting situation, as his farm policies have raised wheat production by some 50 percent since 1952. The main problem now is to grow more feed grain and other fodder in order to expand livestock herds and thus to add to meat and dairy output, as well as to produce more vegetables and fruit to vary the urban diet, and to supply more cotton, sugar beet and similar crops to the processing industries.

Soviet industry is due to bring considerable succor to agriculture in its efforts to intensify production. It will go on providing the wherewithal of mechanization on a large scale, and is also scheduled to triple mineral fertilizer output, bringing it to 35 million tons by 1965. Even at this level of output, however, chemical fertilizers will remain reserved for cotton, sugar beet and vegetables. The Lenin Academy of Agriculture recently estimated that an output of 45 million tons would be needed before fertilizers can even start making an impact on grain yields. Generally, it is clear that, even with the increasing supply of physical inputs which agriculture can count on, it will come somewhere near its exacting output targets only if it is enabled, and encouraged, to take full advantage of the more propitious climate created by Khrushchev's reforms so as to make better use of its resources.

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Soviet farming, much more so than industry, harbors great reserves stemming from the very fact that so many operations are still conducted in highly primitive and inefficient fashion. In sharp contrast to the Stalin era, Soviet farmers now have much better price and income incentives to start pulling themselves out of this trough of backwardness. This they can do by making use of any number of improved farming techniques and practices which still await introduction in the Soviet Union. At the same time, many of the old institutional barriers to their introduction have now disappeared. Thus, the system of highly centralized production planning and narrowly prescribed delivery obligations has given way to a much more sensible and flexible scheme, which enables collective farms to adapt production to their particular conditions. The fact that the collectives themselves now control and operate tractors and farm machinery should enable them to observe more timely schedules of farm operations, a most important potential source of higher output. There is also a new emphasis on keeping track of production costs in collective farming, and comparing them to returns—an elementary and badly needed innovation that should promote more rational farm management.

In short, one certainly should not regard the agricultural goals of the Plan as much more than numerical symbols denoting the fact that a maximum effort to raise output is expected from agriculture. It would be unwise to ignore, however, that for the first time in its history Soviet collective farming has been offered rewards making effort and initiative worth while.

V

What is the import of the Plan for East-West relations? In traditional fashion, Soviet comments depict it as evidence of pacific intent: so sweeping a program cannot but absorb all the energies of the Soviet Union in "peaceful construction." Yet the Plan presents no evidence of any reorientation of economic policy towards more urgent concern for consumer welfare and less emphasis on building up the power of the Soviet state. For another seven years, the time-tested formula of expanding the output of heavy industry (which in Soviet terminology includes military hardware) more rapidly than consumer goods is to govern the pattern of Soviet industrial development and speed its pace.

Khrushchev's report notes that the Plan will "further

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strengthen the defense capability" of the U.S.S.R. Such strengthening need not necessarily mean expanding munitions output. The Soviet budget for 1959, with its trivial reduction in overt defense outlays and very sizeable increase in appropriations to "science," serves as a reminder that much of the contest for military superiority has shifted to the arena of research and development. At the same time, the vigorous pursuit of the Soviet economic offensive underscores the other important fact that "peaceful" capital equipment now serves as ammunition in the vital contest for the allegiance of the underdeveloped nations. Undoubtedly, the Plan has made sure to curb domestic demand for investment resources by the small margin required to assure an ample supply of these high-yield weapons of diplomatic warfare.

In short, no matter how the Soviet Union chooses to employ economic resources to build up national power and back up its foreign policy, it can look forward to disposing of a growing flow of resources to this end. It is this prospect, no doubt, which makes Khrushchev so confident in equating Soviet gains in industrial output with progress towards the defeat of capitalism. Clearly, he does not expect the Western democracies to strike their colors simply because a statistical comparison, in 1972 or any other year, has shown them that Soviet and American production curves have crossed. Nor can he count on Soviet production successes "to enhance the attractive power of the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism" to the point of setting off an unassisted landslide into the Communist fold. But he has good reason to be pleased with the rate at which industrial progress is providing Soviet political strategy with the material means for helping history along towards the outcome postulated by Marxism-Leninism.

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CONTROL OF THE PANAMA CANAL: AN OBSOLETE SHIBBOLETH?

By Martin B. Travis and James T. Watkins

HAS American policy with respect to the Panama Canal outlived its usefulness? Changes in technology, in the international power structure and in the climate of world opinion would suggest that it has. In an age when the United States is turning increasingly to international arrangements to protect its interests on other continents, its position regarding the Canal becomes increasingly inconsistent, if not embarrassing. It might well embroil us in a struggle, initially one-sided, in which all Latin America would move to defend the sovereignty of a sister republic and the principles of self-determination and nonintervention. In the altered circumstances of today we need to take a fresh look at our relationship to the Panama Canal. This involves a candid reassessment of the strategic and economic arguments for its control by the United States.

II

From the outset the strategic value of the Canal to the United States has been regarded by American leaders as of first importance. More than three decades before the Canal was completed President Hayes advised the Senate: "Its relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States."[1] Toward the turn of the century the need for a waterway across the Isthmus was dramatized by the Spanish-American War exploit of the *Oregon,* steaming at flank speed from Puget Sound to Cuban waters by way of the Magellan Straits, a distance three times what it would have been had the Canal been built. Then came the conquest of the Philippines, bringing new American responsibilities in the Pacific far from the centers of power on the Atlantic seaboard. Long before the Japanese were to threaten American interests in Asian waters, President Theodore Roosevelt declared in a special message to the Congress in 1904 that the Canal "has become, as the result of the recent extension of our territorial domination, more than ever essential to our

[1] *U. S. Congressional Record* (46th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1880), v. 10, pt. 2, p. 1399.

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naval defense. . . . Reasons of convenience have been superseded by reasons of vital necessity."[2]

The Canal's contribution, as Captain Mahan stressed in 1912, was to provide the Navy with means of communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific. "Communications," wrote the great authority on seapower, "dominates war in all its aspects."[3] War "in all its aspects," coming in the summer of 1914, a month before the opening of the newly built Canal, confirmed spectacularly the claims which had been made for a trans-isthmian waterway. The efficiency of our Navy was doubled and the supply of key raw materials from abroad was greatly accelerated. So sharp a lesson was not soon to be forgotten by a public already impressed by American engineering prowess.

Two decades later, when war came again in the fall of 1939, naval power was still considered to be our primary defense. Although our forces were divided into three fleets—Atlantic, Pacific and Asiatic—thanks to the Panama Canal, they could rendezvous anywhere in the world in the space of three weeks. The crucial role of the Canal seemed obvious and the course of World War II did nothing to lessen the faith of Americans in the paramount importance of the Canal and of United States control of it.

Since World War II, a great deal has happened to depreciate the strategic significance of the Canal. Its military value has been reduced both by technological developments and by new strategic concepts. Although it still facilitates the efficient disposition of the Navy, there now exists a two-ocean fleet, with aircraft carriers whose beam and canted decks are too great for the Gaillard narrows. Without lessening the convenience and economy of the Canal's facilities for bulk cargo, the growth of continental means of transportation on land and in the air has provided a more adequate alternative to meet the needs of swift wartime mobilization. High speed highways and jet-propelled military and civilian air transport link the east and west coasts with rapid services. Continental pipelines transporting oil at a cost comparable to that of tankers have cut into the volume of inter-coastal trade carried by the Canal. Moreover, the industrial development of the west coast has diverted petroleum products to local consumption. Despite apparent obstacles, it is not impossible that the Arctic Ocean may in time provide an alternative strategic route which

[2] "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904," p. 260–78.
[3] Alfred T. Mahan, "Armaments and Arbitration" (New York: Harper, 1912), p. 184–5.

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will cut nearly 5,000 miles from the 11,200 miles separating the ports of Tokyo and London.

The changed nature of modern warfare has also deprived the Canal of its original importance. As early as 1948, Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, then Commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, pointed out that with the outmoding of face-to-face naval engagements like Jutland or even Midway and the Coral Sea, the two-ocean navy was itself outdated. That left the Canal as a waterway for peacetime shipping and as a route of only secondary usefulness for the wartime transportation of critical materials—hardly a target of prime importance to enemy forces. Since then, the Canal's vulnerability in an atomic-missile war has been demonstrated by the war games of April 1957. Henceforth, the defense of the Canal must be fought far out in the Pacific and the Atlantic or from land bases in continental United States. In the event of a limited war the risk of expanding the conflict is likely to deter the enemy from designating as a strategic target what is no longer a vital supply route.

The danger of sabotage by damaging the locks was recognized even before the Canal was built. A consulting board of engineers reported in 1904 that "it is well-nigh impossible to provide effectually and always against such peril."[4] In consequence, the dream of a less vulnerable, sea-level canal was never quite forgotten. With the explosion of the first nuclear bomb at Hiroshima in 1945, a comprehensive survey was undertaken by Canal officials to determine what effect the new era of warfare might have. The outcome was yet another recommendation for building a sea-level route. The same position was taken in 1954 by a committee of the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, which held that nuclear attacks would have only a temporary effect upon sea-level traffic. Congress, however, was not convinced. Unfavorable action by Congress in the postwar years has been based less upon objection to the estimated cost of two and a half billion dollars than upon the conviction that any kind of canal must be vulnerable to the new weapons. The Congressional view was expressed by Representative Willis W. Bradley, a retired Naval captain:

> As far as I can ascertain, the greatest authorities on modern weapons of war who have given this subject serious attention hold uniformly that any canal would be critically vulnerable to the atomic bomb, regardless of type; that a sea-level canal would be . . . closed for prolonged periods of time beyond any

[4] U. S. Congress, Senate, *Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal,* (59th Cong., 1st Sess., 1906), Senate Doc. No. 231, p. 35.

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hope of speedy restoration; and a sea-level canal cannot be considered secure in an atomic war.[5]

Leading experts on atomic warfare supported the position taken by Congress and some saw in a sea-level canal the danger of developing an American analogue to the Maginot Line.

Measures to protect the existing Canal have changed with the development of new weapons, but happily they have never been tested by enemy action. Before World War I, defense of the Canal within the Navy's waterborne ramparts was divided into "seacoast fortifications" and "land defense by mobile garrisons." But by 1932 the Isthmian Canal Board of the Army, arguing for a second canal through Nicaragua, declared that no proper military protection of the Canal could be devised. Ten years later Secretary of War Stimson found the means of guarding the Canal to be so inadequate as to suggest that the Isthmus would have been a better target for the Japanese than was Pearl Harbor. The overt threat to the Canal in World War II lasted throughout the six months between Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway (June 4, 1942). It was met by concentrating in the Pacific most of the country's remaining naval strength and by stocking extra doors for the canal locks. Local defenses were bolstered by outer and inner patrols of radar-equipped planes and a land-based aircraft warning system.

Since World War II, defense of the Canal has been assigned a low strategic priority. The military is apparently operating on the conclusion expressed by Hanson Baldwin in 1957 that the Canal today is indefensible in total war and short of total war is less defensible and less strategic than ever before. Protection of the Canal is merely skeletal: two anti-aircraft battalions and one infantry regiment, token submarine and surface patrols by the Navy and no permanent units of combat aircraft. Significantly, when Colonel John C. Hickerson, the Army ballistic missile expert convicted of divulging secrets in 1957, was transferred to a Panama Canal Zone billet, *The New York Times* reported that it was "like a policeman being sent to a beat in the sticks."[6]

Today, then, even though any enemy attack would bring airborne response from the continental United States, major strategic importance can no longer be attached to the Canal. Adequate defense of the Canal may be impossible and would certainly

[5] *U. S. Congressional Record* (80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948), v. 94, pt. 10, p. A2451-52.
[6] *The New York Times*, July 26, 1957.

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require a deployment of forces and intelligence units far beyond what is justified by its contribution to the security and welfare of the United States.

III

Since it opened in August 1914, more than one billion tons in trade have been carried through the Canal by more than 260,000 vessels of all types. Nevertheless, in volume of traffic, the Panama Canal does not compare favorably with other important man-made water arteries. The 23 ships passing through its locks daily in 1956 were half the number and bore a third of the tonnage carried by the Suez Canal. The Panama Canal does not link together any of the world's leading commercial areas and as a result only 4 to 5 percent of the world's ocean-going traffic uses it. Present tonnage figures are expected to double by the year 1975 and to triple before the end of the century, but these estimates depend quite as much on favorable political factors as they do upon a general trade expansion among the regions served. Our tariff and foreign assistance programs together with such international contingencies as the Iranian oil controversy and the closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 have all increased the postwar Canal traffic.

The American investment in the Canal, excluding defense construction and the suspended work on the third locks, is carried on the Panama Canal Company's books at less than $360 million. The Canal is operated without cost to the American taxpayer, having been put on a pay-as-you-go basis in 1951 at the insistence of Congress. Current toll collections, amounting to $41.8 million in the fiscal year 1958, are applied to operations of the Panama Canal Company, a semi-autonomous agency (40 percent), interest on the United States investment (20 percent), future development fund (9–10 percent),[7] and annuity payments to the state of Panama (4–5 percent). To support their argument for keeping toll charges at a nominal level, U. S. shipping interests claim that the commercial operations of the Canal have profited the United States by more than $50 million since 1914. They ignore, however, the cost of defending the Canal under U. S. control. Tolls have been kept down to a point where in 1955 they averaged 84 cents a ton as compared with 80 cents a ton for Suez, whose much greater traffic is carried without the expense of operating locks.

[7] A four-year, $19,000,000 project begun in August 1957 will make possible 24-hour service and cut the time of transit by three hours by widening the Canal and providing night lighting.

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Allowing for inflation, the average transit costs are 274 percent below the level established in 1912.

The United States merchant marine is the principal user of the Canal. Before World War II it accounted for 42 percent of the traffic. Since the end of the war it ostensibly has dropped to a third, but the change is misleading since to avoid costly government regulations, United States shipowners have transferred vessels to foreign flags, especially Liberian, Panamanian and Honduran, while plying their former routes through the Canal.

Eight trade routes have accounted for more than 75 percent of the traffic during the last few years. Of these, five terminate in American ports while a sixth is made up of United States intercoastal trade; altogether, 62 percent of the trade through the Canal originates or terminates (or does both) in United States ports. Iron and steel manufactures and lumber dominate the inter-coastal trade; the heaviest exports are coal and scrap iron—principally to Japan, and wheat and flour—principally to Europe; the key imports are iron ore from Peru and Chile, oil from Venezuela, sugar from Asia and bananas from Latin America.

Our economic interests in the Canal are relatively slight as compared to those of Panama and other Latin American states. As a former Panamanian president recently put it, "Panama exists by and for the Canal." Panama's transactions with the Zone reached $45.5 million by 1956, about 24 times the $1.9 million annuity payment committed to Panama by the United States under the treaty of 1955. In return for the goods and services it furnishes the Zone, Panama has been able to import and consume far more than it exports. The combined expenditures in Panama of the United States military establishment, the Panama Canal Company, and Zone residents, together with the earnings of Panamanian employees in the Zone, have actually exceeded the country's international payments in some years. More than 8,100 Panamanians are on the payroll of the Canal Company and another 1,168 work for the Zone administration.

Other countries that also depend heavily upon the Canal are those on the west coast of South America; they rely on trade flowing through the Canal for more than half their export income. These Pacific coast countries are heavily dependent upon export trade, and export duties provide a major source of revenue. Countries outside the Western Hemisphere are also deeply involved in the Canal trade, although their dependence is less marked.

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Nevertheless, ships flying European flags carried almost half of the total tonnage which passed through the Canal in 1957.

IV

The official United States position with regard to the legal status of the Canal and American rights relating to it rests upon Articles 2, 3 and 23 of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, signed in 1903 by the United States and the fledgling republic of Panama. The articles read (italics added for emphasis):

Article 2

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States *in perpetuity* the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said canal of the width of 10 miles. . . .

Article 3

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned . . . which the United States would possess and exercise *if it were the sovereign of the territory* within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.

Article 23

If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed forces for the safety or protection of the Canal, or of the ships that make use of the same, . . . the United States shall have the right, at all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for these purposes.

These provisions of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty were reaffirmed in 1955 in the preamble of the Eisenhower-Remón Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Coöperation. The point was emphasized in the treaty hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, when the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs assured the Senators and other interested parties, such as the President of the Pacific American Steamship Association, that nothing in the 1955 treaty reflected the slightest departure from the traditional American position.

Thus, when Senator Wiley sought assurance that "there is nothing in this present treaty that would in the slightest degree depreciate all the attributes of sovereignty that we possess," Secretary Holland replied:

That is true; and so true is it, that in the course of the negotiations the Panamanians advanced several small requests which, one by one, had considerable appeal, but all of which we refused, because we did not want to leave one

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grain of evidence that could a hundred years hence be interpreted as implying any admission by the United States that we possess and exercise anything less than 100 percent of the rights of sovereignty in this area.[8]

Consistent with this position, in 1956 when Panama was excluded from the conference of the Suez Users Association, Secretary Dulles explained that there was no question of sovereignty in the Zone since "the United States has all the rights which it would possess if it were the sovereign."[9]

These declarations of American rights in the Zone do not mention the legal obligation imposed upon the United States by both the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain to maintain in perpetuity the neutrality of the Canal.[10] In practice the United States has made full use of its control over the Canal Zone. For example, in 1950 the Congress authorized the President to issue special security regulations for the Zone when he deemed it to be endangered by reason of subversive activity. By law the Zone authorities are prohibited from selling petroleum products to ships flying the flags of the Soviet Union, Red China and the Soviet satellites except under special permits issued by the Department of Commerce. In 1954 the French liner *Wyoming* was detained at Cristobal pending investigation of a hidden arms cargo suspected of being shipped from an Eastern European state to Guatemala. More recently, in 1957, Moscow filed a formal complaint when the passage of a Soviet vessel was delayed by Zone officials.

Panamanian authorities, under the influence of a rising tide of nationalism, strongly oppose the position of the United States. To do so is as politically advantageous for them as it is psychologically natural. Sensitive to questions of national pride and dignity, officials and public alike react promptly to real or fancied slights to their country. Public opposition to an agreement extending United States occupancy of certain defense bases led the National Assembly to reject the treaty in 1947. During the Suez crisis in 1956, when Panama failed to receive an invitation to the users' conference, a note was sent to the British Foreign Office recalling that the Panama Canal was on Panama territory and that

[8] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, The Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Coöperation with the Republic of Panama* (84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955), p. 164.

[9] *The New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1956, p. 4.

[10] It was Mr. Dulles himself who said (in 1912), "If it means anything that the Canal is affected with an international use, it means that the Canal is open to all without discrimination."

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Panama was titular sovereign in the Canal Zone despite the grant of certain rights to the United States for specified purposes. When Cairo expressed surprise that the United States and other Western powers should favor international control over the Suez Canal, while opposing a similar régime for the Panama Canal, the Panamanian Minister to Egypt was quick to assert that his government would never accept international control over the Panama Canal. When Secretary Dulles explained Panama's absence from the conference by claiming that the United States represented Panama's interests in the negotiations, the Panamanian Foreign Minister promptly challenged his statement. He declared that the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 regarding neutrality and freedom of transit applied equally to the Panama Canal. "There is no doubt," he said, "that the treaty of 1903 does not grant the United States sovereignty over the Canal. That has been Panama's invariable position since 1904." With the support of press and public for the government's stand, sincere nationalists and political opportunists alike took advantage of the furor for partisan purposes in the presidential campaign of that summer. By the middle of September 1956, *The New York Times* correspondent in Panama could report: "There appears to be hardly a Panamanian who, deep in his heart, would not be happy to see the United States sent packing from the Canal Zone and have the entire Canal operation placed in the hands of Panama."[11]

The provisions of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty came under fire again at a conference on international law held under the auspices of the University of Panama in the spring of 1957. Octavio Fábrega who, as Foreign Minister, had negotiated the 1955 treaty with the United States, attacked Panama's grant of the Canal Zone to the United States in perpetuity as inconsistent with the sovereignty of a nation. He argued that a treaty should have a reasonable period of duration or else be subject to periodic revision. Another exponent of the Panamanian point of view, Professor Cesar A. Quintero, contended that a perpetual treaty could be denounced if such an action had the support of the other Latin American countries. He argued further that any substantial change in the Canal or the construction of a new one would require a new treaty agreement. A number of the participants distinguished between "titular sovereignty" enjoyed by Panama and "jurisdictional sovereignty" enjoyed by the United States.

[11] *The New York Times*, Sept. 16, 1956, p. 24.

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Some went so far as to assert the treaty itself was invalid because of the circumstances in which it was negotiated. For, it will be remembered, Bunau-Varilla, though a duly named envoy of the two-week-old republic, was by nationality a Frenchman; and the treaty, which was accepted in Panama without having been read, was rushed through the United States Senate for approval and then ratified a few hours before the expected arrival in Washington of Panamanians sent to assist Bunau-Varilla.

The question whether these arguments are valid is perhaps less important than whether they reflect a situation destined to grow worse as time passes. Panamanian students commemorate the anniversary of the signing of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty as a day of mourning. It is frequently marked by burning in effigy the French author, whose memory is not cherished in the land, though it owes its independence in part to his operations. Panama's discontent with her position of dependence on the United States is fed by particular grievances. Economic difficulties, the Panamanians feel, would be solved if only a larger annuity were paid from the Canal's earnings. They resent the slowness with which the United States Congress has moved to implement provisions of the 1955 treaty. Not until October 1957 was real estate valued at $25 million finally turned over to Panama and not until July 1958 did United States legislation provide for equal working conditions of Panamanians and United States employees in the Zone. Finally, construction of a high bridge across the Canal at the Pacific entrance is still to be started. Such grievances may seem small but they rankle.

V

A storm is building up in Panama. Appropriate measures taken soon can protect the real as distinguished from the illusory United States interests in the Canal, while a policy of drifting along may jeopardize our interests far beyond Central America.

The conflict cannot be resolved on a national basis, either American or Panamanian. Control of the Canal by the United States, though supported by law, tradition and vast military power, will not be able to withstand the pressures of modern nationalism. The use of force by the United States is out of the question; today, even carefully veiled intervention in the general interest of the Western Hemisphere evokes angry protests, as we saw in the case of Guatemala in 1954. Control of the Canal is

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already exacting a toll in terms of Latin American resentment. This is likely to soar with each new nationalistic demonstration on the Isthmus. For the time being, the Panamanian leaders may control and exploit the nationalistic sentiment to enhance their bargaining power with the United States. But in the long run the United States will confront a situation not unlike that faced by the British in Suez.

Yet, to concede to the tiny population of Panama the power to control a vested interest of the whole community of nations would be no more justifiable than to try to continue the present arrangement. To set up under the Organization of American States a hemispheric agency for operating the Canal, a waterway which *serves all maritime powers directly and all others indirectly*, would open it to the same objections which can be charged against a Danube Commission made up only of riparian powers. There remains the alternative of establishing under the United Nations a specialized agency, the Panama Canal Commission, serving and responsible to the community of nations, and including representatives of the Canal's principal users.

Internationalization would leave unimpaired the real interests of the United States, namely, the preservation of the Canal and access to it, good service at low cost, and a voice in the operation of the Canal. The security of the Canal would be, if anything, enhanced. Already hopelessly vulnerable, an internationalized Canal might seem to a potential aggressor a less attractive target than one under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. In any case, the United States would be entitled to come to the defense of the Canal, if defense were feasible, by acting within the United Nations under Article 51 of the Charter or the "Uniting for Peace" procedures. Such action in defense of an international agency would enjoy moral and practical support which the defense of an exclusive interest claimed by the United States could not evoke. The same principle would apply in the event of limited warfare, where, again, the United States would be in a better moral position to attract the support of the world community.

Good service at a reasonable cost could also be expected from an international agency. Indeed, from a strictly economic standpoint internationalization would offer every hope of bringing an improvement. Less exposed to special-interest pressures than is the United States Congress, a Panama Canal Commission could more readily determine an optimum toll schedule for facilitating

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the flow of traffic and yet building up reserves for needed improvements. And finally, participation in the operation of the Canal would be ensured as long as the United States remained one of the principal users.

It might be argued that internationalization would be injurious to certain interests claimed by Panama, which stands in a special relationship to the Canal. Under international jurisdiction, Panama could expect little support for grandiose schemes for third locks or a sea-level channel. But that, as we have seen, is the present situation. Then, too, Panama's bargaining power, derived from pitting the claims of nationalism against those of the United States colossus, would be lost. Yet this would be more than compensated for by the more effective support which Panama would obtain from Latin American representatives on the Panama Canal Commission. Finally, Panama would lose to the international agency powers heretofore claimed (but not exercised) by itself with respect to the Canal, but by the same measure it would render itself more secure from the arbitrary exercise of power by others.

More than ten years have elapsed since President Truman proposed to the Potsdam Conference that the Panama and Suez Canals and other waterways vital to maritime commerce be placed under the United Nations. He was not heeded. Since then the Danube has succumbed to international Communism and the Suez to Arab nationalism. In many other quarters claims to exclusive national control over waters hitherto regarded as high seas are being pressed with growing insistence. To reverse the tide will take inspired statesmanship and the initiative of a great power. Will history record that the United States was the power and the Panama Canal its instrument?

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CLASS AND CONFLICT IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

By Peregrine Worsthorne

IT has often been pointed out that revolutions make strangely little difference to a country's foreign policy. Each new set of rulers, however much it may differ from its predecessors in everything else, sees the national interest in very much the same way. Communist Russian diplomacy, for example, pursues the same broad aims as Tsarist diplomacy—only with more skill and success. Whatever régime rules in Russia, access to the Mediterranean will seem a glittering prize. Similarly, French revolutionary leaders after 1789 were as concerned to expand their country's frontiers as Louis XIV ever was. Faith in the brotherhood of man in no way precluded belief in a frontier on the Rhine. The reasons for this diplomatic continuity are obvious. A nation's foreign policy is aimed at preserving and increasing the power of the state. Since the purpose of revolution is to seize control of this power there is no necessary reason why a new régime, however much it may differ internally from its predecessor, should alter its basic attitudes to the world outside.

Revolutions, nevertheless, do have an immense influence on foreign policy—not on its aims but on its ability to achieve them. If as a result of revolution a country is racked with civil strife, its enemies will seize this opportunity to limit its power, as happened in 1917 to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if as a result of revolution a nation is invigorated with a new dynamism, as happened to France in 1789, this will add enormously to the momentum of its traditional foreign policy. The inspiration of the *Marseillaise* was a major card in the hands of post-revolutionary French diplomacy, just as the appeal of Marxism-Leninism today enables Soviet Russia's present rulers to set their diplomatic sights far higher than did the Romanovs. The same, of course, is true of revolutionary China and Egypt today. Communist China's basic diplomatic aims show marked similarities to those of Imperial China down the ages. Farouk claimed to be leader of the Arab world no less than Nasser does today. But in each case revolution provided a new popular backing for historic national aims. In the same way, General de Gaulle's revolution last year, while in no major way changing the direc-

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tion of France's foreign policy, seems to have substantially improved its chance of success.

Why is it, therefore, that Britain's postwar social revolution, far from re-animating British foreign policy, seems rather to have dulled its urgency and blunted its purpose? It is difficult to recall a period in modern British history when the nation felt so passive about its role in the world. There are, of course, a great number of purely external reasons which explain this passivity: the polarization of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, the collapse of empire in the face of Afro-Asian nationalism, the psychological difficulties of adjustment from a leading to a secondary power. But none of these reasons adequately explains Britain's particular malaise. The French Fifth Republic, after all, appears able to show a new buoyancy and purpose, in spite of external difficulties greatly in excess of those that face Great Britain. The answer, it seems to me, is that Britain's postwar revolution, although apparently so mild and moderate, has in fact placed a far greater strain on the body politic than the far more spectacular upheavals which have taken place elsewhere.

In contrast to revolutions which turn society on its head, like those in Russia or China, or bring a new man or men to power, like those in Egypt or France, the British revolution merely confused the existing hierarchy without in any radical way reversing its order. Those previously on top remained on top—although less securely so—while those underneath remained underneath—although less uncomfortably so. My point is that although such modifications look very much less dramatic than the violent revolutions elsewhere, and certainly involve fewer changes in the lives of those concerned, the effect is likely to be much greater. For if you turn society completely upside down, the "downs" become the "ups" and vice versa. But to lean slightly to the Left, which is what Britain did, although it looks less dramatic, in fact places a far greater strain on the national muscles. The whole balance of the body politic is upset, without any new equilibrium being acquired. Unlike the somersault revolutions in 1917 Russia or 1789 France, which brought a rush of new blood to the national head, and stirred up every organ in the system, the British shift to the Left merely cramped the old national posture without releasing any new energies. Britain's postwar revolution weakened the old ruling class without replacing it, and strengthened the economic condition of the working class without giving it real

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political power. As a result, British leadership has lost its former intense concern in promoting the national interest, while the masses, enjoying their newly won comforts, see no reason to make sacrifices which their leaders feel too insecure to demand.

Contemporary Britain has rightly been described as a "stalemate state." The conservative elements in the nation have accepted a modicum of redistribution of wealth on the condition that the socialists drop their crusade for an egalitarian society; and the socialists have reconciled themselves to the continuation of social privileges on condition that those who enjoy the privileges renounce their belief in an aristocratic system of government. Both sides, in short, have sacrificed the content of their faith, its essential virtue, in return for certain short-term concessions. In return for conservatism's acceptance of the Welfare State, the socialists have agreed to preserve the public schools, the preëminence of Oxford and Cambridge, upper and middle-class domination of finance and industry, the armed forces and the civil service. In return for socialist toleration of the old order's de facto enjoyment of its traditional privileges, the conservatives have agreed to jettison its de jure claim to enjoy these privileges by right. What the postwar revolution amounts to in effect is the status quo called by a different name. Whereas before the war the situation was regarded by the Left as diabolical and by the Right as divinely ordained—a source of moral passion as much for the one as the other—today it is passively accepted as a makeshift bargain which nobody loves or hates but everybody exploits as best they may. This shoddy hodgepodge is often praised as a truly splendid example of the British gift for compromise. My own view is that it leaves Britain with the worst of both social worlds: the stultifying materialism of socialism without its idealistic leaven and the privileges of conservatism without its aristocratic leaven.

I quite realize that this description of contemporary Britain may seem fanciful both to residents and foreigners alike. But this is because it is so easy to be deceived by appearances. Because our institutions have not changed it is assumed that the basic attitudes with which they were associated remain the same. Because Britain still boasts a Queen it is assumed that her subjects are still prepared to die in her service; because the Foreign Office is still peopled by public school gentlemen, it is assumed that they share the faith of their fathers; because ministers still

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talk in the traditional language of nineteenth century diplomacy, it is assumed that their audiences understand what they are saying; because the man in the street still enjoys singing "Land of Hope and Glory," it is assumed that he still feels intensely proud to be British. Because, in short, John Bull still looks so astonishingly unchanged, it is assumed that he is basically the same as he always was.

This view is as misleading as was the assumption in the 1920s and 1930s that, because all the institutions in Russia had changed, her basic attitude to the world must necessarily have altered as well. Because post-revolutionary Russia looked so different from imperial Russia, because her leaders used different language and dressed in different clothes, the outside world imagined that she had renounced all her classical foreign policy aims. My point is that just as it was foolish to exaggerate the degree to which institutional change would affect foreign policy in Russia, so it is wrong to exaggerate the degree to which absence of institutional change is likely to preserve intact classical foreign policy attitudes in Britain. The Russians stopped talking power politics but went on practicing it. Britain has stopped practicing it, but goes on talking as though it did. I suppose the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact awoke the world to the fact that Communist Russia could play power politics in the classical manner, just as the total collapse of Eden's Suez adventure awoke the world to the fact that Britain no longer could. But just as the Allies' wartime solidarity with the Soviet Union made it easy to forget the Molotov-Ribbentrop lesson—that Moscow would stop at nothing—so Mr. Macmillan's skillful recovery from Suez has disguised its true lesson: that Britain would stop at anything. I cannot, however, forget the glimpse of Britain which Suez momentarily revealed. The classical aims were there, all right. So were the traditional actors. Etonians were in the Cabinet; Sandhurst-trained generals at the War Office; the gentlemen of England rallied to the cause, as, by and large, did the rank and file. The intellectuals complained, but even that was nothing new. Yet somehow the body politic refused to function. The well-known tableau of the "British Lion Aroused" failed to come alive.

No point would be served by going over again all the immediate causes—diplomatic, economic and military—of the Suez failure. Far more revealing, in my opinion, are the social causes which hitherto have been almost entirely ignored. The significance of

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Suez was not the evidence it supplied of Britain's military and diplomatic vulnerability. This, after all, was well known. What was not well known was the grave condition of Britain's body politic. The fruits of ten years of social revolution were revealed: a faltering government, an inefficient armed force, a confused public opinion and a younger generation whose most articulate members clearly felt a profound contempt for the country of their birth. How had this happened?

The answer, it seems to me, lies in the nature of Britain's post-war revolution which has destroyed Toryism without creating Socialism; which has disheartened the middle class without invigorating the lower class; which has drained the blood out of the class system while leaving its outward form intact. Both Left and Right, looking at contemporary Britain, can only see reflected a caricature of their respective social images. Because neither side was strong enough to promote its ideals, both agreed to compromise on a Britain reflecting the lowest common denominator of the philosophy of each.

The case against contemporary British socialism was well put recently by Mr. Paul Johnson, assistant editor of the left-wing weekly, the *New Statesman:*

> Labour . . . after 1945 thought that vertical nationalisation of key industries could place the centres of economic power in the control of the public, and that a limited redistribution of incomes would destroy the class structure. Neither of these things happened. Nationalisation gave the State only a marginal increase in control over the direction of the economy, whilst high income tax merely increased the power and importance of capital. Public ownership became discredited as a social objective because it was presented as merely an alternative system of management. Under high taxation, possession of inherited wealth, or any form of property, became not less but more valuable. Labour effectively prevented the poor or the hard working from becoming rich, while allowing the rich to become richer. Nor has even the limited redistribution of income in the years 1945–58 produced any corresponding changes in the social structure. Where economic barriers between the classes were lowered or demolished, they have been speedily and effectively replaced by social ones . . . more solid by their very nature, for they are largely immune to legislative attack. Social behaviour, as opposed to the distribution of wealth, is not a legitimate or even practicable field for political policy, but it is a vital factor in the distribution of political power. In this metaphysical citadel, which Marx and all his followers had ignored, the British class system was able to rest, recuperate and emerge stronger than before.
>
> Our class structure has survived for two reasons. First, it is complex and finely graduated: the yawning chasms which breed violent jealousies, and

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therefore violent changes, have never been allowed to emerge. Second, it is inclusive, not exclusive. Rising economic groups have always been allowed to find their natural level in the social hierarchy, and the upper tiers have always taken care to come to terms with, and subsequently annex, emergent institutions. This dual process has been hard at work since the war. As full employment and high investment have increased the national income, so the dominant classes have welcomed new recruits and thus broadened their basis of acceptance. Equally, they have accepted and neutralized the new centres of power. The leaders of the Labour Party and the trade-union movement have been given their natural places in the establishment. The new graduates of the Welfare State were slowly and carefully digested. Many of them, of course, went into science and technology, still totally excluded from social and political power. But a number—too few to dilute the spirit of the existing structure, but enough when converted to bring it a perceptible accession of strength—went into those central citadels: the executive grades of industry, the Press, wireless and television, the Treasury, the Foreign Service and the law. As with working class entrants to public schools, the proportion was never allowed to exceed 10 percent. For, although the higher classes have always opened their ranks to new recruits, they will never tolerate an influx of sufficient magnitude to produce a real change of character.[1]

From the way Mr. Johnson puts it, of course, one might assume that the conservative elements in the country had completely reversed the socialist tide and had no further reason to fear. Conservative publicists, however, paint a very different picture. While agreeing that the Tory counter-revolution has nipped socialism in the bud they emphasize the high cost which the Tories have had to pay. The essential quality of Toryism, they pointed out, is that it guarantees a ruling class sufficient security of tenure to enable it to perform its proper function of national leadership. It can afford to plan for the future, in every field, because its present is guaranteed. It can afford to take the long view because it can reasonably expect to be there to inherit the long-term blessings.

This surely is the basic argument for making property, birth and upbringing, rather than merit or ability, the determinants of status, power and income. It may mean that at any particular moment society is less well governed than it could be—in that the best brains and characters will not necessarily be on top—but at least there will be those essential elements of continuity and security which in the long run are even more important for the health of the body politic.

[1] "Conviction," ed. by N. I. Mackenzie (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1958).

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Continuity and security, however, are precisely what socialism has succeeded in undermining. Britain's old order has won a reprieve but not an acquittal. It is allowed to exist, but denied the climate in which it can function. As a result, although birth and upbringing still determine the composition of those who govern Britain—with all the disadvantages which this implies—they do so without any of the advantages to society which such a system should entail. The virtue of a hereditary system is not so much that the men in power should have succeeded from their fathers but that they should feel confident of being able to bequeath to their sons. Under the present conservative-socialist compromise Britain has the disadvantage of the former without the advantages of the latter. There is, therefore, quite as much dissatisfaction on the Right as on the Left. The Tory counter-revolution has run into as frustrating a dead end as the socialist revolution.

The essence of a class system is that its various grades should accept the basic hierarchy as reasonable and right and permanent. It is no good allowing a duke to be a duke, a capitalist to be a capitalist, a landowner to be a landowner, or a working man to remain a working man if in fact the values which such a stratified society reflects are no longer held to be valid. If you allow a duke to call himself a duke, but deny him the authority which gives any function to his title; if you allow a capitalist to hang on to his millions but deny him the freedom to use them as he thinks fit; if you allow the landowner to enjoy his land, but take away the sense of responsibility that should go with it; and if you allow the worker to work but assure him that he ought to be enjoying power, then you get a society in which nobody can feel inclined to dig deep roots. Nobody is doing what they feel they ought to be doing. Guilt and resentment become the dominating emotions. Everybody feels out of place, insecure and on the move. Britain's social revolution, in other words, has killed the class system in theory without killing it in fact; has left the edifice standing but removed the cement which gave it solidity and endurance.

As a result, a generation is growing up which finds Britain a peculiarly uninspiring society in which to live. The best known manifestation of this mood of dissatisfaction is the cult of the "angry young men," exemplified by the Jimmy Porter of John Osborne's "Look Back in Anger." Jimmy Porter accurately reflects the bitter disillusion of those thousands of working-class

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or lower-middle-class young people who feel that their talents, sedulously developed by Welfare State education, can find no satisfying outlet in the contemporary social system. Led to believe that they would inherit a new socialist Jerusalem, where demon snobbery had been exorcised and class barriers destroyed, they find themselves living in a society where snobbery and class barriers have never been so conspicuous. Although, thanks to the redistribution of incomes, they have more money in their pockets than their fathers ever had, and thanks to the state educational system, more brains in their heads, they still cannot scale the citadels of social privilege. There is certainly some truth in this complaint. Precisely because the upper and middle class have been reduced economically in relation to the rest of the country they have more and more fallen back on the last-ditch defense: social superiority.

This is why, of course, the whole weight of the angry young men's ire is directed against the social and not the economic system. Their hatred of the monarchy, for example, arises from the Queen's position as head of a social pyramid allegedly blocking working-class access to social prestige and status. This same basic social frustration also explains their antipathy to all the traditional institutions and values which the deeply rooted class system has evolved. The danger here is that in Britain, more perhaps than in any other country, this kind of social bitterness leads to a rejection of the national image itself. It is very difficult to hate the British social system and love Britain, because the two are so inextricably interwoven. All the sights and sounds and memories which strike chords of patriotism in British breasts are bound up with aristocratic England. Her pantheon of heroes is filled with kings and nobles; her monuments and symbols of glory and power are all deeply embedded in the old order. Unlike France, for example, where the ancient régime was replaced by a revolutionary order which raised France to its pinnacle of power, or America where the national legend draws its strength from a successful revolution, Britain's postwar revolution is essentially unheroic. If anything, it is associated with the decline of British power. Those, therefore, who reject the old order have no alternative national image in which their patriotism can find its natural outlet. Patriotism in France and America means pride in revolutionary achievements. Rejection of the old order is synonymous with love of country. But in Britain, if you reject the old order,

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you are cut off from the main links which bind you to your national heritage. So long as the socialist crusade carried conviction it was possible to replace contempt for the past by hope for the future. But today the angry young men are as critical of socialism as a means for improving the future as they are opposed to conservatism as a means of preserving the past. They find the Red flag as irrelevant to their problems as the Union Jack.

It is often argued that the angry young men are only a small minority, who happen to include amongst their numbers a few exceptionally able writers. I should be more inclined to write their views off as those of a harmless minority if there was not an almost equally negative attitude in their public-school counterparts. It is negative for quite different reasons, of course, but negative all the same. With them the problem is not one of being cut off from the fruits of power and position, but of finding the fruits just not worth eating.

Take, for example, the public-school son of a senior industrial executive. His upbringing will not differ much from his father's or grandfather's—Eton, Oxford, perhaps the Guards, with an assured partnership in the family firm waiting in the background. Privilege will still smooth his way to the top. But the climate of values in which this process takes place will be profoundly different from that which shaped his father and grandfather. He will not regard these advantages as in any way imposing on him a debt of social responsibility. In the first place the existence of the Welfare State makes any such feeling of paternalism seem absurdly old-fashioned. Secondly, because he will be clever enough to realize that his advantages contradict the basic doctrinal assumptions of the society in which he lives, he will regard them as a piece of good fortune, like winning a football pool, which requires neither gratitude nor repayment. Privilege today has a black-market flavor. Those who are lucky enough to enjoy it do not like to rationalize their good fortune, or to attempt to justify it by accepting its obligations. It is regarded as a "perk" which society dispenses for no particular reason. The less said or done about it the less likely society will be to have second thoughts. This privileged section of British youth enjoys life, but in a spirit of indulgent skepticism. In so far as they are interested in politics, it is as a means of protecting a cozy billet. But to sacrifice anything for a cozy billet is clearly a contradiction in terms, like dying for a standard of living.

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There is, I should say, something in common between this kind of privileged negation and the attitude of the angry young men. Both these wings of the younger generation enjoy material well-being, the one nearly as great as that of their fathers and the other infinitely greater. But neither feels at all strongly about society itself.

Any discussion of Britain's role in the world in the years ahead must, I think, take this grave symptom of the health of the body politic very much into consideration. Speeches by statesmen and all other forms of articulation of the national mood by officials or members of "the Establishment" ignore its gravity or draw false comforts from a comparison with the famous prewar resolution of the Oxford Union. In 1935 the young men of Oxford resolved that they would not die for King or Country, only to eat their words with heroic zeal a few years later. Why should not contemporary cynicism prove an equally superficial phase? The answer is really very simple. In the first place the young men who took part in the Oxford resolution were protesting against war, not against King or Country. It was a pacifist manifestation pure and very simple. They did not say they would not fight for King or Country because they did not care a damn for King or Country, but merely that they would not *fight*. Naturally enough, the menace of Hitlerian aggression soon changed this tune. The contemporary mood I have been attempting to describe represents a social malaise which has nothing to do with emotional pacifism. It has to do with King and Country, and not war. Furthermore, we obviously cannot assume that some direct act of military aggression will dramatically put an end to the complaint. We have to consider the contemporary mood not in relation to hot war—which changes everything overnight—but in relation to a protracted period of cold war, where morale cannot rely upon the artificial boost of intense and visible danger.

Seen in this context the contemporary mood can be said to have significantly influenced the way Britain looks at the world. Internally, Britain has reached a condition of social stalemate. The impulse towards socialist egalitarianism and the weight of conservatism have reached a point of balance. Although neither element feels satisfied with the compromise, each sees no hope of overthrowing the balance in its favor or having the balance overthrown to its disadvantage through internal political means. But precisely because there seems little immediate opportunity

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for far-reaching internal change—socialism has lost confidence in being able to forge a new basis of society and conservatism has no hope of truly re-animating the old—the attention of both is more and more turning to the outside world which the Left is beginning to see as its real opportunity and the Right as its real danger. This interest in the outside world, however, is of quite a new kind. It is not concerned with what Britain can do to or for other countries, but what others can do to or for Britain. On the one hand, the Left is beginning to look to the outside world as the *deus ex machina* which will impose on Britain the revolutionary changes which socialism has failed to achieve, and, on the other, the Right sees in the outside world a far more immediate threat to their privileges than anything they need fear at home. This is why you have the remarkable spectacle of the Left welcoming the forces of nationalism in the world at large, which they rightly see as more likely to undermine the old order in Britain than anything they can do themselves, and the Right reacting against nationalism with a fierceness and passion which in the past would have been aroused only by internal threats. Not since the days of the French Revolution, which the radicals welcomed as a God-given ally in their reformist struggle at home and the Tories feared as a far more deadly virus than any native germ, has Britain been so acutely concerned with what is going on abroad. No domestic political argument in Britain today is half so intense as that aroused by the activities of Colonel Nasser, for the good reason that what Nasser stands for seems far more significant in its effect on Britain than anything being said or done by British politicians themselves.

Take as another example the highly important field of Anglo-American relations. The last few years have witnessed an astonishing change in the attitude of the British Left to the United States, particularly amongst its intellectuals. Instead of being represented as the main fortress of the capitalist enemy, it is now held up as the shining example of classless egalitarianism, of the open society. C. A. R. Crosland's latest book, which is the only major pronouncement on the future of socialism written since the war, amounted in effect to a plea for the "Americanization" of Britain. Social equality, he argued, rather than any major change in economic organization, should be the new aim, and the United States was enthusiastically held up as the model which Britain should seek to emulate. As a result, close links with the New

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World are welcomed by the Left as one more means of facilitating changes in Britain. At the same time, because American foreign policy is also regarded on the Left as the principal buttress of British power, thereby giving succor and support to the old order, the United States is as much disliked—at least below the official surface—for its power and diplomacy as it is admired for its social accomplishments. The same ambivalence to the United States is evident on the Right. While placing great emphasis on the Anglo-American alliance as the only available method of supporting British power, there is very real suspicion about the social and cultural influence on Britain of the American way of life.

It is, therefore, no longer entirely relevant in any foreign affairs discussion to measure what Britain ought or ought not to do by using the yardstick of the national interest. National interest assumes the existence of a cohesive nation with a common concern in maintaining its security and power. But today, at least among the younger generation, there is no such cohesion. The angry young men positively welcome the disintegration of empire, the humiliation of the British *raj,* the expropriation of British property abroad, even the defeat of British troops, because each blow helps to undermine a social system which they find intensely antipathetic. The argument, for example, that Britain must intervene in Jordan to protect British interests gets turned on its head. Why should she intervene, since successful intervention will merely help to maintain the status quo in Britain, whereas if Nasser is allowed to succeed this will help to sweep away the old order which depends on maintenance of British power in the world?

Heretical as it may seem, this attitude on the Left is really very similar to the attitude of the French Right before the last war. Having come to regard the Republican image with disgust, they welcomed the Germans as an ally. Only through national defeat could the revolutionary institutions be overthrown. The collapse of the Third Republic was hailed as an opportunity to rebuild France as if the revolution had never taken place. I would not go so far as to allege that the angry young men consciously hope for Britain's defeat. Nor, indeed, did the French Right hope for France's defeat until it had actually happened. But in both cases disgust with the status quo, combined with inability to do anything effective to change it, results in a tragic clash between patriotism and political conviction.

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A somewhat different but equally disturbing dilemma faces those who wish to defend the status quo in Britain. Just as the Left find their desire for change in Britain tempting them to jeopardize the national interest abroad, so the Right find their fear of change in Britain tempting them to be unduly zealous—indeed hysterical—in their defense of the national interest abroad. The Right is acutely aware that the kind of Britain it wishes to preserve very largely depends on Britain remaining a great power. Certainly the Conservative Party's main appeal to the great mass of the voters is its close association with national greatness. It is as the "conserver" of the land of Hope and Glory—with the emphasis very much on the glory—that it wins elections. And it is because the class system is so closely associated in the public mind with the greatness of England that it is so hard to shake. The decline of Britain as a great power, therefore, would undermine the basic conservative appeal far more effectively than socialist legislation. A social system that seemed right and proper while it produced a nation capable of leading the world will look very different when that nation is in decline. What is the point of maintaining a Queen Empress without an empire to rule over? Or a public school system designed to produce a race of colonial administrators without any colonies to administer? Or an Eton on whose playing fields battles are won, if Britain can no longer afford to win battles without relying on the Americans? Everything about the British class system begins to look foolish and tacky when related to a second-class power on the decline, like a ceremonial robe cut for a young Apollo hanging loosely around his shrunken limbs in old age. It is in no way surprising, therefore, that conservative-minded Englishmen should resist so strongly the emerging nationalism abroad which seems to threaten their country's position and by implication the whole structure of British society. Nor, by the same token, is it at all surprising that those who wish to see a basic change in the structure of British society should put more faith in Colonel Nasser than in Mr. Gaitskell. Nor, finally, is it at all surprising that British foreign policy, so increasingly motivated by opposing aims, neither of which depends on objective analysis of the national interest, should lack central purpose and effective direction.

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FRANCO-GERMAN COEXISTENCE AT LAST?

By G. P. Gooch

FOR centuries French militarism was the nightmare of Germans, and following 1870 the spectre of German aggression robbed Frenchmen of their sleep. Whichever pugilist triumphed in the latest struggle, both were aware that another round in the perpetual contest was not far away. When *Père la Victoire* left the arena, his policy of keeping the defeated foe down was continued by Poincaré, who invaded the Ruhr to enforce payment of reparations. Never was there a graver political, economic or psychological miscalculation, never a more complete fiasco. The Entente Cordiale was strained almost to the breaking-point, and the German mark, already on its last legs, received the *coup de grâce;* the German people, irrespective of party, became not merely less inclined but even less able to pay. Thus the soil was prepared for a new harvest of fevered nationalism bent on tearing up the Treaty of Versailles; and Hitler staged his putsch in Munich. Lloyd George argued in his impressive volumes on the Versailles Treaty that it was the best which the passions and pressures of the hour allowed. Farsighted observers, however, among them some of the signatories, had instinctively realized that the towering edifice was built on shifting sand. With wiser statesmanship we might never have heard of Hitler and there might have been no Second World War.

Prospects of something more than an uneasy truce dawned when "the sunshine of Locarno" lit up the horizon and warmed the hearts of Stresemann, Briand and Austen Chamberlain, who had grown to trust each other. They must all learn to speak European, declared the most eloquent and imaginative of French statesmen, who assured his countrymen, "*Tant que je serais ici il n'y aura pas de guerre.*" For the next few years more friendly breezes floated across the Rhine. Germany was welcomed into the League of Nations; signatories of the Kellogg Pact, including France and Germany, renounced war as an instrument of policy; and the occupation of the Rhineland zones ended five years before the treaty limit was reached. I shared the prevailing belief that the volcano was unlikely to erupt afresh for a considerable period, if at all.

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We were soon undeceived. While the twenties closed on a hopeful note, the thirties opened with dark clouds in the sky. Soon after Sir Arthur Salter published his heartening survey "Recovery," the American blizzard swept across the Atlantic and sent the figures of unemployment in Germany rocketing to seven million. The Weimar statesmen had done what they could with a crushing heritage of defeat and humiliation, but democracy had no roots in what Herder had acidly described as the land of obedience. In the elections of September 1930, the Nazi deputies jumped from 12 to 107. Hitler was now halfway up the ladder.

When I read on the London placards on January 30, 1932, the announcement "Hitler Chancellor," I felt that the truce of exhaustion was over and that a new era had begun. Shortly afterwards an American journalist published a little book, "Nazi Germany Means War," but he found few statesmen in Western capitals to heed his warning. Since the Grand Alliance had disintegrated, Hitler found the road wide open when he sent troops into the demilitarized zone and proceeded to gobble up Austria and Czechoslovakia without opposition. Once again he had proved that it is as impossible to hold down large and virile nations as it is to maintain alliances when their vital purpose has been achieved. In the apologia compiled in his cell while awaiting execution, Laval argued that the Second World War was not solely due to the ambitions of a megalomaniac but also to the errors of French politicians, such as driving Mussolini into the German camp. The indictment has been renewed from a different angle with equal severity in the memoirs of Paul Reynaud and General de Gaulle, who lament that the appeal of the latter for a mechanized army to cope with the next German onslaught fell on deaf ears. It was no foe or foreigner who described France in the thirties as the sick man of Europe but one of the cleverest of her politicians, Paul Reynaud himself. And so it proved in 1940. The title he chose for his voluminous apologia, "La France a sauvé l'Europe," strikes even a Francophile as turning the picture upside down. The weakness of France can no longer be concealed from the world or from herself. The failure of the Treaty of Versailles to lead stricken Europe back to the paths of peace is a solemn warning to statesmen of today on both sides of the Atlantic confronted with a similar situation of military triumph. Victories exploited up to or beyond the limit of human endurance are liable to prove boomerangs.

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The principal lesson of this brief retrospect is that the making of a lasting peace by the victors is only less difficult than the winning of the struggle, and that psychological myopia is capable of producing earth-shaking consequences. Germany had recovered her breath after the knockout blow in 1918 as quickly as France under Thiers and Gambetta after the Treaty of Frankfurt. Moderation in victory—even a touch of magnanimity—is also worldly wisdom. While little states can be extinguished as easily as the flame of a candle, great states are as resilient as a rubber ball.

II

The First World War has been described as the War of the Dissolution of the Austrian Empire, and its successor may be termed the War of the Collapse of the Bismarckian Edifice. No one before Alamein and Stalingrad would have dared to predict that the strongest military power in the world would cease to exist as a political entity and that the word Prussia would disappear from the map. The substitution of a democratic republic for an authoritarian empire in 1918 was a trifle compared to the radical amputation of 1945. The loss of extensive territories in the east followed the usual pattern of victories where the loser pays. What was wholly unpredictable was the division of the rump into two spheres, not as a temporary military or administrative convenience, but as a quasi-permanent severance with utterly different institutions and ideologies. The barrier of suspicion between the Teuton and the Slav is an old story, but never has the instinctive antagonism hardened into such rigid forms. The gulf between Communist states and the self-governing communities of the West is even deeper than the destruction of ecclesiastical unity at the Reformation and may prove not less enduring, since the Communist and the free worlds have less in common than had the rival churches. Such a formidable challenge to Christian civilization has been unknown since the Turkish irruption in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and each side is too strong to be coerced by the other.

After the eviction of Charles X in 1830, Metternich grumbled that when France had a cold all Europe began to sneeze. When sneezing is heard today the virus is much more likely to have escaped from Moscow or Budapest. Burke passionately denounced Jacobinism as an armed doctrine, and the label is equally

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applicable to the formidable oligarchy in the Kremlin which not only proclaims its intention but boasts of its capacity to enthrone Communism throughout the world. What that system means to men and women born into a Rechtsstaat is demonstrated by the hordes of refugees now pouring in an unceasing flow into the Federal Republic from behind the Iron Curtain. Man does not live by bread alone; the mind and soul also require sustenance. In one of his challenging aphorisms Lord Acton declared the emancipation of conscience from authority to be the main content of modern history. In Communist states the flowering of the individual is frustrated and the claims of conscience contemptuously ignored.

The more threatening the political and spiritual peril to our Western way of life built up through the centuries, the more urgent is the duty and the more obvious the interest of France and Germany to create a climate of opinion in which the dark heritage of suspicion may gradually disappear for lack of sustenance. A similar unpredictable transformation occurred when Great Britain and France buried the rusty hatchet forever in 1904; and my vivid memories reach back to the eighties and nineties of the last century when one Anglo-French crisis followed another and the Fashoda dispute brought the old rivals to the brink of war. To Rosebery and to Salisbury it was an axiom that France was and would remain the enemy and that all Britain could do was to keep her powder dry. That these two countries would shortly become trustful friends and comrades on the battlefield never crossed their minds. Two years after Salisbury's death the old antagonists beat their swords into ploughshares. What had proved beyond the wit of diplomats was automatically achieved by the emergence of a decisive new factor, Germany's *Flottenpolitik*.

Three years later Britain achieved a similar rapprochement with Russia, since the allies of France could not forever remain enemies. Scowling faces had melted into smiles, and war with France became as unthinkable as with the United States. The precedent of this rapid and fundamental shift in the European situation should encourage us to believe that something equally significant and no less welcome may prove practicable today, with the Communist spectre playing the part of a *deus ex machina* previously taken by the German High Sea Fleet. Sentiment is not involved in dramatic moves on the European chessboard; nations

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can hate but cannot love each other. New perils necessitate revision of policies. It will be one of the beneficent paradoxes of history if the secular Franco-German contest is terminated, not by the latest victory of either but by their simultaneous recognition that nothing less than the survival of their political independence and their cherished way of life are at stake.

With our chastening memories of the false dawn which gilded the sky at Locarno we dare not pitch our hopes too high, but there are some solid grounds for cautious optimism. "We have enough," declared Bismarck after his three wars, and his policy during the following 20 years proved that he meant it. Today France can truthfully make a similar declaration. If she mourns for lost territories they are no longer at her door but overseas. Though the Federal Republic surpasses her in population, industry and commerce and may soon equal her armed strength, its citizens appear to be reconciled to the loss of "the challenge cup of Europe." This tacit renunciation of Alsace and Lorraine has been facilitated by the Coal and Steel Community, and by the growing recognition of the tangible advantages of economic partnership. If most Germans have reconciled themselves to the spectacle of the Rhine provinces as an integral portion of France, Frenchmen are content to see the Saar with its mineral treasures in German hands. While the sentiments of the population of Alsace and Lorraine were too little known to allow either France or Germany to risk a free vote, there has been no doubt about the feelings of the Saarlanders since the plebiscite of 1935. No one today would argue as did Foch that if France lacked the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads over the Rhine she possessed nothing, for discontented subjects are more of a liability than an asset, above all when they are not guaranteed by overwhelming military strength.

In addition to the Rhine provinces and the Saar a third bone of contention has disappeared. In what Friedjung in his last work designated the Age of Imperialism, all the Great Powers except the Hapsburg Empire regarded the possession of colonies as essential to their prestige, their military strength and their economic viability, and they proceeded to help themselves at the expense of Asian and African peoples. Today the wheel has come full circle. We no longer obey Kipling's injunction: "Take up the white man's burden." Willingly or unwillingly we are laying it down. No longer are Matthew Arnold's verses applicable:

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> The East bowed low before the blast,
> In patient, deep disdain.
> She let the legions thunder past,
> And plunged in thought again.

The picture of a dreamy, traditionalist, nerveless Asia faded with the Japanese victory over Russia and the rise of the Congress Party in India. And now Africa is opening her eyes and clamoring for a place in the sun. With the tide of nationalism running like a mountain torrent the elemental urge of colored peoples to cast off a foreign yoke, with "colonialism" an expression of reproach, and with millions ready to die for their newborn faith, the acquisition and retention of colonies is infinitely less tempting than at the turn of the century. In view of recent events in Indochina, Indonesia and North Africa, the Federal Republic can congratulate itself that it is not burdened with the military and financial incubus of a colonial empire. Bismarck—neither a Pan-German nor an Imperialist—never wanted colonies, and yielded to the popular demand and the pressure of a group of industrialists only when he cut several slices off the African joint. These trophies disappeared as the result of the First World War, and Hitler bade his countrymen turn their gaze from distant lands to a far richer prize in the plains of South Russia "where the German peasant could rear a family." Hans Grimm's best-seller, "Volk ohne Raum," published in 1932, finds few readers today. *Qui trop embrasse mal étreint.*

What, then, is there left to fight or quarrel about? Germany is now chiefly interested in working her way into foreign markets, and France hopes to find partial consolation for the loss of her territories in the Far East and North Africa through the exploitation of the fabulous mineral resources of the Sahara. Here is another new factor making for peaceful coexistence, since political stability is unattainable without a minimum standard of well-being for the common man. Frenchmen turn their eyes from the sorry plight of the French Treasury to the glittering prospects of land once flippantly described by Salisbury as very light soil. France needs all her capital and her best brains to seize the opportunity of economic expansion so unexpectedly offered to her, and she cannot afford to be continually looking over her shoulder to her eastern frontier. History—and not least very recent history—is a story of spectacular surprises, and a virile nation never despairs.

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The new relationship got off to a good start. Chancellor Adenauer—saluted by Sir Winston Churchill as the greatest German statesman since Bismarck—has steered the ship with unfaltering hands since the recovery of sovereignty and has contributed more than any single individual to securing the confidence of the Western powers in the reliability of the Federal Republic. So great is the trust placed in Dr. Adenauer's integrity that when the United States became alarmed by the blatant hostility of the Kremlin, it was prepared to take the risk of urging German rearmament. The Chancellor's loyalty to the cause of the West was guaranteed not merely by his own record but by his devotion to his Church, the fiercest opponent of Communism in the world. "We are again a free and independent state," he joyfully declared in 1955 when the Occupation ended; "our goal is a free and united Germany in a free and united Europe." Though both goals seem very far away, he will work towards them till his last hour. Without him, it is generally agreed, the *détente* with France would not have progressed so fast and so far. The Rhine, he declared, must become a meeting-place, not a barrier. He was bitterly denounced by the late S.P.D. leader Dr. Schumacher as "the Chancellor of the Allies;" yet no one really doubts his devotion to the spiritual values of Western civilization. "It is Christianity versus Communism," he exclaims. It is the spirit of the Crusades.

The synchronizing of practicing Catholics of high character at the helm of their respective states is an auspicious coincidence. Like most French rulers and statesmen, from Richelieu and Mazarin to Poincaré and Foch, General de Gaulle thirsted for *les frontières naturelles*—the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees. Since unification had made the Hohenzollern Empire and the Nazi Reich such a dangerous neighbor, France's obvious policy was to turn back the hands of the clock. Speaking in 1948 on the tercentenary of the Treaty of Westphalia, General de Gaulle declared that there must never be another German Empire, merely sovereign German states, each with its own institutions but allowed to form alliances among themselves and to enter a European group if they wished. The need for this drastic denationalization, he explained, was that "the nature of the Germans inclines them to vast ambitions." Between his first and second premiership, however, he discovered that France can no longer say *sic volo, sic jubeo*, like the last of the Hohenzollerns, and that it is less difficult to get a large muscular people down

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than to keep it down. Today, with the larger portion of the German people on their feet again, a litter of petty states could neither be created nor maintained. The existing federation of *Länder* meets the needs and wishes of the people and has come to stay. The shrinkage of French demands has gone *pari passu* with the waning of French strength.

The General, like everybody else, understands that a new chapter in Franco-German relations opened when the Communist menace loomed up, and he is prepared to accept the Federal Republic and its frontiers as he finds them. Necessity makes strange bedfellows, and a businesslike collaboration is no more paradoxical today than was the alliance of France and Russia, each detesting the régime of the other, at the turn of the century. No formal agreement is necessary since treaties can be broken as easily as they are made. Bismarck declared that every pact contained an unwritten clause which was perfectly understood by the signatories—that it only remained valid *rebus sic stantibus*. Lasting relationships are more likely to be achieved by a process of organic growth than by a stroke of a conjuror's wand. For de Gaulle, an additional attraction of the "new look" is that it might diminish the tutelage of the United States which he, as the unbending champion of the dignity of France, has always resented. Since the passion of his life is the restoration of his country to the ranks of the great powers and since this is unrealizable by its unaided efforts, where else can he turn except to his eastern neighbor? The switch in the grand strategy of France can be made without loss of prestige since the Federal Republic needs a friendly France as much as France needs friendly faces beyond the Rhine.

Germany is a child of the West and it is an axiom of the free world to keep her there. Next to the Chancellor, no statesman on either side of the Rhine has labored so zealously and successfully to rebuild the bridges as Robert Schuman, the bilingual Lorrainer who has studied in German universities and has taken the first practical step towards economic integration. His monument is the Coal and Steel Community which has proved that industrialists can work together for their mutual benefit.

Cultural contacts have played little part in keeping the peace throughout the ages, since governments can quarrel and armies clash even when private citizens shake hands. Yet they are not to be neglected or despised. Anglomania was at its height in the

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eighteenth century when Montesquieu and Mirabeau fell in love with our English invention of limited monarchy, and Voltaire applauded our religious toleration, though it was none the less a period of long and ruinous wars. Since Frederick the Great set the fashion of talking and writing in French—even to the extent of composing French verses—some acquaintance with the language and literature has been regarded as an essential part of German higher education; but the compliment has not been returned. No German authors have become such best-sellers in France as Dumas, Victor Hugo, Zola and Anatole France have been beyond the Rhine. Since French tourists prefer Latin countries for their holidays, and Germans make for the cosmopolitan Côte d'Azur, the two peoples know too little of one another.

The work of statesmen, if it is to endure, requires the approval of the communities they represent. No one could expect greater mutual respect after the Second World War than after the First, for fresh grievances were added to the store accumulating for generations. Hatred, however, is beyond the capacity of normal human beings, or even of nations, to maintain indefinitely. If Englishmen and Frenchmen could live down their emotional resentments, France and Germany may, with time and patience, do the same. Shortly after *l'année terrible,* Juliette Adam, Gambetta's hostess and friend, recorded in her memoirs that she started back in horror when she accidentally touched the arm of a German customs official. Since then, despite two far greater struggles, the clinical thermometer has fallen. Many Frenchmen today share the feelings of Goethe who confessed that he could not hate the French though he was heartily glad to see them go. Many members of the Resistance hated the Vichy quislings more fiercely than the invading hordes, and inflicted the most terrible penalties on them when the tide turned. Few Frenchmen today would accept Lord Vansittart's picture of the German race as unique in wickedness, the brazen horde and the butcher-bird throughout the ages. If his verdict were correct there would be little hope for the West.

A considerable portion of the German youth of today appear to have reverted to the more humane traditions which in the days of Lessing and Kant, Goethe and Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Schlegel brothers, earned the respectful admiration of Mme. de Staël, Coleridge, Byron, Carlyle and many another lover of good literature and philosophy. Just as the outstanding legacy

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of Napoleon III was a healthy distrust of dictators, so Hitler's disastrous performances may beget a horror of the Führer principle. In his pregnant little treatise on "Perpetual Peace," Kant for the first time argued that self-determining communities were less likely to go to war than an irresponsible autocrat who could issue orders for a campaign as easily as for a hunt. Since democracy, as Montesquieu rightly argued two centuries ago, requires more virtue in the citizen than any other type of government, the color of the new Germany will in some measure depend on the history teachers in the schools and the choice of textbooks for their students. Truth must not be concealed; but abuse is something else. The cessation of mudslinging is a need of the times. Since the writing of history, as Ranke declared, is a matter of conscience, the compilers of French and German schoolbooks carry an exceptionally heavy burden of responsibility.

The moods of nations, as of individuals, sometimes undergo profound and enduring changes in response to novel and deeply felt experiences. Clemenceau and Poincaré would scarcely recognize their weakened fatherland today, and the paladins of the Hohenzollern Empire would rub their eyes if they read Meinecke's "The German Catastrophe," in which the veteran historian recanted his Bismarckian enthusiasm and summoned his countrymen to turn their eyes from Potsdam to Weimar. At the height of the Anglo-German feud, Count Reventlow denounced England in a book entitled "The Vampire of the Continent." Today all parties in the Bundestag except the Communists rejoice that their old enemy survives as a bulwark of the free world. French and Germans alike are learning that coexistence, not blinkered nationalism, is the condition of peace and progress. The old slogans which recently corrupted the German soul have lost their appeal. Reunion, not expansion, is their demand. If nothing succeeds like success, nothing discredits like catastrophic failure. Next to Dr. Adenauer, no living German has done so much as President Heuss to disassociate postwar Germany from the crimes of the Nazi thugs. The disappearance of Prussia allows the liberalism of the south and the Rhineland to raise its head, and every student knows how influential a factor in the growth of West German liberalism were the ideas of the French Revolution which brushed away many cobwebs of feudalism and fostered the idea of the Rechtsstaat, the reign of law.

Among the factors making for harmony is the widely felt need

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of both peoples for the moral support of the British Commonwealth. With the thorny problem of Alsace and Lorraine out of the way, Englishmen can at last be on terms of friendship with both peoples—an achievement which Lansdowne and Grey, to their regret, found impossible. England, declared Palmerston in a memorable phrase, has no eternal friendships, only eternal interests. Today, next to the maintenance of closer relations with the United States, no section of our foreign front is of such cardinal importance as the collaboration of the new France and the new Germany, both sick of the horrors and futility of war. Super-patriots like Treitschke were reminded by Bismarck in the opening phase of the *Reichsgründung* that putting forward the hands of the clock would not make it go faster. Confidence, declared Burke, was a plant of slow growth in an ancient bosom, and both French and German bosoms are stored with secular resentments. The establishment of confidence in each other's good will must be a slow process, an organic growth rather than a mechanical contrivance.

The omens are favorable, for self-preservation is the master instinct of man and beast. French and German representatives and experts sit together at Strasbourg, on the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, at the military headquarters of NATO, at UNESCO and on other bodies. Isolationism is out of date in the nuclear age. In England it ended with the Japanese alliance of 1902 and the Entente Cordiale in 1904. In the United States its last remnants disappeared with the revelation of settled Russian hostility after the Second World War. France and Germany, who have been used to making and breaking alliances for centuries, no longer dream of standing alone. Defensive regional pacts are envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Russia would not be so formidable or feel so sure of herself without the comradeship of China and her subservient satellites. Everything points to the integration of communities with a similar ideology. Is it too much to suggest that one of the brightest features of a storm-tossed world is the Franco-German rapprochement now in progress? Every year should quicken the pace as the bitter memories of the past grow dimmer and the material advantages are increasingly experienced. Though a historian, with the whole panorama of the past spread out before his inner vision like a scroll, realizes as well as anybody that the future is unpredictable, I venture to close this *causerie* on a major chord.

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PAN-AFRICANISM: A DREAM COME TRUE

By Paul-Marc Henry

FEW were the French-speaking delegates who could hear, even less understand, what the grand old man of pan-Africanism, Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, had to say at Accra during the All African People's Conference last December. Some, however, may have recalled that the first Pan-African Congress ever convened took place with the permission of the Prime Minister of France, Georges Clemenceau, in 1919, at the Grand Hotel in Paris. It is difficult to find any trace or report of the event in the French or Anglo-Saxon press, which was then busy with what were known as "more important things," such as the fate of the Middle East, the Balkans and an obscure bunch of conspirators called the Soviet Communist Party somewhere in Moscow.

Last December Dr. Du Bois was describing to much younger and more successful generations of African politicians his various efforts to convene the second, third and fourth Pan-African Congresses, none of which actually took place in Africa. Were these young men moved by his account of the struggles of the pan-African movement? And were some disturbed by Dr. Du Bois' rather equivocal conclusions? "Your nearest friends and neighbors," he said, "are the colored peoples of China and India, the rest of Asia, the Middle East and the Sea Isles, once close bound to the heart of Africa and now long severed by the greed of Europe. Your bond is not mere color of skin but the deeper experience of wage slavery and contempt. So too, your bond with the white world is closest to those who support and defend China and help India and not those who exploit the Middle East and South America."

English-speaking Africans may have read and meditated the remarkable book by George Padmore (now Advisor on African Affairs on Kwame Nkrumah's personal staff) entitled "Pan-Africanism or Communism?" It is unlikely that many of the French-speaking delegates had done so. They were more likely to have known the remarkable Senegalese, Blaise Diagne, usually represented as a symbol of a successful assimilationist policy, but in fact one of the most active supporters of the pan-African movement, as represented by Du Bois. It has been said that "Diagne was not without his critics, some of whom were sincere and others

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motivated by jealousy. He was called by some a traitor for having brought the Africans to fight for France and a tool of the rich white colonial interests. Others, however, praised him as having done more than any other to strengthen the position of colored peoples in the French Empire."[1]

Europeans would do well to cease underestimating the practical stimulation which can be derived by efficient African politicians from the intelligent use of ideological weapons. As seen from Paris, politics in French Africa has appeared to be merely an extension of party politics as played in the rather special atmosphere of the Palais Bourbon. It was "unrealistic" and slightly treacherous to reinterpret some of the attitudes of French-trained African politicians according to criteria which found their origins outside the magic and closed system of French politics. Yet Diagne, the most important actor of the first Pan-African Congress, was not alone in being drawn into activities which had nothing to do with French political parties. A quarter of a century later, another French-trained deputy, Sourou Apithy, from Dahomey, took a prominent part in the conference which followed the fifth Pan-African Congress (held in Manchester in 1945), and which was supposed to set up a permanent institution to be known later as the "West African National Secretariat." It was there he met Dr. Nkrumah, then a rather penniless postgraduate student in London.

This individual participation by two leading French Africans is important and significant, but not decisive. For between 1946 and 1958 one does not find any trace of activity by any French-speaking politician in the various stages of the pan-African movement, as interpreted and operated by Mr. Padmore and Dr. Nkrumah.

This chasm materialized clearly when Dr. Nkrumah took the initiative in organizing the West African delegates into the West African National Secretariat. Later events were to take Dr. Nkrumah even further away from his self-appointed task of organizing a movement which would cover West Africa as a whole. From 1947 to 1957, the year of Ghana's independence, it is fair to say that the dream of pan-Africanism, though alive, was second in priority to the immediate task of establishing self-government and then independence.

It is surely significant that during the same period the French

[1] J. A. Rogers, "World's Great Men of Colour," as quoted by Padmore, p. 121.

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territories of West Africa went through somewhat the same evolution but devoted their efforts to obtaining within the rigid framework of *la République une et indivisible* enough autonomy and self-government to be able to stand on their own and develop their personalities without for the time being considering independence as a prime objective.

Meanwhile it has become a fact that the vigor and inspiration of pan-Africanism, stripped of any excess of American-Negro influence as expressed by black zionism or Garveyism, has taken roots in the land of Africa under the active and skillful leadership of Dr. Nkrumah, political secretary of the fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945. As a movement which was conceived in America and which blossomed in West Africa, pan-Africanism remains essentially an English-speaking movement, a delayed boomerang from the era of slavery as practiced on the West African coast two centuries ago. It is significant that, linguistically and ethnically, most of the American Negroes in North America came from the coastal areas on the Gulf of Guinea, and only a few from the interior areas of Senegal and Niger.

The Prime Minister of Ghana has been thoroughly consistent as far as pan-Africanism is concerned. According to him, "the independence of Ghana will have no meaning unless it is strengthened with the total liberation of Africa." Ghana, in other words, is to be as Piedmont was to an amorphous Italy—Accra the Mecca of pan-Africanism. Not to accept implicitly or explicitly the basic leadership of the Prime Minister of Ghana is in fact to reject the basic tenets of pan-Africanism, as defined by the small team which has followed the Prime Minister since his early days in London.

II

One may wonder why so little attention was paid by the leaders of Ghana as well as by foreign observers to the very important changes which were taking place simultaneously in the French-speaking territories nearby. The barrier of language is one explanation, but not sufficient. One difficulty was that the French-trained politicians were far more interested in what was happening in Paris and in their constituencies than in neighboring Ghana and Nigeria. The road to freedom was to be found through a free negotiation between the French territories in Africa and their Metropole and not through some kind of local arrangement with

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a neighbor, even though that neighbor in fact had to deal with the same problems and tackle the same difficulties. Therefore, pan-African propaganda for a short time fell on deaf ears.

The same was true, however, in Nigeria where the several provinces were far too busy negotiating their own differences to worry about the gigantic problem of West African unification. It can even be said that the more Ghana claimed a special position of leadership in Black Africa, the more Nigerian and French territories became aware of the need to evolve their own plans for some kind of loose confederacy which would eliminate the risk of personal power without rejecting what seemed both unavoidable and useful. In other words, pan-Africanism as an ideology was growing fast, but not as a uniform and well-disciplined movement. The problem was basically how to establish contact between French-speaking and English-speaking areas.

The history of the next few years, perhaps of the next few months, will show if the Prime Minister of Ghana considers himself first and foremost a national leader or an international one. In some respects he finds himself in a position similar to Napoleon the Third, who as Emperor of the French was responsible for the welfare and peace of France, but was also committed, through his past activities and connections, to the liberation of the captive nationalities of Western Europe, such as the Germans and Italians. Nkrumah, like Napoleon III, and some of the more contemporary European leaders, is committed to a revisionist policy. As the fifth Pan-African Congress observed: "The artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obstruct the political unity of the West African peoples." Echoing this basic view, the All African People's Conference, meeting in Accra last year, held that "the great bulk of the African continent has been carved out arbitrarily to the detriment of the indigenous African peoples by European imperialists, namely: Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Portugal."

As the spokesman for African revisionism, Nkrumah has no challenger. Together with his advisor, George Padmore, he is the *doctrinaire* to whom all nationalist movements in Africa south of the Sahara are looking for example, support and guidance. He is fast becoming the elder statesman of Black Africa. Apart from the heads of the independent states of Liberia and Ethiopia, who had to carry in isolation their own struggle for survival, he has contributed more than anybody else to the promotion of the "Afri-

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can personality" which is to play so important a role in world politics during the next decade.

Students familiar with the story of the rise of European nationalism in the nineteenth century will find many differences between the national struggle of, say, Germany and Italy to build up their political unity and the various brands of African nationalism. However, the emotional fervor is the same and is certainly to be found in the spiritual leaders of pan-Africanism. In this vein, Nkrumah expressed the hope in Accra that the African continent will not see a repetition of the petty quarrels and the constant disagreements, wars and national disasters which have marked the history of the other continents.

To an outside observer therefore, pan-Africanism, as interpreted and expounded by Nkrumah and his team, is a political Janus. One face is looking towards more effective power at home, that is, in Ghana and on the African continent. The other is looking outward upon a world in which a reborn and reunited Africa will play a most important role in the promotion of peace and progress.

To a next-door neighbor, like Félix Houphouet-Boigny, political leader of the Ivory Coast, or Sylvanus Olympio, Prime Minister of the Republic of Togoland, pan-Africanism is apt to look like a convenient smoke screen for very precise and down-to-earth territorial ambitions. To a distant colleague in "world government," like Mr. Nehru in India, it must clearly be the other way round: pan-Africanism is indeed a movement of world-wide importance and the petty affairs of Ghana are to be left in their parochial context.

III

The fate of Africa will be the result, however, of a concrete interplay of local forces in a regional framework and not of an abstract generalization. As the heartland of pan-Africanism is, after all, in West Africa, and is surrounded on all sides by French-speaking territories, it may be profitable to find out how these French-speaking territories have so far reacted to this so-called "universal doctrine"—a doctrine which may very well be for them as abstract as the theory of the Covenant was to Georges Clemenceau or, conversely, the theory of collective security to President Hoover.

The story of "nationalism" in French Africa is basically differ-

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ent from the story of African nationalism in British-dominated territories. From 1946, the date of the constitution of the Fourth Republic and the year in which French citizenship was granted to all the inhabitants of French Africa, to 1956, when the hotly debated *loi-cadre* was adopted, the political élite of French Africa had to express itself *within* the framework of the French political system, the center of which was the National Assembly in Paris. There is hardly a politician now responsible for the fate of the new autonomous republics and federations who has not been closely involved at one time or another with the intricacies, contradictions and excitement of the French parliamentary game. Votes of the African members of the National Assembly were sometimes decisive factors in a fragile governmental majority. African *députés* and *sénateurs* learned their politics, not in the narrow confines of territorial problems, but in the strange and stimulating world of the French parliament, where every issue in contemporary history was discussed thoroughly, albeit inconclusively.

One could argue that the world as seen from Paris is rather distorted. French deputies themselves were not always aware of the real factors of power politics. The continuous presence of friendly and able African colleagues led them to believe that there was no such thing as African nationalism in French areas, that the idea was a foreign import and, in some cases, one of those notorious plots against Franco-African community and its spiritual achievements.

On the other hand, there was no better school for intellectual and political sophistication than that of the French parliament of the Fourth Republic. The high level of debate in the congresses of the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* and the *Parti du Regroupement Africain* shows how deep the Paris influence went. During the recent discussions in Africa, between the *Fédéralistes* and the *Territorialistes,* the most demanding of constitutional advisers could not have found any flaw in the legal reasoning involved.

Such is the result of more than ten years of direct participation of the African élite in the French political game, to which must be added the close connection existing for more than eight years between the trade-union movement in France and the trade-union movement in French Africa. Also, France, like Britain, carried out during this period a systematic policy of promoting university and higher education with a massive program of scholar-

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ships in French universities. As in Britain, and perhaps more so, the African student has picked up eagerly the rhetoric, the logic and the *Weltanschauung* of his fellow students of the postwar period, who were ready to reëxamine the basic postulates of political life. In Paris, existentialism, Catholicism, "progressivism" and Communism were the abstract intellectual categories which dominated the thoughts of the young and enthusiastic African.

Political leadership in French Africa is therefore of the most "modern" kind. In this process of assimilating new values and destroying old ones, the French-trained Africans found great support in their innermost spiritual being. The fundamental process of eliminating any "inferiority complex," which was done in North America and in English-speaking Africa by a quasi-mystical pan-Africanism and black zionism, was carried out in France through entirely different methods.

The American public did not pay much attention to the Congress devoted to *la négritude* which took place in Paris in 1957, under the sponsorship of that vigorous group, *Présence Africaine*. Many prominent Negroes from the New World and from Africa participated. Very few English-speaking Negroes were present, with the important exception of Richard Wright, now living in Normandy. This gathering showed clearly, however, that French-speaking Africans (and for that matter French-speaking West Indians) were claiming not merely redress for the untold harm done by European slavery and colonialism on the African continent. They were asking for full recognition by European cultures of the essential contribution made by Black Africa to what is known as Western civilization. In the fields of history, music, poetry, plastic arts, their contribution was said to place Africa, and therefore the African himself, on a footing of equality with Europe. There was no denial of the positive contribution of Western culture to Africa, provided it was recognized by all concerned that Africa can give and had already given much in exchange.

Obtaining spiritual equality is in a sense far more important than the immediate achievement of political and constitutional equality. The quest goes beyond the more theoretical aspiration for "liberty, equality and fraternity." This is where the English-speaking African politicians and those of the pan-African "school" have made a basic mistake. They considered the rather empty phrases of the 1789 vocabulary as one more "trick" of the French

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colonialists to exorcise the temptations of black nationalism. This belief seriously underestimates the depth of the spiritual revolution which has taken place in French Africa. Most of the French-trained African politicians are simply not interested in a doctrine which has been evolved by small teams of theoreticians who have derived their experience from the very special situation of the Negroes in America or of the constitutional struggles in British crown colonies. The same words, including "African unity," may have very different meanings. One suspects that this basic misunderstanding may dominate the trend of events in West Africa during the next few months, if it has not already emptied the much publicized Ghana-Guinea union of any real significance.

IV

If French-trained African politicians are relatively immune to the seduction of pan-Africanism, one may wonder why it was a former French territory, independent Guinea, which took the first concrete step toward the pan-African program, that is, the Union of West African States. How is it possible, in the first place, that the vast Federation of French West Africa, which once embraced in one administrative, economic, financial and cultural union the eight territories of Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey, was broken into component parts in less than two years? The answer lies in the *loi-cadre* itself, which deliberately selected the "territory" as the basic unit within which the process of transferring power would take place. But individual governments led naturally to growth of local patriotism which was hostile to any form of interference from outside.

Territories became used to discussing their individual problems directly with the metropolitan authorities concerned. The only common instruments which crossed territorial boundaries were in the fields of customs, federal finances, investments, defense and foreign affairs; these were left to the representatives of France which, through parliament, were indirectly controlled by the African members of the National Assembly sitting in Paris. This uneasy compromise between the power of the basic unit and the semi-federal powers exercised by the Metropole was a transitional one. Within the parties and the trade-union organizations like R.D.A., P.R.A. and the *Union Générale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire,* of which the Prime Minister of Guinea, Sékou Touré, was

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vice-president, there was a strong movement toward a new formula of federation. This would have a joint all-African executive and would, in fact, restore the federation as a purely African instrument rather than as a projection of the metropolitan bureaucracy. When the referendum was organized, the decision was taken to count the votes *by territories* and not by federation or by overseas territories as a whole.

Territorial sections of inter-territorial parties, like the R.D.A., were given the freedom to vote as they wished. Thus it was possible for Sékou Touré, who happened to be vice-president of the R.D.A., to ask for a negative vote and for Houphouet-Boigny, who is the president of the same party, to vote affirmatively. Similarly, certain sections of the R.D.A., in the Sudan for instance, are in favor of a West African Federation, although the R.D.A. of the Ivory Coast is dead set against it. Through this procedure, French West Africa ceased to be an organized block of French-speaking territories as soon as one territory, at least, could vote no, and did so, taking the opportunity offered by General de Gaulle to become immediately independent.

One may argue about the basic reason for Mr. Sékou Touré's negative vote. It is likely on the basis of his own statements that it was a tactical move to give himself a better bargaining position in future negotiations with France and with the neighboring French territories, and in the hope of eventually setting up a new West African Federation on his own terms. Instead, he was thrown into the whirlpool of pan-African politics at the very moment when Mr. Nkrumah was looking for an opening into French-speaking territories after having largely failed to get his foot in the door of Nigeria.

It is rumored that when Mr. Sékou Touré was presented with a first draft of a treaty of union between Ghana and Guinea he disliked the spirit of the whole thing, which was little more than the offer of a merger under the leadership of Ghana. The first draft was therefore much watered down, so that the final result was a statement of intention rather than an actual act of union. The final declaration is limited to a statement of principle. Subject to the ratification of the respective National Assemblies, the two Prime Ministers "have agreed to constitute their two states as the nucleus of a Union of West African States." It is, however, made clear that "the action taken with a view to achieving a Union of West African States is not, in any way, designed to prejudice the

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present or future relations between Ghana and the Commonwealth, on the one hand, and the Republic of Guinea and the French Community, on the other."

Dr. Nkrumah and Mr. Sékou Touré also made it clear in later statements that the joint declaration had practical possibilities in the fields of communications, foreign affairs, monetary, financial and economic matters, which would be studied and implemented in due course. The Union had also more general aspects of value for the rest of West Africa. It was an "open union" in which any other West African state was invited to participate. It was, Nkrumah told the Ghana National Assembly, a step "towards the establishment of the African community which will have its own distinctive outlook and African personality."

What is important here is that the two states wish to keep their own separate personalities and are anxious not to prejudice their respective relations with the Commonwealth and the French Community. From now on, pan-Africanism will have to leave the ground of "utopian romanticism" and, in Nkrumah's words, "will be guided in the creation of the African community upon which we have embarked by the realities of the actual situation."

Pan-Africanism has therefore entered a new phase. Like every successful ideological movement, it has had to transform itself. Its basic theses are now common ground for all African politicians in the same way as the European ideal is accepted by all nations of Western Europe. Emerging Africa will raise many new problems that Dr. Du Bois, Dr. Padmore and Dr. Nkrumah could not have imagined within the limited context of American Negro experience and the British West African experiment with parliamentary democracy. French Africa has been through its own type of revolution. French-trained African politicians have different traditions. Their view of a united Africa is apt to be at the same time more intellectual, more Western and somewhat more Marxist than the concept evolved by the small team responsible for the success of the fifth Pan-African Congress and the two recent Accra Conferences.

Such as it is, pan-Africanism is a dream come true. It will soon be taken for granted, at the very moment when it will be transforming itself into something more complex and more powerful. The change will probably be in the direction of a general ideology rather than a practical political movement based in Ghana, and led by a ruling few.

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ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA

By John J. Kennedy

FUTURE historians are likely to note with respect that the second half of the 1950s was a period in which some of the most powerful dictators in Latin America were pulled down. The list includes, among others, the strongmen who once ruled such important countries as Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba; today only two or three of the old-style régimes of force still stand. In the many countries from which dictators have recently departed, responsible citizens are struggling to establish constitutional government in societies still marked by the wounds and scars left by years of authoritarian rule and then by revolution. Whether they will succeed in establishing stable régimes of proven democratic commitment remains a question.

Argentina's struggle for democratic recovery—now in its fourth year—has been longer than that of the other countries. In other respects Argentina is also unique among the former dictatorships. For example, it possessed a much more advanced economy before the Perón era than did other countries before their ordeal under one-man rule. Argentina's experience may therefore have only a limited applicability to other situations, but it does illustrate the extreme difficulty of replacing dictatorship with constitutional government.

The Argentine people have been through a lot since Perón fell in September 1955. His régime was succeeded by a Provisional Government of revolutionary origins, directed by the armed forces but not excluding civilian participation. Six weeks later the Provisional Government underwent an internal crisis which resulted in the Presidency passing from General Lonardi to General Aramburu. Aramburu's government sought to restore traditional civilian rule, with the announced intention of quitting office as soon as practicable. It reëstablished the pre-Perón Constitution and called a popularly elected convention for constitutional revision. The work of the convention did not amount to much, but the government went ahead with plans for general elections for the Presidency and the Congress. Meanwhile it faced subversive threats from the still loyal and numerous body of Perón's followers.

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The elections took place in February 1958, with organized Peronism excluded from the lists. The voters were offered what was nominally a multi-party choice, but under the operative electoral law, the winning party was assured of two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the party running second took the remaining seats. Hence, in reality the contest lay between the Intransigent Radicals (U.C.R.I.), whose Presidential candidate was Arturo Frondizi, and the People's Radicals (U.C.R.P.), whose candidate was Ricardo Balbín. The outcome was an overwhelming popular victory for Frondizi. When the newly elected authorities took office in May 1958, the process of restoring constitutional government was, in a strictly formal sense, completed.

A realistic restoration, however, involved more far-reaching and more complicated problems than the conduct of honest elections and the willingness of temporary military rulers to step down. For Frondizi faced much the same tasks that the Provisional Government had been struggling with, but he was not armed with the same revolutionary powers for undertaking them. An economy disastrously out of balance was one of the inheritances which had passed from Perón to the Provisional Government and in turn to Frondizi. Peronism continued to be a serious threat to national order, as the crippling strikes of November 1958 and January 1959 demonstrated.

These events led the new President to declare a state of siege and to resort to military force in an effort to cope with the situation. These drastic measures were taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Constitution and with the subsequent approval of the Congress, but they undoubtedly gave a new coloration to the Frondizi administration. In consequence, some observers have wondered whether the President had not turned himself, albeit constitutionally, into a strongman backed by military force in a manner that at least superficially suggested a reversion to the recent past. This query can perhaps best be answered in terms of three basic questions regarding Argentina's present situation:

1. What has been the nature of the Peronist threat in Argentina and how did Frondizi seek to meet it before he reverted to the state of siege and reliance upon military support?

2. How do the military authorities fit into the Frondizi régime? Are the armed forces in effect in command of the government and merely operating behind a civilian façade?

3. In resorting to a show of military force to meet the recent

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crises, has Frondizi put himself in a position that is in any way comparable to what Perón's once was? If not, what is the essential difference between the present régime and the earlier one?

II

During Perón's long tenure, his chief but by no means sole source of strength lay in organized labor. For a long time he also had the backing of the armed forces, although some of this support was grudgingly accorded. An over-expanded bureaucracy was another element of support, though probably less dynamic than the others. In the beginning his régime enjoyed at least acceptance by the Church hierarchy as a whole and the enthusiastic support of several conspicuous churchmen. By the time of his downfall Perón was engaged in a bitter struggle with the Church, the armed forces had turned against him, the bureaucracy had proven to be too passive to be a source of strength, and the only support remaining came from the vast segment of organized labor in those unions which owed their origin or growth to Perón.

Perón's departure naturally loosened his grip on certain parts of the labor movement, but it did not end the fanatic loyalty of a very considerable majority of the labor leaders. The Provisional Government found that 62 unions, or roughly two-thirds of the total, remained Peronist in spirit. These unions offered a continual problem to the Aramburu régime, but armed as it was with revolutionary powers the problem was not an insuperable one, even when, as in mid-1956, the threat of subversion was very real.

The reasons for labor's loyalty are not hard to find. Prior to the advent of Perón, Argentine political leaders gave scant attention to the problems of the urban worker. The Socialists as a minor party had sponsored a very limited labor movement. Small Catholic groups under Bishop Andrea had undertaken similar ventures. But the major parties gave the worker little notice. Perón changed all this by making organized labor a new and potent factor in Argentine politics. A definitive appraisal of the tangible gains that this brought to the individual worker will probably have to wait for a time when passions have cooled. There seems to be little doubt, however, that some gains were genuine. During Perón's first term as President, 1946–51, real wages rose while the national economy was strong enough to bear the burden of the increase. If the economic ills which set in after 1952 nullified this advance, there remained the fact that Perón had given the worker

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a great psychological boost. For the first time in Argentine history the factory hand, the bus driver, the packing-house worker could feel that he was participating in public affairs and that his participation was not only accepted but eagerly solicited. Continuing loyalty to Perón in labor circles probably resides, then, not only in the memory of gains made before 1952 but also in the new sense of importance which Peronism had inculcated. Appeals to this loyalty have undoubtedly been strengthened by the economic hardship encountered since Perón's departure and by the fact that the party of Perón—who once "solved" the worker's problems—has been proscribed.

When Frondizi took office his major political problem was to find the means of lifting the proscription without at the same time opening the door to civil disorder. On the one hand a régime pledged to constitutional rule could not consistently deny rights of political organization to a vast sector of the electorate. On the other, to allow the Peronists to revive their undeniably large party held threats of large-scale subversion. Both during his Presidential campaign and afterwards, Frondizi sought to overcome this dilemma by attracting the workers into his own party. This tactic had at best a meager success. It is true that many Peronists voted for Frondizi and thereby helped to swell his popular vote. But this did not mean that they had committed themselves to him. They may have given him their votes simply in the expectation that he would be the easiest of the leading candidates to deal with. They may have even voted "on orders" from the ex-dictator sent from Ciudad Trujillo, as has frequently been alleged. They may have voted as they did for many other reasons. What seems most improbable, however, is the charge that Frondizi won Peronist votes because of a "deal" between himself and Perón. Indeed, responsible critics of Frondizi have commented privately that there is no basis for the allegation. An arrangement of this sort would surely have required Frondizi to respect the integrity of Peronism in the labor movement. Instead the whole effort of the government was to take labor into its own camp.

The effort achieved no success. There were too many circumstances against it. In his first month in office the President decreed an imposing wage increase, but it did not keep pace with inflation. Frondizi could deal with labor leaders as spokesmen for an important segment of Argentine society, but he could not restore their sense of being the dominant figures. When he invited foreign

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investment and particularly foreign participation in the exploitation of national petroleum resources, he violated the time-honored shibboleths of economic nationalism and offended not only Peronists but many other Argentines. Peronist organizations meanwhile remained loyal to the creed.

In November 1958 and again last January the Peronists, Communists and other disaffected elements produced the strikes which led to the imposition and continuance of the state of siege. They did so in the name of the economic nationalism which the government had ceased to honor. In this venture the Peronists were not very clever—probably they never have been very clever. For in effect they defeated themselves by solving Frondizi's dilemma for him. In the beginning his constitutional duty had been to find the means to reincorporate the Peronists into the public life of the nation. Their avowed purpose in striking, however, was to subvert and frustrate the policy of the state. In the face of this threat, it then became the President's constitutional duty to safeguard public order. He did so by invoking the state of siege and by the use of military force. If the Peronists had been wiser, if they had refrained from such drastic action, they could have kept the dilemma alive for months, perhaps for years. It would have remained a source of embarrassment to the government and would have preserved the Peronists' own potential importance. As it was, they merely weakened their position by acting outside the law.

III

In meeting the Peronist threat Frondizi had little choice but to fall back on the power of the armed forces. The merits of some specific acts in this connection can be debated—for example, the decision to bring huge blocs of workers under military discipline —but of the need to count on military support in these crises there appears to be no question. This does not mean that the military is now giving the orders to a subservient government.

Last September I asked a leading military figure whether the armed forces would ever again assume responsibility for the conduct of public affairs. His first reply was a resounding *never!* When I probed for some qualification of this categorical answer, he replied that the military régime which held power between September 1955 and May 1958 had had as its whole purpose the restoration of constitutional democracy. Success in achieving this goal, as much as the practical experience of these 30 months, had

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left the military with an "acute civic conscience." They had come to understand better the problems of government and had learned that this was not the task for which by training or temperament they were best fitted. Only under a genuine threat of Peronist seizure of public authority would they ever willingly take over the reins of government.

These are the views of an officer who would in all probability be the number-one candidate for Peronist firing squads. If they are not wholly representative, they are shared at least by that important segment of the military which overturned the dictatorship in 1955 and which does not want to see anything like it again. Indeed, a military coup seems most unlikely. Time has softened the military attitude toward civilian authority. The ranking officers no longer believe that government is simple or that they can easily endow it with military efficiency. They are obviously far from ready to abandon the advantages of their situation, but the crises of last November and January suggest that the officers have traded a commanding position for a bargaining one. This will naturally subject the civilian authorities to pressure, as, for example, when Frondizi dropped Rogelio Frigerio, his chief economic adviser, from the government in November. But pressure and the will to drive a hard bargain certainly create a very different situation than when the military is calling all the turns.

Since Frondizi took office, his government has unquestionably lost a portion of its popular support, as the Peronists (and the smaller groups of Communists, certain nationalists and others) have turned against it. But the election probably was never a very accurate index of Frondizi's strength since the Peronist votes represented so uncertain an asset. Because the Peronists are now in overt opposition, one should not assume that the bulk of the populace has turned against the government. The threat to public order and the means taken to combat it have undoubtedly increased the importance of the armed forces as a source of support, but this does not mean that the military are in command or that they are in a position to seize command.

Yet, parallels between the present régime and Perón's will inevitably be drawn. In the Perón period the armed forces were also an indispensable element of support. His government, too, resorted to the state of siege on occasion. It can be pleaded that in the present situation the legislative branch has operated freely and that the judiciary has continued to function. But under

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Perón a Congress was also in existence and courts operated. Do these parallels make Frondizi a second Perón?

Perón manipulated a huge machine in which the controlling counterweights were labor and military power. Until his last days he could always press the lever that would move now one, now the other, to keep the machine in balance. This power made him irresponsible and ultimately unaccountable to anyone. Frondizi commands no such machine. And although he has made mistakes and revealed personal weaknesses, to his credit he has seriously endeavored to establish the principle of government accountability to the people.

In a strict sense this is a pioneering venture in Argentine political history. In the past, the measure of a government's success has tended to be its strength or its popularity. An accountable government is not concerned with these as ends in themselves. Rather it is concerned with the real needs of the nation as a whole and the means to satisfy them. It is responsive to social demands but can resist unwarranted pressure for special privileges. It protects the powers of the state against domination by any special groups which, having failed to attain power through constitutional methods, seek to do so by force or subterfuge. And finally, of course, such a government is accountable for its actions, by providing assurance that there will be elections in which the people can freely choose or renew a government that is their own.

It is this kind of responsibility that the Frondizi government has shown the most apparent concern to assume and discharge. The President has been accused of many faults in office; first, of temporizing with the Peronists, then of being unduly repressive toward them. His loyalty to his own party has been questioned, especially in connection with the forced resignation of the Vice President last November. There are indications that party conniving has not been absent from the manœuvres which continue to leave two provinces without representation in the Senate. All these and other charges may be debated on their merits, and some of the debates will eventually show that not all the means employed have been the wisest or even the most honorable. What appears to be beyond question, however, is that the continuing concern of the present régime has been to protect public power against moves which would threaten the basis of popular government.

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IV

The second major effort of the government is, of course, to advance the material well-being of the people. The problems are enormous because the Argentine economy no longer has the great strength that it had during the years when Argentine tastes and standards were set. Argentina once lived very comfortably on its export trade. Beef, wool, cereals and vegetable oils provided foreign exchange for the importation of manufactured goods and fuels. The world economic crisis of the 1930s broke down this balance and World War II made for further dislocations. Internal changes in the economy created still more difficulties. Beef, for long the most solid source of foreign revenue, declined in production relative to population. Mismanagement of other resources resulted in loss of markets abroad, while Argentine cereals met new and stronger competition.

During the early years of Perón's presidency these losses caused no immediate hardship, because the country had accumulated substantial foreign exchange reserves during World War II. But the adverse balance of trade has continued, approaching in recent years an annual rate of $300,000,000. To overcome this, the government has devised a program, two features of which merit special attention.

One is the expansion of the industrial capacity of the nation so that a greater portion of goods and services may be supplied domestically. According to government economists, Argentina's production must be stepped up by 35 percent to provide the goods and services which the growing population needs. They see the shortest route to the new figure in a program of rapid industrialization. Government spokesmen insist that industrialization does not mean a neglect of the traditional agricultural and pastoral resources, although many observers are not entirely convinced that full account is being taken of the agricultural potential.

The other feature is to invite foreign participation in the exploitation of petroleum resources of the nation so that the disastrous energy shortage—the chief cause of the trade imbalance—may be reduced. According to government estimates, the consumption needs of Argentina will run to about 16,000,000 tons by 1961. For about half a century exploitation of the oil resources has been in the hands of the state monopoly, Y.P.F. (*Yacimientos Petrolíferas Fiscales*). Y.P.F. has recently been producing at the

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rate of about 5,000,000 tons, with an annual increase which still falls far short of need. Imports have been required to satisfy the rest of the demand. It is expected that the contracts with foreign oil companies for further exploitation of Argentine resources will cut down the import requirements to zero within a few years.

In addition, there is a need for more capital to build up local industry and to rehabilitate seriously neglected services such as the transportation system. The major accomplishment of the government to date has been the securing of combined loans and credits amounting to $329,000,000, which were announced in December. These were obtained from the International Monetary Fund, United States government agencies and private banks. Additional private investment was invited by the President during his visit to the United States. In order to provide a more attractive climate for foreign investment, both official and private, the government has undertaken currency reform and has reduced official expenditures to levels of "austerity."

What is most remarkable about this series of ventures is not that Frondizi was able to undertake them so soon after entering office; rather, it is that the government was able to make what amounts to a grand-scale assault on the doctrine of economic nationalism which has been deeply rooted in Argentina for more than a generation. The belief that any large-scale foreign investment involved an "impairment of sovereignty" is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of petroleum. Y.P.F. has never been able to meet the country's petroleum needs, but in spite of its deficiency, it has long been regarded as a safeguard of national integrity. Its monopoly was believed to have prevented "imperialist" exploitation by foreign companies, which might serve as channels of foreign governmental influence on Argentina's internal politics or, worse yet, involve Argentina in the military strategy of the great powers. It is too much to expect that these fears—once cultivated by Frondizi himself—will die out quickly in the population as a whole, but it is encouraging that government officials from the President on down have shed them in the brief period that the régime has been in power. Of course, officials insist that the government remains in control and that Y.P.F. has not suffered organizationally. They still contend that foreign companies are dangerous when they have "concessions" or when they acquire title to either the soil or the product pumped out of it; on the other hand, foreign companies are harmless when they

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work on a "contract" basis and can gain only monetary compensation for the processes of extraction. However this may be, it seems clear that the developments in petroleum, currency reform and foreign investment will serve to bring Argentina closer to the United States than it has ever been or wished to be.

In international affairs the Argentine people have traditionally been neutralist in spirit and their governments have generally resisted foreign commitments, especially those which would tie them to the Colossus of the North. Events of the last few months have marked the beginning of a reverse trend. Will the Argentine people accept this departure from tradition? At best, they will not be enthusiastic. And their tolerance will be tested as they see more clearly that economic rehabilitation is a long-time operation with few spectacular successes in the immediate future. Acceptance of closer links with the United States may indeed depend on their showing some fairly tangible benefits without undue delay.

When Frondizi arrived in Washington in January 1959, it was frequently pointed out that he was the first Argentine President to visit the United States. The Argentine visitor who most closely approached Frondizi's status was Juan B. Alberdi, not a president, but the "Father of the Constitution of 1853," who visited Washington more than 100 years ago. Alberdi, too, came at a time when Argentina was in the process of reconstruction after a long period of internal strife and disaster. His government, too, was having its troubles with dissident forces not yet ready to accept a reunited republic. But Alberdi did not linger long in Washington. He moved on to London and Paris where he expected to find the foreign resources which would aid in the reconstruction of his country. Frondizi, a century later, is also trying to reconstruct a battered country and he, too, must look for foreign aid. But his journey had, of necessity, to terminate in Washington. There are no other capitals to which he can appeal.

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STUDENT POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA

The Venezuelan Example

By S. Walter Washington

PARTICIPATION in politics is something which Latin American students inherited from their forebears in Europe, especially in Spain, where for centuries students have played prominent roles in the fight for human rights. In the New World, frequent tyrannical governments have made the practice more usual than it ever was in Europe. During periods of dictatorship, students have been the repositories of the ideals of the nation and they have given expression to the grievances of the people. They have often shouted from the housetops what their fathers dared say only in the privacy of the home. On other occasions when their fathers rationalized the status quo, the new generation has repudiated them as old-fashioned in their thinking.

Three conditions give special weight and direction to student political activity: (1) Latin Americans have respect for the educated; (2) an increasing number of students come from the poorer classes and are impatient for social reform; and (3) Latin American populations are young—over 70 percent of Venezuelans, for instance, being under 30 years of age. For these reasons, the counsels of the aged, the experienced and the sophisticated are less listened to, and those of the students are more listened to, than in most other parts of the world.

As the tide of democracy has swung back and forth, the students of Latin America have been constant in their support of its ideals and have been in the forefront of the revolutions against tyrannies. A tradition has grown up; the students are expected to keep alive the goals toward which the nation should be working during the dominance of dictators, whether good or bad. As the students leave the universities for other pursuits they may become aligned with special interests, they may turn to the support of dictators, they may become disillusioned and may cause disillusionment in others; but there are always new generations of students and, despite past failures, the public remains not only confident that they will keep the ideals alive but also hopeful that the millennium is around the corner.

These idealistic factors are reinforced by more personal motiva-

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tions. In Latin America a boy after eight or ten years of age enjoys a position within the family quite different from that of the same age group in the United States. He no longer takes orders from his mother, but bosses all the females in the household. The boy is encouraged by them to assert his ego in every way possible. It is not surprising that by the time he is 15 or 16 and enters high school he is confident of being able to solve the world's problems. In only a few schools have sports been introduced, and, lacking other outlets and having in mind the traditions of the students, politics becomes his major interest. The grownups encourage him by characterizing his political thinking as "purer" and less biased than his father's.

If you add to this the fact that all Latin Americans have sharp political intuition and enjoy the game, you will understand how, in the university, politics is the major extracurricular activity and permeates all others. But like extracurricular activities elsewhere it has its leaders and specialists. Sometimes these are young men who realize they lack the mental ability to do well in the classroom and take advantage of the prestige of the student in politics to start political careers. Others are brilliant boys with a flair for leadership and oratory, who often neglect their studies because of the lure of public life. In either case they form political action groups, whose members develop fraternal feelings which often endure after graduation and form the basis of political parties in the nation later on. For example, all the major political parties in Venezuela today originated in university groups. The recently elected President, Romulo Bétancourt, for instance, started his political career and his party when he agitated against the dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, who threw Bétancourt and more than a hundred other students into jail in 1928. An incidental feature of the system is that student political leaders often prolong their student life, either because they don't want to give up their positions or because they are awaiting the right opening to proceed from the university to the national political scene.

It should be said that not all Latin American students take part in politics all the time, just as not all students in the United States spend all their time following athletic events—much as this may often seem to be the case. In the first place there are the Catholic universities where discipline is fairly well maintained and political activity kept at a minimum. The Catholic University of Caracas has about 1,000 students as compared to 7,000 in

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the Central University of Venezuela, which is also in the capital. Even in the latter, the majority devote most of their time to study, upperclassmen especially being loath to spare time for political activities, but there is a large and vociferous minority which does expend its energies in this manner and this minority expands rapidly into a majority in times of crisis. There is also a difference among the faculties. During the recent dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela it was said that the law students generally started trouble and if there seemed to be a prospect of reprisals they always managed to get out in time to let others be punished. Engineering students have the reputation of being the most conservative.

In ordinary times, however, all of them cast their ballots for student leaders and the ratio of independent voters to the party faithful is roughly the same as among their elders on the national scene. Like their elders, students often vote for a personality rather than for a principle, and, while enjoying their political importance, the majority normally leaves it to those who are interested in politics to carry the ball. Under the circumstances existing since the fall of Pérez Jiménez, many of these have been Communists or fellow travellers.

II

The proclivities of the students are fully exploited by the political parties. It is an old practice of opposition leaders to place students in the forefront of demonstrations that might provoke violence on the part of the powers-that-be, and the police of the recent dictator did fire upon and wound a group of high school students who demonstrated against him in May 1957. On less important issues the party leaders have provoked students to make political demands that they themselves did not dare to make.

Soon after the present Venezuelan political parties came into existence in the 1930s and 1940s, they appointed directors of student activities who recruited supporters not only in the universities but also in the *licéos,* or high schools, and even sometimes among the primary school pupils. Political activities in the primary and secondary schools have since been forbidden by law and a tacit understanding has existed among the teachers not to use the classroom for political indoctrination. Because of the many extracurricular activities in the schools, however, the politically minded teachers—one estimate is that about half of the

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teachers belong in this category—have plenty of opportunities outside the classroom to make their influence felt. Each party, working through its teachers and its student leaders, has tried to enhance its prestige by such tactics as seizing upon an issue in the educational field and using it as a pretext for leading the student body in a strike. If one party gets the credit for what turns out to be a successful movement, meaning one that the school authorities have to accept, each of the other parties will feel that it must find an issue on which to show what it can do. Needless to say, such tactics play havoc with school discipline.

When political leaders desire a demonstration in force on some national issue and find the university students apathetic, they appeal to the high school students and generally get an enthusiastic response. In Caracas, high school leaders who have moved on to the university retain their earlier contacts and frequently provide the channels for getting mass support for demonstrations planned in the university. This happened in the demonstration against Vice President Nixon.

The Communists are of course extremely active in the schools. Most of the full-time teachers come from the lower economic levels, because the *Instituto Pedagógico,* which trains high school teachers, has always provided a free education. Their background thus inclines them to the left. The number of professed Communists now in the *Instituto* is not large; the great majority of the teachers and students are members of the *Acción Democrática* party, whose extreme left wing, however, offers an excellent cover for the Communists who are working underground. It takes only a few of them, one or two well placed in each high school, to make their influence felt in inciting the students to political action of a kind they desire.

In the university, political life takes on a different aspect because it is integrated into the administration of the institutions. Throughout Latin America students have a voice in running the universities to a degree that is unknown in the United States. One of the reasons is that most of the professors are professional men who teach only part time for the sake of prestige and for little pay. They do not, therefore, have the feeling of corporate responsibility characteristic of the full-time faculties of an American university. In most of the so-called autonomous universities of Latin America, control is shared in some respect between administrators, faculty and students. Many administrators stoutly

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defend the system and, in view of the independence shown by students from their early school days, it is understandable that administrators welcome the sharing of some of the responsibility by elected student leaders. Unfortunately the students do not always accept the defeat of their representatives' views in the university councils and they sometimes repudiate their own leaders. Consequently they frequently engage in walkouts, strikes and even violence to enforce their will. In many places the students have the professors and the administrators completely cowed.

In 1952, after much student agitation, President Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela closed the Central University and kept it closed until the fall of 1953. When it reopened it was without any autonomy, authority being vested in officials appointed by the government. Professors and students considered themselves as fellow sufferers. Even under the dictatorship, however, there was a degree of student independence that would surprise a professor in the United States. If the students didn't like a test, for instance, they would walk out in a body, or they would decide when they were going on their holidays. If a professor tried to penalize them he generally failed. After the fall of Pérez Jiménez, the students reasserted themselves and exercised more administrative power over the university than ever before. In most cases they were the deciding voice in dropping professors alleged to have been partisans of the recent dictator. This domination of the universities by the students gives them a self-confidence, and even an arrogance, that is carried over into their national political activities.

III

Once upon a time American and French democracy dominated ideological thinking among students, but the triumphs of Communism in some parts of the world and the denunciations of it in others have aroused what appears to be a widespread and insatiable curiosity about it. Leftist thinking is understandable among the increasing number of students from the poorer classes who are looking for quick solutions of the serious social problems to which they have been personally exposed. Students from other social classes, however, seem to have similar tendencies. The reasons include their rebellious spirit, their inexperience, their impatience with the slowness of social progress and of the growth of democracy in Latin America, and their dislike of what they feel the "rightist" United States stands for. They identify us with dicta-

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tors, especially Pérez Jiménez, who made much ado about persecuting the Communists. As we gave him a medal, supposedly on that account, our anti-Communism has had the effect of intensifying sympathy for the Communists on the part of people who knew that he was persecuting all who opposed him. They decry as undemocratic our racial prejudices, the reputed difficulties of American liberals under the influence of McCarthyism and the known difficulties of some Latin American liberals in getting visas to visit our country.[1]

Although articulate student opinion in Venezuela is leftist, the number of students converted to Communism is small and the number who profess it openly is even smaller. The *Acción Democrática* party is the largest in the universities as well as in the rest of the country, but it is divided into several factions, one of which advocates policies more radical than those espoused openly by the Communists; it undoubtedly includes real Communists in its ranks. Non-Communist nationalists, however, see little reason not to work with the Communists, for the distant threat of Soviet control seems less dangerous to them than the power of the United States, with which they are closely linked by economy and geography.

In late 1955 or early 1956 there was established a *Frente Universitario* composed of Communists and non-Communists working for the overthrow of President Pérez Jiménez. This student group worked closely with the *Junta Patriótica,* a national underground organization of the various parties that had been suppressed, and with the university professors and high school teachers who signed the *Manifiesto de los Intellectuales,* demanding a change in the government. Although dissident army officers actually sparked the revolution that overthrew Pérez Jiménez in January 1958, and although his departure on the night of January 22 was brought about by a general strike and an uprising on the part of the entire population of the nation, the public looked upon the students as having been the earliest and hardest workers toward the desired goal.

[1] The newly elected President, Romulo Bétancourt, fortunately ran the gauntlet of the inquisition to which applicants for visas are subjected and spent much of his exile in the United States and in Puerto Rico, but many others refused to expose themselves to the ordeal and stayed instead in other Latin American capitals where they absorbed all the anti-American propaganda they could hear. After the revolution of January 1958 they returned to Caracas and assumed leading positions in the fields of teaching, journalism and the radio. Many of them are also in the second rank of leadership in the now dominant *Acción Democrática* party and will probably be heard from in the legislature.

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The efforts of the students had been brought into the open two months before when they started a demonstration within the grounds of the University City in Caracas and then began a march toward the President's Palace. At the Plaza de Venezuela the police stopped them with tear gas, chased them back into their grounds and then sought them out with clubs, arresting as many as they could lay their hands on. At one critical moment in the roundup a girl Communist ran the gauntlet of a police cordon and not only got away herself but diverted the attention of the police enough to enable others to escape. She became a heroine to the students and an example of one way the Communists have gained prestige. Following this incident the Central University was closed and remained closed until after Pérez Jiménez had fled. During that period the students were busy making propaganda, establishing their leadership among the poorer classes and generally promoting conditions which led to the general strike of January 20, the demonstrations of the two following days and the flight of the hated one.

In the Central University of Caracas, after the fall of the dictator, the normal system of student government and participation in the university administration was reintroduced by the Provisional Government. The students of the eleven schools created eleven Centers, the president of each being *ex officio* a member of the Federation of Student Centers. In the elections for a dozen or more officers for each Center, the voters had to choose between various slates, and in the spirit of the truce that had been declared by the national party leaders each slate was composed of members of various parties, including the Communists. The elections therefore failed to reveal the real strength of the parties, but they do show how the Communists profited from the truce to get into positions of influence in student government.

A professed Communist was, for instance, the presidential nominee on the winning slate in the School of Humanities and automatically became a member of the Federation. He was the oldest member of that body in point of student life, having entered the university in 1949, left when it was closed in 1952 and returned in 1956. In the Federation his colleagues elected him to be their vice president. The university, still lacking a statute, was being governed by a rectorial commission, but the Federation, taking advantage of the prestige gained by the students in the revolution, exercised a virtual veto over every administrative act

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of the commission and its chairman, the acting rector. The Communist vice president of students, a man with a pleasing personality, quick perception and a facility for presenting facts clearly and forcefully, for a time probably wielded as much power as anyone in the University City.

In December 1958 the Government Junta enacted a new Law of Universities which gives complete autonomy to the four national universities—the Central University in Caracas, the University of the Andes in Mérida, the University of Julia in Maracaibo and the newly established University of Carabobo in Valencia. The statute ratifies student participation in the university councils and makes the arrangement permanent.

IV

The students again played significant roles during the political crisis of July 1958 when there was alleged to be a threat by a group of army officers to overthrow the democratic régime. Early on the morning of July 22, the Central University announced the suspension of the final examinations that were going on and called upon the faculty and students to defend their country from impending danger. At a meeting that morning an emissary of the government solicited the aid of the students and promised that they would be issued arms if necessary. The President of the Federation of Student Centers gave instructions as to how the students should distribute themselves in strategic locations to defend the city if the army should make a move. Having been told how to make "Molotov cocktails" out of soft drink bottles and gasoline, they dispersed to ransack soft drink stands and drain the tanks of all automobiles in the neighborhood. They then took up their stations at the indicated strong points, where the poorer classes rallied behind the student leadership, as they had done in the preceding January. Some of the poor people from the shacks on the hills are said to have rushed toward the University City earlier in the day to help the students defend it from what they thought was an impending attack by the military.

Late in the afternoon of the same day, after the army had shown that it was not disposed to interfere, the university professors and students followed their acting rector to a grand demonstration of thousands of people before the Presidential Palace to show their devotion to the régime in power. The demonstration was organized largely by the student leaders and was marked by

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orderliness and discipline. That evening the Provisional President of the Republic went to the University City in person and thanked the students for their help in preserving the régime. The affair was over as far as student leaders were concerned, although the agitation did not die down until the Minister of Defense and other alleged culprits were exiled on the third day.

The incident is interesting in several respects. In the first place, it was afterwards rumored that there had been no specific threat to the régime and that it had been manufactured to test the strength of the democratic elements of the population. Whether or not this was true, the incident did show how much the government relied upon the students to show democratic strength and it certainly raised their youthful egos. The Communists also gained prestige both because they were said to have been the principal object of attack by the military engaged in the conspiracy and because of the efficiency which many professed Communists displayed in organizing the demonstrations in the university, in the city of Caracas and simultaneously in other cities and towns of the country. Moreover, the principal scapegoat was the Minister of Defense, an outspoken anti-Communist.

Students played a smaller part in other eruptions marking Venezuela's emergence from dictatorship. Doubtless incited by the Communists, the university students did plan a demonstration against Vice President Nixon, using high school students to produce the mass effect. They were proud of their success and the orderliness of the affair, even though Mr. Nixon cancelled his appearance because of the violence which another group perpetrated against him and Mrs. Nixon as they entered the city of Caracas from the airport. The students disclaim all responsibility for the latter incident and there is little reason to believe that they were responsible. Those who took part were older men of the gangster type, obviously not students, and it is not in the character of Latin American students to thrust others into the front line to fight their battles.

At the time of the attempted coup d'état of September 7, the universities were closed for vacation and, although students joined the workers and middle class people who spontaneously attacked a military police barracks, the students as such played no significant role.

In the election of December 7 and the campaign that preceded it, the Federation of Student Centers was neutral. It stood for

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peace and order between the parties and for basic unity during and after the elections. There was no campaigning on the campuses, but individually students worked off the campus for their respective parties. Although Admiral Larrazabal, the former Provisional President who had congratulated the students in Caracas for their patriotic support the previous summer, enjoyed wide popularity, few university students participated in the riots in Caracas which followed news of his defeat. Some primary and high school students were in evidence but most of the demonstrators were not of the educated class. It is significant that the Communist youth, who had supported Larrazabal, behaved with great discipline, opposing all post-election demonstrations and urging the people to accept the electoral results "in a spirit of national unity." Thus, in so far as the Central University is concerned, the political truce, which has proved so useful to the Communists, withstood the strains of the presidential elections.

V

It is evident that in Venezuela as well as in other countries of Latin America the Communists have understood how to use the schools and the universities not only for indoctrinating the coming generation but also for present political action. There is considerable evidence that they are currently more interested in the latter than in the former.

They have taken advantage of the political truce to consolidate the prestige that they acquired in the underground activities against Pérez Jiménez. In order to strengthen their respectability they have become efficient and zealous workers in student welfare and in such extracurricular activities as dramatics, as well as in political action. Many who proved their worth have been too busy to study and do not seem eager to graduate too soon. They have concentrated on establishing personal friendships with the leaders of other parties and gaining the confidence of the student body, so that they might be regarded as democratic leaders who need not be feared because of their membership in the Communist Party. They hope that after the truce comes to an end, some of their student leaders may still enjoy the support of political independents and the left wing of the *Acción Democrática* party.

On the brighter side, it must be remembered that many Venezuelan students flirted with Communism in the latter years of the dictator, Juan Vicente Gomez, and later recanted. We can expect

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the same thing to happen to some of the present-day Communists and, even more, to many non-Communists who now seem unaware of the danger of placing confidence in those whose first loyalty lies outside the country. The nationalism that the Communists promote so zealously today can boomerang against them.

Will the political influence of students maintain its intensity? Some professors predict that if stable government can last the students will settle down in a few years. Others believe that what is needed is a complete reform in the educational system, including a curtailment of the students' power in the administration of the universities. Both these developments might reduce the power of students in the university administration. But it is difficult to believe that the tradition of student political activity, which is so well imbedded in the political organization and in the thoughts of the people, can be upset in any short period of time. Latin Americans of all ages are intensely interested in politics and, as democracy develops in Venezuela, party rivalry will open the field to even more political activity, as each faction seeks credit for social and economic reform. The children become interested at an early age and a large proportion of their teachers are involved. The tradition is likely to continue that those who aspire to political leadership must start their careers in school and this in itself will keep them in politics.

As for anti-Americanism, it should be noted that Venezuelans, including students, have shown little hostility toward private American citizens despite the fact that the 30,000 or 40,000 Americans in Venezuela have provided them with a host of opportunities. It is obvious to most of these Americans that many aspects of American life, other than government policies, are much admired. The *Centro Venezolano Americano* estimates that there are now about 7,000 Venezuelan students in the United States—as many as there are in the Central University in Caracas. The future of Venezuela and of Venezuelan-United States relationships may therefore be determined as much by those who return from the United States as by the students at home. The former, although not exposed to the same demagoguery, may be just as critical of United States policies that seem detrimental to the interests of their country. What is most needed is a careful reëxamination of our policies in an effort to reëstablish our country as the leader of democracy in the eyes of the Venezuelans and other Latin American peoples.

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ISSUES IN SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY

By Herbert Tingsten

IN order to understand Sweden's foreign policy and, generally speaking, its attitude towards the world at large, one must bear in mind two facts—its long period of peace and neutrality, and its exceptionally calm internal political development. Since 1814 Sweden has not participated in any war, nor has it entered into any alliance.

It is true that on a few occasions Sweden has either been threatened by war or has manifested a marked inclination to take part in one. This was the case during the Crimean War, when many leading Swedes were disposed to join forces with England and France for the purpose of regaining Finland from Russia; however, the war ended before these plans matured. When Prussia and Austria invaded Denmark in 1864, a pan-Scandinavian movement urged that Sweden come to the aid of that country; but due to the strength of the attacking powers and the rapid course of the war this "activist" movement never became important. In 1905, when Norway dissolved the union with Sweden, certain circles recommended war as a means of reëstablishing it; but the government and the political leadership worked for a peaceful solution and an agreement was reached which in time became the foundation for good relations between the two nations. During World War I, another "activist" movement urged that Sweden join Germany to liberate Finland; but public opinion overwhelmingly supported peace and neutrality. After the war, when the population of the Aland Islands, situated between Sweden and Finland, demanded annexation to Sweden, some politicians and newspapers made vehement statements; but the question was referred to the League of Nations and its 1921 judgment in favor of Finland did not strongly disturb Swedish public opinion. World War II from time to time brought danger of war to Sweden; the government was pressed to make certain dubious concessions which were strongly criticized (particularly the transfer of a German division from Norway to Finland through Sweden during the summer of 1941). In this period Swedish defenses were reorganized and the nation was prepared for armed resistance to more extensive German demands. Sympathy for the Allies was dominant, and particularly for the occupied neighbors, Norway and

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Denmark, but this did not lead to the formulation of serious plans for military intervention.

The reasons for this long period of peace are no doubt to be found in the geographical position of the country, in special circumstances such as the dependence of certain belligerents on Swedish iron ore (though in some situations that also constituted a temptation for aggression), and in pure luck. Occasionally one hears talk in Sweden, and perhaps even more abroad, about some particularly strong Swedish love of peace which is supposed to be responsible for the country's long avoidance of war. There seems to be no reason to credit this view. Obviously the Swedish government and people, like most governments and peoples, have desired peace, but the essential truth is that geographic position, national homogeneity and the absence of irredenta—for it would be an exaggeration to use this word to describe the Swedish-language minority in Finland—have reduced the danger of war and made nationalist aspirations seem absurd. Sometimes Swedes brag about maintaining peace during the conflicts with Norway in 1905 and with Finland about 1920, but thinking people realize that military action in either of those cases would have been most unwise, indeed criminal. Under such circumstances the maintenance of peace can hardly be cited to prove exceptional wisdom or exceptional morality.

The fact remains that the lengthy period of peace and neutrality has naturally affected Swedish public opinion and thereby helped determine the Swedish position. People believe in the possibility of continuing what has come to appear as a national tradition. Swedish opinion has also developed a kind of smugness similar to that of Americans in certain periods of their history. The idea that one's own nation is peaceful, well disposed and basically cosmopolitan while others are egotistical and stubborn is common among all peoples, at any rate in Europe. And naturally this view has manifested itself strongly in Sweden where there are so many apparent proofs of political virtue.

Sweden's domestic policy has been characterized by very much the same quiet and continuity as its foreign policy. On the basis of the constitution of 1809 the country has step by step achieved political freedom, universal suffrage and a parliamentary system wherein the government exercises the rights nominally pertaining to the monarch. Racial, ethnic or religious differences have hardly existed and have at any rate lacked importance; the economic

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crises of the last four decades have affected Sweden, but their consequences have been less severe than in most other countries; urbanization and industrialization, which came relatively late, have never opened up such a gulf between the classes and produced such fierce class strife as in most other Western democracies, and such dangers as threatened were limited relatively quickly by social reforms and social equalization. Since about 1920, which marked the definite advent of parliamentary democracy, the conflicts between the parties have gradually weakened. For the overwhelming majority of Swedes national unity, strong defense, complete democracy and social reforms have become fixed values. The Conservatives have given up their resistance to democracy and the Social Democrats have abandoned more extensive nationalization projects and written off Marxism.

Since World War I the Social Democrats have consistently been the largest party, with recently about 45 percent of the votes. They have been dominant in the government since 1932, during World War II in coalition with the other democratic parties and from 1951 to 1957 in coalition with the Agrarian or Center Party. The three non-socialist parties, the Conservatives, the Center Party and the Liberals (the People's Party), have commanded about half or close to half the votes, in about equal shares. The Communists, with 6 to 7 percent of the votes, have as a rule supported the Social Democrats, but it should be strongly emphasized that the latter have, with a very few exceptions, clearly renounced Communism and rejected the Communist demand for a people's front. At present the lower chamber of the Riksdag is composed of 45 Conservatives, 32 members of the Center Party, 38 Liberals, 111 Social Democrats and 5 Communists.

In Sweden the democratic parties concentrate their interest to an unusually high degree on domestic policy: details of monetary and commercial policy, the fight against inflation, the maintenance of full employment, support for the farmers (about 20 percent of the population), the shaping of social welfare policies. In these quiet surroundings foreign policy questions are apt to appear dangerous and disconcerting. As the parties are shaped by domestic issues, all try to maintain unity in foreign policy in order to avoid schisms within the parties and uncertainty among the voters. This explains why to a large degree the debate over foreign policy has taken place not in the Riksdag but in those newspapers which are more or less independent of the parties.

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II

Sweden's entry into the League of Nations in 1920 was accomplished in the face of strong differences of opinion. No such differences appeared when we joined the United Nations in 1946. Nevertheless, there was only limited faith in the new organization, and, during the debate which preceded the decision to join, the statement was often made that the success of the venture would depend on unity among the large powers and that nothing in the Charter would have much value if this unity was disturbed. In general this attitude toward the United Nations has persisted. Nobody recommends leaving it, all admit its value, but most also emphasize its limitations. Among the political parties it is impossible to find drastically different evaluations of the United Nations, even though there often have been differences of opinion regarding decisions that the organization has made or failed to make. In general, the Swedish attitude to the United Nations is probably much the same as that of other democratic European nations, even though the election of a Swede, Dag Hammarskjold, to the post of Secretary General has somewhat increased interest in the organization and the tendency to praise its work.

When the planning of a Western defense alliance began in the spring of 1948, a lively debate commenced in Sweden, as in Norway and Denmark. From the beginning the Swedish government was against entering what later was to become NATO, while individual politicians and some large newspapers, particularly the largest of them all, the Liberal *Dagens Nyheter,* insisted that Sweden should participate. When the government in the spring of 1948 invited Denmark and Norway to negotiate a Scandinavian defense alliance, this was generally regarded as an attempt to counter the propaganda for NATO in the three countries. The negotiations did not achieve their goal, however, since Norway and Denmark insisted on some form of affiliation with the proposed Western alliance, and this Sweden refused. The consequence was that Denmark and Norway entered NATO in the spring of 1949, while Sweden remained outside.

The decision of the Swedish government was accepted by all the political parties even though a number of individual Riksdag members and some newspapers dissented. One factor in determining the attitude of the parties was no doubt a reluctance to cause disunity on a central question of foreign policy. Public

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opinion polls revealed highly divergent views. According to one such poll in the spring of 1949 almost every second Swede holding an opinion on this question (the Communists not included) favored joining NATO. As late as 1952 a similar investigation indicated that approximately one out of three democratic Swedes who had formed an opinion held the same view. During subsequent years, however, the question of entering NATO has become somewhat dated, even though the debate continues; and at present the probability is that the large majority—without much knowledge of or interest in the question—shares the view of the government and the political parties.

Those who defend Sweden's policy of neutrality—or, as it is officially called, the alliance-free policy—claim, quite simply, that to join NATO would increase the risk of war. Foreign Minister Östen Undén argues that, in the event of thermonuclear war, Sweden could neither affect the outcome nor be adequately protected by the alliance, while a conventional war would be very much like World War II and all the old arguments for Swedish neutrality would apply. His opponents declare that his reasoning presupposes that Sweden would run little risk of war as long as it does not join the Western defense alliance. Actually, this presupposition is completely untenable. For one thing it is possible that Russia might make an isolated attack on Sweden or make demands on Sweden that cannot be accepted without surrender. Or Sweden may become involved in a world war, particularly if Swedish territory becomes of importance in mounting attacks on Norway and Denmark or in defending them. In this view, the only way to limit this risk of war so far as possible is to join NATO, for then Sweden in time of peace could make effective defense preparations in collaboration with the other NATO countries, and in case of attack would be assured of assistance. As long as Sweden remains outside the alliance it is possible that the country could be attacked and occupied from the East without getting any help from the West; for the possibility of getting such help is greatly diminished unless it has been prepared in advance and can be given rapidly in accordance with prearranged plans. The critics of the policy of neutrality hold that Sweden therefore has just as strong reasons for joining NATO as did Norway and Denmark. They point in particular to the risk of Russia demanding parts of northern Sweden to make possible a rapid attack on Norway or, in the event of a large-scale war, demanding the right to

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pass Soviet Units through Sweden, just as the Germans demanded (and were granted) similar rights in 1941.

The advocates of NATO membership also point out that Sweden never can become neutral in the sense that it would react against demands or violations of neutrality with equal force regardless of whether they came from the East or from the West. Sweden's democratic and humanitarian character ties it unalterably to the West, and no conditions can be imagined which would lead Sweden in case of war to become an ally of the dictatorships of the East. This is just as well known in Russia as in the United States and England. Therefore, when the government talks about absolute Swedish neutrality this is a bluff which fools neither side in the cold war. In several debates cabinet members have been asked whether they consider it conceivable that Sweden would in any situation become an ally of Russia; it is characteristic that none has dared answer yes.

Such are the main arguments in the debate. However, I want to emphasize that a powerful reason for neutrality has been a fear that Russia might occupy Finland or stiffen its policy towards that country if Sweden were to enter NATO. This reason is rarely mentioned in the debate since it is supposed to irritate Russia; but it has certainly been of essential importance in shaping opinion in leading Swedish circles—probably more important than the arguments of Mr. Undén and others.

III

During the last few years the foreign policy debate, particularly as it concerns defense, has concentrated on obtaining nuclear weapons for Sweden. Swedish military men were long inclined to underestimate the importance of modern weapons; by tradition, conventional weapons were considered sufficient even though since World War II the defense organization has been modernized by the purchase of new aircraft and tanks. However, some newspapers, particularly *Dagens Nyheter*, have demanded for years that Sweden should have access to atomic weapons. Recently the same demand has also come from the military and has thereby become a main point in the debate.

Two reports by the Commander-in-Chief, dated the fall of 1954 and the fall of 1957, form the foundation for the debate. In the second of these he writes: "Obtaining atomic weapons [*i.e.* tactical atomic weapons] is the most important action to be taken to

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counterbalance too large a diminution of the effect of our defense in relation to that of an aggressor." The main reason is self-evident: we must if possible have weapons as efficient as those of an enemy, particularly since we must be assumed to be inferior to him in other respects. The Commander-in-Chief emphasizes that even if we have atomic weapons our goal can only be to have "our armed forces stop an attack for a sufficiently long time for us to get support from abroad before large parts of the country have been occupied or resistance has had to cease." Our defense can prevent the occupation of Sweden only for a limited time; therefore, under any conditions, help from abroad is necessary. Commenting on the 1957 report, *Dagens Nyheter* wrote that Sweden was spending 2,700 million kronor a year (more than 500 million dollars) for practically useless defense. "Continue to say, if you wish, that we should have no atomic weapons! But if you do, give as your reason that the Russian régime can be good also for the Swedish people, that we should surrender rather than fight—in order to become, after the surrender, the tools of the tyranny to which we have capitulated. Do not give as your reason that we could offer strong resistance without atomic weapons—it cannot be done."

The opponents of Swedish nuclear weapons have not offered a very consistent or complete set of arguments. It has been said that even if Sweden obtains tactical atomic weapons the country can nevertheless be subjugated by still stronger nuclear weapons; such reasoning suggests that we should have no defense at all since our defense never can be as strong as a Russian offense. It has also been said that the acquisition of atomic weapons could be construed as an unfriendly act and thus increase the danger of attack—to which the answer is that no matter what the Swedish defense looks like, no nation can begin war against us in the honest belief that we are preparing an attack. Probably more important than these arguments is the horror propaganda, which rejects nuclear weapons simply because of their dreadful effects. During the debate, too, a pacifist movement has appeared, which not only condemns nuclear weapons but condemns every kind of defense as meaningless or immoral; though not widely supported, this movement has probably influenced public opinion to a certain extent.

The powers-that-be have not made up their minds so far regarding the Commander-in-Chief's request for nuclear weapons, but

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the discussion has become spirited in recent months and a decision is expected during the coming year. The Conservative Party has clearly declared itself in favor of the new weapons and its leader, Mr. Jarl Hjalmarson, has promoted this view energetically. The Agrarian or Center Party appears to take the same stand although not in so unqualified a manner. Within the Social Democratic Party there are differences of opinion. So far no cabinet member has committed himself; different views seem to be represented within the cabinet, where resistance to atomic weapons is led by the Foreign Minister, the most convinced and influential spokesman of Swedish neutralism. Among Social Democratic women there has been intense propaganda against nuclear weapons, depicting their dreadful results and exaggerating the biological risks much as has been done in West Germany. The Liberals are also divided; statements by their leader, Professor Bertil Ohlin, have come close to supporting positively the procurement of nuclear weapons, but within the so-called free church organizations which belong to the party cadres there exist other opinions and even pacifist tendencies. There is reason to believe that the reluctance of the Social Democrats and the Liberals to take a stand is due in part to tactical considerations; they fear dissension within their own parties and the Liberals also fear that the Social Democrats would exploit the nuclear weapons question in coming elections. The Communists are of course strongly against atomic weapons for Sweden while continuously praising Russia for being invincible, precisely because of its atomic and hydrogen bombs. It is difficult to gauge public opinion on this question. In the latest public opinion poll, in the summer of 1957, 40 percent stated they were in favor of nuclear weapons for Sweden and 36 percent were against, with 24 percent doubtful. If the government and Riksdag were to decide to purchase nuclear weapons there is no doubt that the large majority would accept the decision.

There is also another aspect of the debate on nuclear weapons. Swedish atomic research has progressed so far that the scientists are ready to begin studying the production of atomic bombs, but special appropriations for this purpose have not yet been granted. It is believed that within seven or eight years Sweden could produce atomic weapons. Usually the discussion has turned on the issue whether there should be such production in Sweden. But many of those who support the idea of atomic weapons for Sweden think that the first step should be to try to purchase from

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abroad (initially from the United States) a variety of missiles so that in case of a Russian attack we could be supplied with the actual warheads. Critics of this suggestion argue that Sweden cannot obtain these weapons from the West and that in any event such an attempt would be incompatible with Swedish neutrality. Personally I am fully in favor both of Sweden joining the Atlantic Pact and of its purchasing atomic weapons. If we cannot become a member of NATO, then atomic weapons, whether produced in Sweden or obtained from abroad, would be a substitute, albeit not a really satisfactory one, for the relative safety which we would achieve through the Atlantic Pact.

However, I want to emphasize strongly that most of those who support the alliance-free policy and/or oppose Swedish atomic weapons have formulated their opinions without any tendency towards either pacifism or defeatism. All the democratic parties have stated forcefully that Sweden is to defend itself against attacks and that it is not to accede to demands either to give up any part of its territory or give up its neutral position. This combination of willingness to defend oneself and unwillingness to assure oneself of the aid or the weapons necessary for an efficient defense may seem unreasonable—and in my view it is—but it represents a strong and honest opinion within the leading political groups.

IV

A few words might be said at this point about Sweden's relations to the other Scandinavian states and to plans for European collaboration.

When the plans for a Scandinavian defense alliance collapsed, other means were sought to maintain and strengthen Scandinavian solidarity. In this respect the formation of the Nordic Council in 1951 on the initiative of the Danish Prime Minister was most important. The Council, which met for the first time in 1953 and since then has held annual sessions of a few days each, includes representatives of the parliaments and cabinets of the member nations. It is the practice to keep questions of defense and foreign policy off the Council agenda and therefore Finland has been able to be a member since 1955. The Council has of course no authority to take decisions, but it is entitled to make recommendations and has done so on legal, cultural and socio-political questions and on some matters pertaining to customs. The Council's most remarkable contribution has been in taking

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the initiative toward easing inter-Scandinavian traffic, with the primary result of making the member nations a uniform passport area. On the other hand, the debate on a Scandinavian customs union has not so far yielded any important results. It should be emphasized that the creation of the Nordic Council has no particular bearing on major foreign policy issues, as is clearly shown by the fact that beyond the borders of Scandinavia the member nations are working along completely different lines; nor can the Council bring about any change in this situation.

The Swedish representatives in O.E.E.C., in close association with the British, have strongly advocated that the mutual customs reductions and increased import quotas which the European Economic Community has begun to establish this year should be expanded to Western Europe as a whole through the creation of a free-trade area. Indeed, Sweden has shown an unusual diplomatic activity on this question. The reasons are self-evident. With its large foreign trade per capita, Sweden is to a marked extent dependent on its exports to maintain and develop its standard of living. About 70 percent of these exports go to Western Europe, including 34 percent to the Common Market countries. Scrapping the Western European tariff barriers would consequently mean an important advantage for Swedish exports if Sweden joins the market area, and just as important a disadvantage if it remains outside. Discrimination on the part of the Six against imports from non-member nations is therefore a grave matter. On the other hand, the increase in competition on the home market which would result from lower tariffs would be less severe in Sweden than in most other countries, because domestic industry has gradually been weaned away from tariff protection against foreign competition. From this point of view Sweden seems unusually well prepared for a common Western European market.

V

On the whole, the Swedish conception of foreign policy, of the leading powers and their relations to each other, shows many of the same variations and nuances as are seen in other West European countries. The Swedes have reacted strongly against Soviet aggression and threats, especially at the time of the establishment of dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War and the Russian action against Hungary in 1956. In certain periods, such as during the Geneva Conference in 1955, there

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were illusions, as in other countries, about the possibility of a reconciliation between the parties of the cold war. Generally speaking, these illusions have abated as most people have come to realize that the Communist dictatorships hold to their purpose of continued expansion and are not inclined to make real concessions on any point.

Certain events and conditions peculiar to Sweden have served to increase the fear of Russia and the animosity to the Soviet régime. Several spy cases involving the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm have been exposed and Russian diplomats have been requested to leave. A matter of great importance in forming Swedish opinion was the Wallenberg case. A young Swedish diplomat, Raoul Wallenberg, credited with having saved thousands of Jewish lives, was captured by the Russians when they took Budapest in 1945. The Russians long denied that Wallenberg had been kept prisoner, but in 1957 they admitted it, blaming the previous false denials on the late Minister of Security, Abakumov. At the same time they claimed that Wallenberg had died in 1947 in a Russian prison. The Russian lies and other circumstances make many people believe that Wallenberg is still alive as a prisoner in Russia. Again, the Swedes reacted strongly when the Russians shot down two Swedish aircraft in 1952 over international waters; the Russians denied the incident and refused the Swedish government's claim for damages. The so-called Peace Conferences which have been arranged in Stockholm by the Communists and their fellow travellers have served primarily to increase Swedish criticism of the dictatorships of the East; before the latest of these conferences in July 1958 the Swedish Federation of Labor, which includes practically all Swedish workers, declared that the conference was intended as a platform for the foreign policy and Party purposes of Communism and that there was no reason for the trade unions to give the conference "economic or moral support."

Naturally the United States and its policy have been much more discussed in Sweden since World War II than ever before. Opinion has been characterized by the same ambivalence as in other democratic states in Western Europe. The more conservative vacillate between the old prejudice against America as a culturally primitive country and strong appreciation of America as the fortress of economic liberalism and the most powerful defender of Western freedom. More radical opinion also fluctuates; some-

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times America is seen as an example of democracy and social equality, sometimes as the last rampart of unchecked capitalism. However, it is obvious to most Swedes that without the protection of the United States the democracies of Western Europe would fall prey to Communist tyranny. Naturally, criticism of the United States has centered on such things as McCarthyism and discrimination against Negroes in the South; however, the decisions of the Supreme Court regarding desegregation have been of great importance in forming Swedish ideas of American society. There is a third point of view which tends to be ideologically neutral, putting the United States and Russia on an equal footing. It has adherents in certain intellectual non-Communist groups, but particularly since the events in Hungary in 1956 it can hardly be said to have had any influence.

Discussions of foreign policy on specific issues, especially Sweden's activity in the United Nations, have to a large extent been in terms of attacks on, or defense of, the Foreign Minister. Through his strong position within the Social Democratic Party, Mr. Undén is considered the indisputable leader of Swedish foreign policy. He has been criticized for exaggerated neutralism even by those who in principle advocate an alliance-free policy. This has happened on a number of occasions in response to positions taken by Sweden in the United Nations—for instance in July 1958, when the Swedish delegate opposed the United States and the Western nations on the Lebanon question. Certain statements by Mr. Undén have come in for violent criticism, such as his insinuation on one occasion that the United States was as foreign to Sweden as Russia, and his reference another time to "the so-called free world." Those actions and statements have been explained by the fact that through his socialist convictions he is truly neutral in the sense that he feels no strong affinity for the democracies; but more probably they result from Mr. Undén's conviction that the alliance-free policy precludes taking positions or stating views which in any way involve the cold war. Critics feel that as a result the Foreign Minister has presented Swedish opinion in a false light to the rest of the world; he has not emphasized sufficiently the indisputable fact of our solidarity with other democracies. But within his own party the tendency is to interpret his actions and his cautious and frequently dry statements as expressions of realism and statesmanship.

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ISRAEL AND THE AFRO-ASIAN WORLD

By Arnold Rivkin

A STRIKING development in international relations is the mounting interest with which more and more states of Africa and Asia, notably Ghana and Burma, are looking to Israel. They have found in Israel a state with an advanced technology capable of extending assistance, providing technicians, entering into trade, and supplying investment capital without in any way compromising their sovereignty or threatening their independence. Israel also has the advantage of being a relatively neutral source of assistance, without any of the possible ideological implications which might attach to assistance from the West or the Communist bloc. In addition, the dynamism of the Israeli development effort, the pioneer spirit that pervades it, and its visible achievements in difficult circumstances have undoubtedly excited the interest of many underdeveloped countries, and provide an attractive model with which they can identify themselves.

For Africa, Israel's desire to establish reciprocal relations offers a special attraction in that it can serve as a countervailing political force to offset Egypt's ambitions there. This was first perceived by Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, who has his own plans for Africa; and as a result the Israeli initiative has found its warmest reception in Ghana.

African relations with Israel, which have been evolving over the past 18 months, have proved capable of withstanding antagonistic and even disruptive external pressures. Egypt's previously discreet efforts to weaken the Ghanaian-Israeli relationship became relatively overt at the Accra Conference of Independent African States in April 1958. There, the Egyptians tried to obtain an anti-Israel resolution which would tend to drive a wedge between Ghana and other African states on the one hand and Israel on the other. They were defeated. Dr. Fawzy, Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, sustained a double rebuff, first, in his failure to have the question of Israel placed on the Conference agenda as a separate item, and second, in the noncommittal resolution which emerged from the Conference, calling for a "just" resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. At the subsequent All-African People's Conference held in Accra in December 1958, Egypt sustained still another setback in her efforts to introduce

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the Israeli issue at an African conference. This meeting of representatives of African political parties, trade unions and nationalist organizations firmly resisted Egyptian efforts to label Israel as an "imperialist" state along with the United Kingdom and France.

One of the highlights of the All-African People's Conference, which assumes particular importance in this context, was a somewhat enigmatic statement by Prime Minister Nkrumah in his address to the opening session of the Conference. "Do not let us also forget," he warned, "that colonialism and imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise, not necessarily from Europe. We must alert ourselves to be able to recognize this when it rears its head and prepare ourselves to fight against it."[1] Certainly this is susceptible, *inter alia*, to the interpretation that Nkrumah was warning against direct Egyptian expansionism or indirect Communist penetration of African areas through a willing Egypt. This interpretation is consistent with the report that "Dr. Nkrumah told intimates late last week that he would ignore Bandung [Conference of African and Asian states in 1955] because he felt that President Gamal Abdel Nasser . . . had corrupted its principles of non-interference and intruded Asian and Communist influences into African affairs."[2]

The role President Nasser envisages for Egypt in Africa is set forth in his book on the Egyptian revolution. It expresses a latter-day version of the "white man's burden," complete with references to Egypt's "manifest destiny" and "civilizing burden" in "the interior of the Dark Continent:"

> The peoples of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard their northern gate, and who constitute their link with the outside world. We will never in any circumstances be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.[3]

In North Africa this role has meant interference in the internal political affairs of Tunisia and Morocco and calculated campaigns to penetrate the public administration and educational system of Libya. In the Sudan it has meant interference in the Sudanese national elections, assertion of territorial claims against the northern frontier boundary of the Sudan, and disputes over use

[1] *The New York Times*, December 9, 1958.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] Gamal Abdul Nasser, "Egypt's Liberation—The Philosophy of the Revolution" (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955), p. 109–110.

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of the Nile River waters. In the Horn of Africa it has meant an intrusion in domestic affairs by a political appeal to "Moslem unity." In Africa generally it has meant a drumfire of anti-Western and anti-Israel propaganda and a beehive of conspiratorial activity against incumbent régimes in independent African states as well as in dependent territories.

Under the circumstances, for an African nation to establish close relations with Israel is at once courageous and useful. The kind of political penetration that Egypt has achieved in Libya would be particularly dangerous in sub-Sahara Africa at a time when education and public administration are generally undergoing drastic changes with the coming of independence. The ability and willingness of Israel to supply technicians and management personnel on reasonable terms for sterling reimbursement is thus extremely important. It could be a crucial factor in preventing "indirect aggression" by Egypt.

II

The most far-reaching of the evolving relationships between Israel and Afro-Asian states is that between Israel and Ghana. As a precedent and as a model for other countries to follow, it warrants examination in greater detail. What are the elements of this new relationship which may at first glance appear unlikely between states with seemingly disparate interests?

Trade. Early in 1957 the Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry went to Ghana to represent Israel at the Independence Day ceremonies of the new nation. Shortly thereafter trade relations between Ghana and Israel were inaugurated, and the first shipment, a modest export of 1,000 tons of cement and miscellaneous industrial items from Israel, took place in May 1957. In the following August the Ghanaian Minister of Trade and Industry headed a trade mission to Israel to explore the possibilities of developing a regular flow of trade between the two countries. These visits at the ministerial level led to the initialing of a preliminary trade agreement in January 1958, and in July long-term trade and payments agreements came into force. The agreements are for a period of four years but are automatically renewable on a yearly basis unless terminated by either party after appropriate notice.

A principal feature of the agreements is the provision of credits to Ghana in the impressive sum of $20 million over the four-year

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period. Credits for capital goods and services are to run six and one-half years; others are to run five years. All credits involve a two-year grace period for payments of principal. Under the trade agreement Ghana will buy cement and other building material and equipment, tires, glass, ceramics, paper, cardboard, leather goods, plastics and other industrial goods, processed foods, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and in return will export to Israel cocoa, coffee, copra, oil seed, hides and skins, palm kernels and oil, hardwoods, bauxite, manganese and rough diamonds.

In 1956, prior to independence, Israeli trade with the Gold Coast was virtually non-existent; one year later Israeli exports to Ghana during its first nine months of independence exceeded $100,000, and imports from Ghana reached $300,000. In 1958, on the basis of unofficial statistics, Ghanaian exports to Israel will show a further growth but are not likely to increase at the rate of growth projected for Israeli exports to Ghana.

Dizengoff West Africa, Ltd. was organized in Israel in 1957 as a trading company with the exclusive purpose of engaging in two-way trade between Israel and West Africa. It established an office in Accra early in the same year and a second branch office was opened early in 1958 at Lagos, Nigeria. In the first nine months of operation of the Accra branch, Dizengoff received orders for $550,000 worth of Israeli goods—primarily cement, tires and food products—and placed orders for approximately $250,000 worth of Ghanaian goods—mainly cocoa and timber.

Investment. In the fall of 1957, the Black Star Line was incorporated in Ghana with 60 percent ownership vested in the government of Ghana and 40 percent ownership in Zim Israel Navigation Company, Ltd., a private Israeli corporation. The corporation has an authorized capitalization of $1,400,000, with $840,000 paid in. Zim is the managing agent and will operate the Black Star Line for the first five years. Thereafter, the government of Ghana may, if it desires, take over these functions and, in fact, buy out the Zim interest. The company owns three vessels and has four others under long-term charter sailing on regular schedules, primarily between West Africa and the United Kingdom and Western Europe. The start of operations in December 1957 was commemorated by Ghana in a series of three colorful postage stamps designed by an Israeli artist.

In conjunction with the establishment of the Black Star Line, Israel has provided a technical assistance mission to assist in the

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establishment and operation of a Ghanaian Nautical Academy to train officers for the developing merchant marine. For a number of years Israel will help to staff the Academy and on-the-job training will be made available aboard Zim vessels and in Zim offices in Israel and abroad.

The second major Israeli investment in Ghana is in the building industry. The Ghana National Construction Company, Ltd. was established in March 1958, with 60 percent participation by the Ghana Industrial Development Corporation, a wholly-owned government corporation, and the remaining 40 percent controlled by Solel Boneh, the industrial complex of the Israeli labor organization, Histadrut. The new corporation is to engage primarily in large-scale construction projects in the public sector, but it may also participate in private projects, particularly industrial building. Technical assistance is also an important feature of this investment. Solel Boneh is to train a substantial number of Ghanaians in the skills and techniques of the construction industry. The capitalization of the new corporation, all paid in, is $560,000.

These two investments have established precedents, particularly with respect to the distribution of ownership and the provision of Israeli technical personnel and assistance. Future investments in Ghana are likely to adhere to the pattern set in these two important ventures.

Technical Assistance. In addition to private technical assistance associated with the two Israeli investments described, the government of Israel has provided technical assistance in the fields of city planning, public veterinarian services, trade union organization, irrigation and drinking water supplies, and maritime law. Ghana has also shown considerable interest in receiving technical assistance in the operation of coöperatives. During the fiscal year 1958, Ghana received visits from Israeli technicians in the fields of coöperative farming and resettlement projects, cooperative banking, coöperative marketing and consumer coöperatives.

Perhaps the most dramatic technical assistance is to be found in the agricultural field. An Israeli coöperative settlement expert is studying the feasibility of creating farm communities patterned on the Israel *kibbutzim* and *moshavim*. Other Israeli technicians are pioneering in water-drilling experiments in the hinterlands. And still others are concerned with commodity marketing, agricultural credit and agricultural productivity generally.

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Exchange Programs. In addition to trade, investment and technical assistance, there has been a growing exchange of official and unofficial visits between the two countries. Israel has initiated a scholarship program for Ghanaian students to study in Israel; more than 40 have already arrived there and the number is expected to increase steadily. The Israeli government helped to recruit two Israeli professors of civil engineering to teach at Kumasi College of Technology for three-year periods. There is also a growing number of private scholarships, such as the ten granted by Solel Boneh to provide Ghanaians with the opportunity to become architects, engineers and building foremen.

The evolving Ghanaian-Israeli relationship thus brings together two new postwar states, both pioneers in their respective ways and areas, and both seeking in difficult circumstances to create enduring and viable nations. It brings together two former segments of the British Empire which, as part of that Empire, had no contacts. It brings together two states heretofore unrelated by historic ties, tradition or habit solely on the basis of newly developing mutual interests.

III

Many of the elements found in Israel's relationship with Ghana are present in her expanding relations with other areas of Africa and Asia. These contacts have been abetted by the completion of Israel's "dry land Suez Canal," the hard-surface road reaching to the port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel has instituted regular freight service between Eilat and the entire east coast of Africa and the Union of South Africa, postal services between Eilat and Ethiopia and British East Africa, and expanding commercial contacts with Ethiopia, British East Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Mozambique and the Union of South Africa. The recent trade agreement between the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Israel is among the most important of these expanding trade relations. The agreement puts trade between the two countries for the first time on a general open license system and a most-favored-nation basis.

Both Liberia and Ethiopia maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and both have been developing trade, investment, technical assistance and cultural relations with that country. Both are reported to have stood firm with Ghana in resisting Egyptian attempts to obtain an anti-Israel declaration from the Accra

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Conference of Independent African States. The Liberian Construction Corporation was set up in Israel for the expressed purpose of constructing public works and roads in Liberia; and the Alliance Tire and Rubber Company, Ltd. of Israel is in an advanced state of negotiations with respect to investment in a new rubber plantation in the Western Region of Nigeria. Israel has also developed increasing contacts with other parts of West and Central Africa, and trade with French West Africa, especially, increased last year, partly, perhaps, as a result of the visit of Mrs. Golda Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, to that area and to Nigeria in March 1958. In 1957 Israeli exports to the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa also started to increase significantly.

In Asia the relationship between Israel and Burma comes closest to the Israel-Ghana model. Burma is Israel's oldest friend in Asia. Their growing relationship has been subjected to hostile pressure ever since early 1955, when Burma incurred Egyptian displeasure by its efforts to moderate the Arab anti-Israel resolution at the Bandung Conference. Shortly thereafter Prime Minister U Nu of Burma defied an Egyptian demand that he abandon an official visit to Israel. Instead U Nu made his visit to Israel and cancelled a planned three-day visit to Egypt scheduled at the same time. Israel has established diplomatic relations with Japan, Thailand, Laos, Ceylon and the Philippines, as well as Burma. The one striking gap is the absence of any rapprochement with India, which has steadfastly refused to exchange ambassadors although it recognized Israel as long ago as 1950.

On the economic side, there has been a growing stream of Israeli technicians going to Burma, and a reverse flow of Burmese trainees going to Israel. Both groups have been largely concerned with agricultural development. Recently 56 Burmese arrived in Israel to spend one year living and working on collective and coöperative farms on the frontiers of the country. At the same time a Burmese army contingent of 33 officers and men will spend one year studying defense arrangements in these border settlements. In 1956 and 1957 Israeli exports to Burma, made up entirely of industrial goods, totalled approximately $1,000,000, while Israeli imports from Burma amounted to $900,000 in each of these years. For both countries, these are not insignificant totals.

A shipping partnership has recently been formed with financial interests in Hong Kong, which annually handles Israeli exports

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amounting to more than $2,000,000. The Gold Star Line is to operate between Far Eastern ports, the United States and West Africa, with the Black Star Line serving as its representative in West Africa and as a connecting link with Western Europe. Thus, Israel has brought together in an imaginative way its developing and complementary relationships with Ghana and Hong Kong. In this type of arrangement there are potentially interesting possibilities for triangular trade.

Elsewhere in Asia, Israel has growing trade relations with Japan, the Philippines and Iran. In 1957 trade with these states showed a significant increase over the 1956 levels. Growing numbers of Asian trainees are finding their way to Israel, including a small group of trainees from Thailand, India and Japan who are studying at Israeli scientific and technical institutions. The most recent development is the creation by the Israeli government of an integrated program of several months' duration for the study of agricultural settlements and coöperative enterprises. At the present time 60 trainees from 17 Afro-Asian countries and territories are participating.

IV

One of the most hopeful aspects of Israel's relations with Afro-Asian states is that her economic methods, rather than those of the Communists, may serve as a model for underdeveloped areas.

The Soviet and Chinese Communist models undoubtedly have a strong attraction for those countries which, after centuries of subsistence-level economies and, in many cases, generations of colonial status, are seeking the shortest route to economic development. The underdeveloped countries are casting about for the formula that will not only work for them but also achieve maximum results in minimum time. The temptation to find a short cut by the use of authoritarian policies and techniques is constantly with them.

The forced pace of Russian and Chinese development is likely to be attractive for new political leaders in underdeveloped countries under a variety of circumstances: for those laboring under a compulsion to show tangible results within a single generation; for those impatient with democratic processes for obtaining a consensus on development policies; for those unsure of their position and fearful of the political pressures likely to accompany economic growth; for those attracted by the argument that poor

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nations cannot afford the luxury of relatively unplanned growth of private economic sectors; and for those whose anti-colonialism leads them to regard all private enterprise with suspicion and to consider private ownership of the means of production a dangerous relic of the colonial past.

The Israeli model might well prove to be a sort of economic "third force"—an alternative differing from the Western pattern but certainly far more compatible with free-world interests than any Communist model. For Israel has many things in common with the underdeveloped countries: limited natural resources, short supplies of capital, fundamental social problems, major tasks of building a national state and developing new political institutions, and a will to develop modern economies—indeed, the whole range of problems confronting almost any new state in today's world. The inspirational note and sense of purpose associated with the Israeli economic development effort are likely to exercise an appeal for underdeveloped countries with a drive to achieve expanding economies and higher standards of living. Finally, and most important, Israel by no stretch of the imagination presents an external threat to these newly independent countries. Israeli assistance can be accepted without fear of "strings" which might in any way be thought to compromise the independence of the recipient states.

As Israel develops its relationships with other African and Asian countries, her economy and development schemes will be on exhibit before a growing number of visitors. The availability of qualified Israeli technicians and the apparent adaptability of Israeli economic development techniques are likely to enhance the possibilities for a transfer of some or much of the Israeli experience to African and Asian areas.

V

The general benefit to Israel of expanding relations with the Afro-Asian states is implicit in the foregoing. In conclusion, it seems worth while to note some of the specific advantages which may accrue to Israel as these relationships develop.

Already, Israel is breaking out of Nasser's "Arab circle." Measures to secure and develop the port of Eilat and an overland route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba are part of the unfolding strategy of outflanking the Arab blockade on the east. Similarly, the Black Star Line, founded in Ghana with sub-

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stantial Israeli participation, provides a greater measure of security on the western flank. It would appear unlikely that Egypt will choose to interfere with free access to the Suez Canal of ships flying the flag of Ghana even if such ships should be plying routes originating or terminating in Israel.

The friendly and mutually profitable relations which Israel has achieved with other young states have also been successful thus far in forestalling Egyptian efforts to turn the Afro-Asian bloc against Israel. The refusal of the African states and political organizations to take an anti-Israel position at the respective Accra Conferences, already noted, is one instance of this important development.

The material advantages for Israel in developing fruitful economic ties with African and Asian states and territories are no less promising. The Afro-Asian world represents both markets for her manufactured goods—cement, tires, chemicals and pharmaceuticals—and sources of raw materials for her processing and manufacturing industries and of agricultural products which supply her with food and animal fodder on reasonable terms. Israel is particularly interested in obtaining rough diamonds for her important diamond finishing industry, which furnishes her second most important export by value. African areas, such as Ghana, are a source of diamonds outside the control of the international cartel, which in recent years has reduced Israel's share of total production within the syndicate.

Investment opportunities of the type already developed in Ghana and Hong Kong are also advantageous to Israel. They afford employment opportunities for her technicians, provide a return on capital invested, and, in sterling areas, achieve savings in foreign exchange.

Finally, the advantages which Israel finds in her growing relations with the states of Africa and Asia are shared by the free world generally. Her assistance in economic development, the expanding use of her technicians and her agricultural and industrial technology, the increase in her private and quasi-public external investment and the growth of her trade—all these contribute to the strength of a number of young and uncertain states in Africa and Asia. In addition, in several of these states Israel offers an economic model as an attractive alternative to that offered by the Soviet Union. These developments are in the general interest as well as of value to the nations directly involved.

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SUPERVISING AGREEMENTS: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE

By Jacques Freymond

IN the present world of distrust and fear, where we apparently must accept a bellicose form of coexistence as a substitute for peace, the problem of how to supervise the implementation of international agreements assumes great importance. Not a day goes by without some reference to it, whether in the context of partial or general disarmament or in discussions of the Middle East or "disengagement" in Europe. This may justify a study of a recent experience in international supervision—that of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission set up under the terms of the Armistice Agreement in Korea.

It will be recalled that the Armistice Agreement concluded at Panmunjom in July 1953 provided for the establishment of a Military Armistice Commission, composed of representatives of the two belligerents, and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which was "to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection and investigation." The latter was to consist of representatives of four nations which, to the extent that they had not participated in the war, could be considered neutral—two of them (Sweden and Switzerland) appointed by the United Nations Command and the other two (Poland and Czechoslovakia) by the North Korean-Chinese Command.

The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was primarily to see that both sides adhered to their agreement not to strengthen their military forces, either by increasing their personnel or by bringing in more advanced weapons. To accomplish this, the Armistice Agreement provided for 20 Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, five to be stationed at ports of entry in South Korea, five at ports of entry in North Korea and the balance held in reserve in the Demilitarized Zone. These ten unassigned Teams could be sent anywhere to investigate reported violations, at the request of "the Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof." These responsibilities of the Supervisory Commission, although strictly circumscribed, appeared to be clearly defined and capable of execution. The means placed at its disposal should have enabled it to supervise the movements of personnel and matériel at the ten designated ports of entry and, upon the request of either side, to dispatch the mobile Teams to conduct investigations at designated points.

Yet obstacles immediately arose, and they soon proved well-nigh insurmountable. The first lay in the divergence between the conceptions of the Armistice held by each side. During the armistice negotiations it had already become apparent that, while the representatives of the United Nations wanted neutral supervision to be as extensive as possible, the North Korean and Chinese representatives wanted its responsibilities and powers restricted. The final terms of the Agreement gave practically no freedom of action to the Supervisory Commission; its function was merely informational. It could do no more than "report the results of [its] supervision, observation, inspection

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and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission." It was not to concern itself with the way in which its observations were followed up or with measures to punish violations. It was devoid of executive power, subordinate to the Military Armistice Commission, which alone was authorized to "supervise the implementation of the Armistice Agreement" and "settle through negotiations any violations" of the Agreement's provisions.

The Supervisory Commission was also restricted in the geographical sense. It was to cover designated ports of entry, but what assurance was there that the traffic to be supervised would actually come through those ports? Might it not be re-routed? The inspectors were not allowed freedom of movement to satisfy themselves on that score. Moreover, for their own safety they were constantly surrounded by bodyguards who showed the most attentive solicitude—a curious reversal of roles, by which those who were supposed to be under supervision were enabled to supervise their supervisors.

Moreover, the Supervisory Commission found itself immobilized from within, as it were, by its own composition and by the fundamentally different concepts which its members had of their mission. It had been set up on a parity basis, with each side nominating two members. Unlike the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, it was not to exercise executive powers, and for that reason it was considered unnecessary to provide for a fifth member country. It could therefore be effective only to the extent that the two component groups might be in agreement or that its members might reserve the freedom of individual judgment which would have made it possible to achieve a majority vote. If the members had in fact enjoyed the degree of independence which a truly neutral role required, they would have been able to concentrate on establishing the objective facts.

Actually, the notion that any state which had not participated in the Korean War was neutral was, of course, unrealistic. Furthermore, the emphasis on parity in the articles of the Armistice Agreement implied that there were interests to be defended rather than truths to be sought. The classic tradition of the neutral's duties towards all concerned was replaced by a somewhat diffuse concept of the neutral's duties towards the side which had proposed his appointment. Though the Swedes and particularly the Swiss, whose country was not a member of the United Nations, might resist such a concept, they were virtually forced into it by the unvarying support which the Polish and Czechoslovak members gave to whatever position was taken by the North Koreans and the Chinese. Within the Commission a division was created which could not be bridged. A majority vote could not be achieved; the Commission was reduced to impotence.

II

The situation was aggravated by the differing ways in which the sides interpreted the Armistice Agreement. While the Inspection Teams in South Korea were able to carry out their task to the extent allowed by the Agreement, those in North Korea were subjected to restrictions which in effect rendered them totally ineffective.

In April 1955, the Swiss Federal Council reported to the Federal Assembly that

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At the end of 1953 it seemed entirely clear that as far as South Korea was concerned all movement of personnel and war matériel was passing through the designated ports of entry, as provided in the Armistice Agreement. The ships' papers showing the merchandise carried, including items which did not have to be declared and did not come under the heading of "war matériel," were all made available to the Inspection Teams.

Even so, the Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Teams never failed to notice the slightest error and draw it to the attention of the Commission, insisting that supervision in that particular area should be intensified.

In North Korea conditions were entirely different. In three of the five northern ports there was no activity at all and in the other two traffic was extremely limited. Even more striking was the systematic way in which the authorities, aided and abetted by the Czechoslovaks and Poles, obstructed the activities of the Inspection Teams. Here again a quotation from the report of the Swiss Federal Council is relevant:

> The intention to inspect railway stations had to be announced two hours in advance. By the time the Inspection Team arrived the station would usually be deserted. If, on the other hand, a train was in the station and the Swiss and Swedish representatives wanted to inspect it, their Czechoslovak and Polish colleagues would refuse, on the grounds that according to the station master's declaration the train was not carrying war matériel. It would also be claimed that the train was engaged in rail traffic in the interior of North Korea and that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was therefore not authorized to inspect it. No documents or timetables could be consulted; according to the railway authorities, such documents did not exist. Finally, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had no way of inspecting the several lines of communication which linked Manchuria and Siberia with North Korea but without passing through the ports of entry enumerated in the Armistice Agreement. No air or maritime traffic could be supervised in North Korea.

The difference between the conditions in North and South Korea was so marked that the Swedish and Swiss representatives began trying to introduce in the North some of the methods used in the South. But they could accomplish nothing in the face of the determined opposition of their Czechoslovak and Polish colleagues.

The use of the mobile Inspection Teams accentuated still further the existing divergence of views. As the effectiveness of an investigation depended on its speed, one would have supposed that as soon as a request was received a Team would be dispatched. Yet that was not the case. The Supervisory Commission, as a result of a somewhat surprising interpretation of Article 28 of the Armistice Agreement, had reserved the right to decide how such requests were to be followed up, and thus had opened the door to precisely those obstructionist manœuvres which the provision granting each side the right to request an investigation had been designed to prevent.

In mid-October 1953, for example, the Commission received a request from the U.N. representative on the Military Armistice Commission to make an immediate investigation at a point on the northwestern border of Korea to which, it was claimed, a cargo of aircraft had been dispatched subsequent to the signing of the Armistice Agreement. The immediate departure of an Inspection Team was both necessary and feasible. Yet the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives prevented it, insisting that certain incorrect terms in

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the text addressed to the Commission should first be deleted, particularly that the term "Communist" used by the representative of the United Nations Command should be replaced by the precise terms "Korean People's Army" and "Chinese People's Volunteers." This process took two days and it was only then that the mobile Inspection Team could be dispatched.

Some months later, at the beginning of 1954, the Supervisory Commission was informed that the Chinese-North Korean Command would no longer admit into the area under its control mobile Inspection Teams dispatched at the request of the United Nations Command. This unilateral declaration, for which the Armistice Agreement gave no authorization whatsoever, did not, it was true, put an end to all inspections; but from then onward the number was greatly restricted. In 1955 there was a renewed exchange of accusations which resulted in the dispatch of several mobile Inspection Teams to both the North and South; but the conditions under which they had to work prevented them from reaching any more positive conclusions than in the past. The Swedish and Swiss members of the Team which had been sent at the request of the Chinese-North Korean side to investigate an incident involving aircraft had the feeling that the witnesses they interrogated had been carefully groomed in what they were to say. Another investigation made at the request of the United Nations Command revealed the existence of landing fields in North Korea suitable for jet aircraft. The presence of a certain number of Mig-15s was noted and the Swedish and Swiss members were convinced that other jet fighters had taken off before the arrival of the Inspection Team. In most cases the mobile Teams were as unable as the Supervisory Commission itself to furnish a majority report.

There was nothing to be done but to admit failure. The Supervisory Commission could not provide the guarantees against violations of the Armistice for which it had been set up. It could not verify the figures furnished it by the two sides. Up to the end of March 1954 it had been informed by the United Nations Command of the arrival in South Korea of 631 combat aircraft, 631 tanks, 82,861 weapons of all calibers, and more than 220 million rounds of ammunition for small arms alone. Up to that same date the Chinese-North Korean side had announced the entry of not a single aircraft, only seven tanks, 641 firearms and 56,650 rounds of ammunition. Four years after signing the Armistice the United Nations Command had reported the entry of 22,800 aircraft, whereas the other side stubbornly maintained that the corresponding figure for the North was zero.

Yet how could it possibly be imagined that an army the size of that of the Chinese volunteers could dispense with ammunition or spare parts? How could any faith be put in "witnesses" who affirmed in 1955 that none of the combat planes on certain airfields in North Korea had ever had to be repaired and that there had never been any need for ammunition or spare arms?

III

The report that the Commission had met with failure was submitted in the spring of 1954 by the Swedish and Swiss representatives. They found encouragement for doing so in a letter, dated April 15, from General Julius Lacey, senior representative of the United Nations Command, in which he drew attention to violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Chinese-North

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Korean side and criticized the Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Supervisory Commission. In particular he took them to task for their continual opposition to the dispatch of mobile Inspection Teams to North Korea. Three weeks later, faced with the impossibility of reaching agreement in the Supervisory Commission on a reply to this letter, the Swiss and Swedish representatives wrote to General Lacey pointing out the regrettable loopholes in the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, and proposing that the Military Armistice Commission should undertake a new examination of the supervision problem. They concluded by stating: "Under the present conditions the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is not able to act in conformity with what was presumably the intention of the signatories to the Armistice Agreement."

The Swedish and Swiss representatives followed this with a report to the Military Armistice Commission in which they described the work of the Supervisory Commission, emphasizing the marked difference between the conditions under which it had operated in the North and in the South. "All efforts of the Swedish and Swiss members of the inspection groups to increase the number of unannounced inspections and make them more effective," they stated in part, "have been constantly and systematically frustrated. In view of the way in which such inspections have been conducted, they have ceased to have any usefulness and have served merely as a façade. The inspection groups in North Korea have never been able to evaluate the movement of matériel in a manner comparable to that applied in South Korea."

At the same time the Swedish and Swiss Governments made representations to the Governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China to the effect that they were concerned over the prolongation of a mission which they had accepted on a temporary basis and particularly over the fact that it had proved impossible for the Supervisory Commission to take effective action. They therefore asked the two sides to consider whether it might not be better to relieve the Commission of its task. However, the Czechoslovak and Polish Governments insisted that the Commission was playing a useful and even effective role and that its activities should be continued in the interests of peace itself. The Government of the People's Republic of China expressed a similar view.

When the Geneva Conference ended without bringing the Korean problem nearer solution, the Swedish representative to the United Nations put the matter before the Political Committee of the General Assembly at the beginning of December 1954. He drew up a new statement of the difficulties encountered by the Supervisory Commission. He pointed out that the parity formula which had been adopted was unworkable and that the system of supervising five designated points was inadequate in as much as four rail lines linking North Korea with China crossed the border at points where inspection was not specifically authorized. The United States representative agreed that the Supervisory Commission was paralyzed and rendered ineffective by its own rules of procedure, but the delegates of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic insisted that the Commission was serving a useful purpose and that there was no need to reform it. Thus, those who had hampered and indeed paralyzed the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission posed as its most ardent and active defenders while the repre-

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sentatives of the United Nations Command and the Swedish and Swiss representatives, who had sought in every way to make the Commission effective, appealed for its abolition.

But the United Nations Command, though impatient to end this travesty of supervision for which it was paying half the costs, did not want to assume responsibility for abridging the Armistice Agreement. Sweden and Switzerland felt that it was not for either of them to make the decision. The result was a "compromise," which went into effect in the summer of 1955. It was agreed, not without misgivings, to cut down the size of the Supervisory Commission staff by abolishing two of the stationary Inspection Teams in both North and South Korea and by making a 50 percent reduction in the number of men on the remaining Teams. This was only the first step, for in the following year the United Nations Command notified the Military Commission of its decision to suspend temporarily the provisions of the Armistice Agreement regulating the activity of the Supervisory Commission. On June 8 it requested the Commission to withdraw the Inspection Teams from South Korean territory. Subsequently, it was decided to abolish all the stationary Teams, and from then on the Commission's activity was limited to recording such information as each side might furnish concerning changes in its military personnel and armaments.

In the following year the Commission had to bow to the United Nations Command's decision to introduce new weapons into Korea in defiance of the Armistice Agreement. Finally, in January 1958 the United Nations Command announced its intention to introduce atomic weapons into South Korea. The inability of the Armistice supervision bodies to carry out the task of inspecting the activities of one side, as provided for in the Agreement, had driven the other side to free itself of its obligation in order to ensure its own protection.

Had not the time come to abolish the Supervisory Commission? This question was continually being asked and continually left unanswered. The Czechoslovaks and Poles, having protested along with the Chinese and North Koreans against flagrant violations of the Armistice Agreement by the United Nations Command, failed to take the logical counterstep, which would have been to offer to open North Korea to effective inspection. Instead, they appeared quite ready to accommodate themselves to the new situation. The Americans and South Koreans, no longer hampered by the presence of the Czechoslovaks and Poles and free to accelerate the modernization of their armament, now showed less haste to do away with a body which had ceased to inconvenience them and might even serve to restrain the propaganda directed against them by the North Koreans and Chinese. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission thus remains a façade, maintained only because of apprehension about the void that would occur if it were abolished.

IV

This experience has been most instructive. Like many others, it clearly reveals the difference in the concepts held by each side as to proper dealings among nations. One side looked upon the Armistice as a step towards a peace settlement and considered itself bound, in its own interest, by the provisions of the Agreement which it signed. The other side looked upon the Armistice only as a lull in a struggle which must not be allowed to terminate until the

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final victory of socialism had been achieved—a lull needed in order to regroup its forces but without interrupting the battle that was continuing by other means. To this end, the Agreement must first of all be binding upon the other side and must furnish a legal pretext for interfering in its activities, weakening and paralyzing it, while at the same time ensuring that the revolutionary camp would be protected in carrying out its own illegal designs. Hence there is nothing surprising about the tenacity with which the Chinese and North Koreans have insisted upon maintaining the fiction of Armistice supervision. Having used it to cover the clandestine reconstitution of their own forces, they can then turn it against the enemy which they have driven to open violation and even denunciation of certain of the Armistice provisions.

Must it then be concluded that in the existing circumstances—and when a Communist state is involved—international supervision of any kind is out of the question?

It is easy enough to think so, for the problem of dealing with governments which use legal machinery to carry out illegal operations and which regard politics as only another means of waging war often seems insoluble. The area to be supervised is likely to be large and the number of inspectors small; the specialized problems raised by technical developments are enormously complex. Thus if either party to a dispute wishes to circumvent supervision it has every chance of succeeding.

Yet that is not sufficient reason for dismissing the matter. What lessons can we draw from past experience that may be helpful in the future?

If supervision is to be effective, it must be organized with the greatest care and the procedures to be followed must be worked out to the smallest detail. This takes time. For example, it may be important to consult the representatives of the countries which are to carry out the supervisory mission. The Swiss Government, to which the Korean Armistice Agreement was submitted in draft form, put before the United States Government a number of observations and suggestions which could not be taken into account. They unfortunately turned out to have been all too pertinent.

Above all, the supervisory staff should be assured real freedom of movement and the right and the means to pursue its investigations to whatever point it considers necessary. As soon as it is restricted to the inspection of certain areas only and prevented from making investigations elsewhere as it sees fit, it loses the ability to furnish the guarantees expected from it. Some will ask whether this privilege will not be abused. Certain provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement were aimed precisely at protecting the two sides against the possibility that the supervision machinery might be used for purposes of espionage. Indeed, this was one of the South Korean Government's most vehement objections to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Here again there can be no solution unless those responsible for supervision regard themselves not as defenders of the interests of one camp but as strictly impartial mandataries of both sides or as representatives of the superior body from which they draw their authority.

A supervision agreement should also provide that any attempt by either side to hinder the work of the inspectors would be punishable. Sanctions of some kind are essential. Yet the most effective weapon at the disposal of any international supervising body is likely to be publicity. Tricksters, however

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cynical, are reluctant to be unmasked and publicly confounded. For that reason provision should be made that the reports of inspectors shall be given the widest possible publicity. In this way the supervisory commission itself would have in its hands a means of punishing obstructionist tactics and violations of international agreements.

Finally, it is vital to put supervision in the right hands. When international crises have arisen since the Korean War a hasty call has gone out to military men who had no political background or to civilians who had no knowledge of either international or military affairs. In both cases, they often were entirely unfamiliar with the area to which they were to be sent. In addition to being men of political and military experience, the persons chosen for such delicate and important tasks must have unquestioned integrity; they must have the moral authority before world opinion to give them success in their effort to maintain true objectivity and serve a cause transcending the interests of one party or nation.

The formation of a corps of functionaries for missions of inquiry and supervision will have to be undertaken sooner or later. Individuals ought to be chosen for it not by the usual geographical criteria but for their character and intellectual capacities. The special training they receive should simply round out their inherent qualifications through study of the special problems that will confront them in their work and of the experience that has been gained in dealing with such problems in the past.

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In this very interesting selection of 15 essays, written over the last decade, Mr. Beloff is concerned with three principal themes: problems confronting the contemporary historian; problems of European and international integration; and certain leading features of American history and foreign policy.

INTEREST GROUPS ON FOUR CONTINENTS. EDITED BY HENRY W. EHRMANN. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 316 p. $6.00.

This study in comparative government comprises papers on interest or pressure groups in Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, the United States and Jugoslavia.

THE COMMUNIST WORLD AND OURS. BY WALTER LIPPMANN. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1959, 56 p. $2.00.

The four newspaper articles written by Mr. Lippmann upon his return from a visit to Russia in the autumn of 1958.

WHAT WE MUST KNOW ABOUT COMMUNISM. BY HARRY AND BONARO OVERSTREET. New York: Norton, 1958, 348 p. $3.95.

A useful introduction to Communist theory and practice, the activities and vagaries of the Communist Party in the U.S. and the implications for general foreign policy.

HANDBUCH DES WELTKOMMUNISMUS. EDITED BY JOSEPH M. BOCHEŃSKI AND GERHART NIEMEYER. Freiburg: Alber, 1958, 762 p. DM. 24.80.

A massive handbook, prepared by 15 specialists of several countries, dealing with the various aspects of international Communism: its structure and philosophical foundations, its techniques for seizing and expanding power and its application in economics, law, culture and religion.

A GUIDE TO ANTI-COMMUNIST ACTION. BY ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN. Chicago: Regnery, 1958, 244 p. $4.00.

In pursuit of the general theme—"Know the enemy, then attack him"—the author undertakes to identify the nature of the external and internal Communist threat, including "how to spot a Communist," and provides a guide to lines of individual action.

PERMANENT PEACE. BY TOM SLICK. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1958, 181 p. $2.95.

A plan for collective security within the framework of the U.N., based on an international police force and progressive national disarmament.

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PUBLIC VIEW, 1945–1955. By William A. Scott and Stephen B. Withey. New York: Manhattan Publishing Co. (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1958, 314 p. $3.00.

This volume, in the series of studies on international organization initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was prepared under the auspices of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. One of three dealing with American policies and attitudes toward the U.N., it is concerned chiefly with public attitudes and opinions as reflected in polls and surveys.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By Stephen S. Goodspeed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, 676 p. $7.25.

A comprehensive survey, almost a textbook, on the development, role and contemporary problems of international organization.

TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS. By Nagendra Singh. New York: Praeger, 1958, 209 p. $6.00.

A juridical study arising from the question of the legitimacy of the claim of Communist China to representation in the U.N.

UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION. By M. S. Rajan. New York: Longmans (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1959, 679 p. $12.75. (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, Rs. 25.)

An extensive study, by the Research Secretary of the Indian Council of World Affairs, of the thorny question of the limits of the jurisdiction of U.N. organs with respect to member and non-member states.

LA CRISE DU SYSTÈME DE SÉCURITÉ COLLECTIVE DES NATIONS UNIES 1946–1957. By Fernand Van Langenhove. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1958, 272 p. Belgian Fr. 250.

An analysis of the crisis in the collective security system of the U.N., arising out of unanticipated international developments, and of the consequent transformation of its functions.

SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By D. W. Bowett. New York: Praeger, 1958, 294 p. $7.50.

A legal analysis of the right of self-defense, with particular attention to the provisions and experiences under the United Nations Charter.

FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE ET INFLUENCES NATIONALES. By Mohammed Bedjaoui. New York: Praeger (for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1958, 674 p. $12.50.

A systematic examination of the functions, responsibilities and operations of the secretariats and staffs of the U.N. and related organizations.

DISARMAMENT: A STUDY GUIDE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Yves Collart. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1958, 110 p. Guilders 3.

A useful, brief reference, in French and English.

THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS. By G. I. A. D. Draper. New York: Praeger, 1958, 228 p. $6.00.

Five lectures dealing chiefly with the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

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FREE ELECTIONS: AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK. By W. J. M. Mackenzie. New York: Rinehart, 1958, 184 p. $3.50.

While described as an "elementary textbook," this is a most informative and helpful discussion of the possible methods of organizing free elections.

L'OURS ET LA BALEINE. By Victor Alexandrov. Paris: Stock, 1958, 252 p. Fr. 630.

A frivolous and often quite inaccurate short history of Russian-American relations.

FRIEND TO FRIEND: A CANDID EXCHANGE BETWEEN PEARL S. BUCK AND CARLOS P. ROMULO. New York: Day, 1958, 126 p. $2.50.

A brief but frank discussion of American-Asian relations, what the difficulties are and how both sides may help in removing them.

LEZIONI DI STORIA DEI TRATTATI E POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE. I: PARTE GENERALE. By Mario Toscano. Turin: Giappichelli, 1958, 518 p. L. 3500.

These materials, presented in a preliminary form as an aid to students, will be of interest to all writers in diplomatic history and international relations. Includes a general discussion of treaties, treaty collections, diplomatic sources and diplomatic memoirs.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1959. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1959, 231 p. $3.95.

Brought up to date as of January 1, 1959, this standard annual reference work gives the composition of the governments of all countries; sums up party programs and lists their leaders; and lists newspapers, indicating their political affiliations and editors.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE WORLD DOLLAR PROBLEM. By Donald MacDougall. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, 622 p. $12.50.

The author, a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, addresses himself to the question whether the so-called dollar problem was a temporary consequence of the war or whether it is likely to persist in the future as a troublesome feature of the international economy of the non-Communist world. On the whole he is somewhat pessimistic and anticipates recurrent deficits.

SOME MONETARY PROBLEMS—INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL. By Per Jacobsson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 374 p. $6.75.

A collection of the articles and speeches over the last 35 years by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.

THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Albert O. Hirschman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958, 217 p. $4.50.

In this study of the problems of economic growth in underdeveloped countries the author is less concerned with the question of poverty and resources than with the issue of balanced versus unbalanced growth and the search for inducements.

LANDMARKS OF TOMORROW. By Peter F. Drucker. New York: Harper, 1959, 270 p. $4.50.

As the title suggests, Mr. Drucker is attempting to sketch the economic, political

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and intellectual configuration of our future society, less in terms of predictions and forecasts than of problems, tasks and challenges.

THE STRUGGLE FOR A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING. By W. Brand. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 438 p. $7.50.

An extensive review of the economic difficulties confronting underdeveloped countries attempting to raise their standards of living. A translation of a study first published in the Netherlands in 1954.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT: THE KEY TO INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. Edited by James Daniel. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, 282 p. $5.00.

A symposium of papers given at the San Francisco Conference of October 14–18, 1957, sponsored by Time-Life International and the Stanford Research Institute.

RICH LANDS AND POOR. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Harper, 1958, 168 p. $3.00.

A leading Swedish economist discusses the vicious circles—social as well as economic—which inhibit the advance of poorer societies.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF AIR TRANSPORT. By Kenneth R. Sealy. New York: Rinehart, 1958, 207 p. $1.50.

A useful brief introduction.

The Second World War

WEDEMEYER REPORTS! By General Albert C. Wedemeyer. New York: Holt, 1958, 497 p. $6.00.

General Wedemeyer, who served during the Second World War both in Washington and in the Far East, gives his views of our handling of the conflict. In general he has little good to say about either our military or political strategy. In his view the U.S. was too hasty in entering the war, delayed too long in the assault on Europe, and was completely off the track in attempting to achieve a reconciliation of the Nationalist and Communist forces in China.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN. VOLUME II: INDIA'S MOST DANGEROUS HOUR. By Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby and Others. London: H.M.S.O., 1958, 541 p. 55/. (New York: British Information Services, $10.22.)

This second volume in the Japan series of the official British "History of the Second World War" deals authoritatively with the loss of Burma in 1942, the development of India as a base, and operations in the Pacific in 1943.

WHAT HAPPENED AT PEARL HARBOR? Edited by Hans Louis Trefousse. New York: Twayne, 1958, 324 p. $6.00.

An extensive selection of documents.

STALINGRAD. By Hans Schröter. New York: Dutton, 1958, 263 p. $5.00.

An excellent survey of this decisive battle, by a former German war correspondent.

TWILIGHT OF THE SEA GODS. By Thaddeus V. Tuleja. New York: Norton, 1958, 284 p. $3.95.

A brief, popular history of the German Navy in World War II.

DAS UNTERNEHMEN "SEELÖWE." By Karl Klee. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958, 300 p. DM. 35.

A detailed account of the abortive German plan to invade England in 1940.

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The United States

THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1959, 669 p. $6.75.

In this second volume of his major work in progress, "The Age of Roosevelt," Mr. Schlesinger provides a wide-ranging account of the first two years of the new Administration, 1933–1934. While foreign affairs have been reserved for subsequent treatment the domestic canvas is full enough: the A.A.A. and N.R.A., the rise of federal relief and public works and the emergence of the C.I.O., and with all this, increasing alarm and dismay on the part of the opposition. Of particular interest is the author's subtle and skillful analysis of Roosevelt as President.

OFF THE RECORD WITH F.D.R., 1942–1945. By William D. Hassett. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958, 366 p. $6.00.

This diary of F.D.R.'s confidential secretary during the Second World War provides a number of interesting insights into the last phase of the President's life, though no answers to some of the perplexing issues of those years.

THE AMERICAN STYLE. Edited by Elting E. Morison. New York: Harper, 1958, 426 p. $5.00.

An interesting though somewhat disorganized symposium of papers and discussions, at a 1957 conference held under the auspices of the M.I.T. Center for International Studies. The principal speakers—Abraham Kaplan, J. Robert Oppenheimer, George F. Kennan, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray and W. W. Rostow—dealt, directly or tangentially, with the question of the style and adequacy of American performance in face of the appalling demands of the times.

ARMS AND THE STATE. By Walter Millis with Harvey C. Mansfield and Harold Stein. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958, 436 p. $4.00.

Undertaken initially by Harold Stein and completed, in consequence of his illness, by Harvey Mansfield and Walter Millis, this volume comprises a survey of United States civil-military relations in recent years, with particular emphasis on the decade 1945–1955. The central theme is the emergent and as yet unresolved problem of the confluence of civil and military factors in our national policy.

ARMS CONTROL AND INSPECTION IN AMERICAN LAW. By Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 289 p. $5.50.

A useful "examination of problems which arms control and inspection may raise under the Constitution and laws of the United States"—a potentially very important subject.

IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. By John W. Caughey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, 207 p. $4.00.

Under such chapter headings as "toward a police state" and "shackling the mind" the author expresses his alarm over what he takes to be the continuing erosion of freedom of speech, assembly and the press.

THE CAUSES OF WORLD WAR THREE. By C. Wright Mills. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, 172 p. $3.50.

In a series of angry chapters Professor Mills goes after the American "power elite" and their "crackpot realism," which, in his view, will inevitably lead to nuclear war sooner or later. He offers his own proposals in a brisk staccato and appeals to American intellectuals to go out and fight for them.

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THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. By Holbert N. Carroll. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958, 365 p. $5.00.

An able and comprehensive study of the recent and significantly expanding role of the House of Representatives in the making of foreign policy. The author is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh.

FOREIGN AID REEXAMINED: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL. Edited by James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958, 250 p. $5.00.

A collection of papers based on a conference held by the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Emory University. Many critics of foreign aid are represented.

THE REPORTER'S TRADE. By Joseph and Stewart Alsop. New York: Reynal, 1958, 377 p. $5.00.

For a dozen years after the Second World War the newspaper column of the Alsop brothers was one of the most important providers of information and molders of opinion in American journalism. Now, after the affable dissolution of the partnership, the two men give a most interesting account of their activities as legmen, commentators and, not infrequently, Cassandras. While at times they have been, in their lambasting of all administrations, overly alarmist, their sense of continuing crisis certainly corresponds to the times in which they have been writing.

U.S.A.—SECOND-CLASS POWER? By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, 334 p. $3.95.

This alarmed and perhaps alarmist report on our military strength corresponds to Mr. Pearson's customary style of reporting and flaying.

ON MY OWN. By Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Harper, 1958, 241 p. $4.00.

In this third volume of informal autobiography, Mrs. Roosevelt tells of her many activities since the death of her husband—her travels, her work in the U.N., her staggering schedule of correspondence and engagements.

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES AND NATIONAL POLICY. By Olin T. Mouzon. New York: Harper, 1959, 752 p. $7.50.

A textbook on material, human and capital resources and their appropriate employment by the U.S. to achieve national security.

FREEDOM TO TRAVEL. New York: Dodd, 1958, 144 p. $4.00.

This is the report of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. In its conclusions and recommendations it deals both with the principles involved in the right to travel and with a number of procedural reforms with respect to passports and travel restraints.

FOUNDATIONS: THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE. By René A. Wormser. New York: Devin-Adair, 1958, 412 p. $7.50.

The author, who served as counsel for the Reece Committee, presents his criticisms of the major tax-exempt foundations, especially in their impact on American education and foreign policy.

CHANGING IMAGES OF AMERICA: A STUDY OF INDIAN STUDENTS' PERCEPTIONS. By George V. Coelho. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 145 p. $3.50.

A study—based on interviews of a number of Indian students—of the changes and modifications of a foreign student's image of his host country, a matter of some interest in our consideration of the value of exchange programs.

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Western Europe

DISENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE. By Michael Howard. Baltimore: Penguin, 1958, 92 p. 65 cents.

Despite the suggestion in the title, this book, the outcome of discussions of a study group, clearly prefers the continuation of the status quo and the division of Germany to any disengagement which might lead to a disruption of NATO.

ECONOMIC THEORY AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. By Tibor Scitovsky. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, 153 p. $3.50.

Four theoretically oriented essays arguing for the economic advantages of Western European union, by a Professor of Economics at the University of California.

EURATOM: ANALYSE ET COMMENTAIRES DU TRAITÉ. By J. Errera and Others. Brussels: Éditions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1958, 436 p. Belgian Fr. 425.

A commentary on the Rome treaty instituting the European Atomic Community.

DÉSATOMISER L'EUROPE? By E.-N. Dzelepy. Brussels: Éditions Politiques, 1958, 165 p. Belgian Fr. 60.

A vigorous cheer for the Rapacki Plan and much criticism of Messrs. Dulles and Adenauer.

L'ÉCONOMIE FRANÇAISE. By Jean Chardonnet. Paris: Dalloz, 1958, 452 p. Fr. 2200.

This first volume of a valuable study by a leading economic geographer deals with basic conditions of production in France—energy, population, finance and transportation—and then with French industry—structure, organization, geography, prices. A later volume will deal with agriculture, trade and current problems.

TWO YEARS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: VICHY 1940–1942. By Adrienne Doris Hytier. Geneva: Droz, 1958, 402 p.

A detailed monograph on French foreign policy during the two and one-half years of limited freedom of action between the armistice and full German occupation.

LA SIDÉRURGIE FRANÇAISE. By Roger Biard. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1958, 316 p. Fr. 1000.

Quite a bit of information about the French steel industry going back over many years is looked at from a very leftist point of view.

FRENCH ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND ELECTIONS, 1789–1957. By Peter Campbell. New York: Praeger, 1958, 144 p. $4.50.

A succinct description of the changing French electoral procedures since 1789.

HISTOIRE ÉCONOMIQUE DE LA BELGIQUE, 1945–1956. By Fernand Baudhuin. Brussels: Bruylant, 1958, 438 p. Belgian Fr. 380.

A solid sequel to the author's earlier economic history of Belgium from 1914 to 1939 and his account of the Belgian economy under the German occupation.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN IRELAND. By J. L. McCracken. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 229 p. $4.80.

A detailed and sober study of the origins and role of Dáil Éireann, the elective house of the Irish parliament, from its founding in 1919 to 1948.

FROM BISMARCK TO ADENAUER: ASPECTS OF GERMAN STATECRAFT. By Gordon A. Craig. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958, 156 p. $4.50.

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In these lectures, consisting chiefly of interpretative sketches of a number of German statesmen—Bismarck, Holstein, Bülow, Kiderlen-Wächter, Rathenau, Stresemann, Bruening and Adenauer—Professor Craig succeeds in giving both an illuminating survey of Germany's vicissitudes as a great power and his own reflections on the art of diplomacy.

THE GERMAN RESISTANCE. By Gerhard Ritter. New York: Praeger, 1959, 330 p. $7.50.

A considerably abridged translation of a leading German historian's study of Carl Goerdeler (noted here January 1956).

WALTHER RATHENAU: PERSÖNLICHKEIT UND WERK. By Helmuth M. Böttcher. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1958, 322 p. DM. 16.80.

A biography that is far from meeting the need for a serious appraisal of Rathenau's complex personality and career.

DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK IN DER ÄRA DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK. By Ludwig Zimmermann. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1958, 486 p. DM. 35.

A substantial general history of German foreign policy in the Weimar period, a period overshadowed by the question of treaty revision.

DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN VOLKSDEMOKRATISCHEN STAATES 1945–1958. By Walter Ulbricht. Berlin: Dietz, 1958, 691 p. DM-Ost. 7.

Speeches and articles by the German Communist leader since 1945.

SCHEIN UND WIRKLICHKEIT IN DER DDR. By Hermann Weber and Lothar Pertinax. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 303 p. DM. 9.80.

A discussion of conditions in the German Democratic Republic, proceeding from some 65 questions about Communist theory and practice.

AGITATION UND PROPAGANDA. By Ernst Richert in Collaboration with Carola Stern and Peter Dietrich. Berlin: Vahlen, 1958, 331 p. DM. 24.50.

A study of propaganda and agitation techniques as developed in the Soviet zone of Germany: press, meetings, films, schools, etc.

STATO E CHIESA. Edited by Vittorio Gorresio. Bari: Laterza, 1957, 268 p. L. 1700.

These papers on church-state relations in Italy created quite a stir of controversy when they were presented in 1957. Some of the subsequent comments and discussions are included in the present volume.

IL MOVIMENTO OPERAIO TORINESE DURANTE LA RESISTENZA. By Raimondo Luraghi. Turin: Einaudi, 1958, 372 p. L. 2000.

An able and informed study of the workers' resistance movement in Turin, from the strikes of March 1943 to the insurrection of 1945.

ELEZIONI POLITICHE E LEGGI ELETTORALI IN ITALIA. By Lucio Luzzatto. Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1958, 310 p. L. 500.

A general introduction to elections and voting procedure in Italy.

DIECI ANNI DI POLITICA AGRARIA NEL MEZZOGIORNO. By Manlio Rossi-Doria. Bari: Laterza, 1958, 412 p. L. 2400.

A critical review of the achievements in agrarian reform and development in southern Italy during the last decade.

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MASSNAHMEN ZUR FÖRDERUNG DER PRIVATEN KAPITALBILDUNG IM PORTUGIESISCHEN REICH. By Ralph von Gersdorff. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1958, 265 p. Swiss Fr. 12.45.

A somewhat disorganized study of the problems of capital formation in Portugal and Portuguese Africa.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY 1924–1926. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1958, 557 p. $7.50.

This fifth volume of Professor Carr's imposing work in progress, "A History of Soviet Russia," is the first of three covering the critical and relatively uncharted years 1924–1926. After giving a brief background and a sketch of the leading actors, the book is devoted chiefly to economic matters and especially the agricultural question. As in the preceding installments, Professor Carr demonstrates his mastery of the historian's craft.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM. By Gustav A. Wetter. New York: Praeger, 1959, 609 p. $10.00.

This is a translation and revision of a major philosophical study which has already appeared in Italian (1948) and German (1952) editions. After an extended historical introduction to Soviet Marxism, Father Wetter, a Jesuit scholar, provides a detailed and systematic analysis of dialectical materialism as it has developed in the Soviet Union. The English edition includes theoretical and doctrinal modifications since Stalin's death.

DER SOWJETMENSCH. By Klaus Mehnert. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1958, 497 p. DM. 16.80.

Klaus Mehnert, a leading German student of Soviet affairs, was born in Moscow and has made some 12 trips to the Soviet Union between 1929 and 1957. Out of this store of travel and experience he undertakes a substantial portrait of the Soviet man —his conditions of life, his interests and desires, his relation to the ruling order.

RUSSIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. By Derek J. R. Scott. New York: Rinehart, 1958, 265 p. $4.00.

A short textbook, somewhat awkwardly organized and cursory in places.

THE SOVIET NAVY. Edited by Commander M. G. Saunders. New York: Praeger, 1958, 340 p. $7.50.

Eighteen contributors participate in this useful symposium on the background, development and present potentialities of Soviet naval power. The composite picture is a formidable one.

LENIN ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALITY. By Alfred D. Low. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, 193 p. $4.00.

A monograph analyzing Lenin's writings on the question of nationality with particular reference to the relations of the Great Russian people to the other nationalities of Russia.

THE SOVIET FAR EAST: A SURVEY OF ITS PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY. By Erich Thiel. New York: Praeger, 1957, 388 p. $8.00.

This work, first published in German in 1953, is a useful though not exhaustive regional geography of the Soviet Union to the east of Lake Baikal.

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LA COLLECTIVISATION DE L'AGRICULTURE. By Charles Bouvier. Paris: Colin, 1958, 242 p. Fr. 975.

A substantial history and analysis of collectivization in the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe, a persistent, if intermittent impulse which, as the author stresses, is to be understood only as an integral part of the planned "socialist transformation" of a country.

THE PROFITS OF SLAVERY. By Adolfs Šilde. Stockholm: Latvian National Foundation in Scandinavia, 1958, 302 p. (New York: American Latvian Youth Association, $3.80.)

An account of forced labor and deportation in the Baltic states, based on interviews with some 2,000 German and Austrian war prisoners who were released from the U.S.S.R. between 1955 and 1957.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND: AN OUTLINE OF HISTORY. By M. K. Dziewanowski. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959, 369 p. $7.50.

A much-needed, competent and scholarly review of the complicated history of the Polish Communist Party from its origins in the years of partition, through the severe crises of the 1920s and 1930s, up to Gomulka's return to office in 1956.

A CASE HISTORY OF HOPE: THE STORY OF POLAND'S PEACEFUL REVOLUTION. By Flora Lewis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1958, 267 p. $3.95.

An excellent report, by the wife of the *New York Times* correspondent, Sydney Gruson, on the movement of events in Poland from the death of Stalin to the present. While the hopes of October 1956 have not been realized, the changes accomplished in that dramatic year remain of permanent interest.

POLEN ZWISCHEN HOFFNUNG UND VERZWEIFLUNG. By Wanda Bronska-Pampuch. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1958, 375 p. DM. 16.80.

A Polish-born journalist's appraisal of the ambiguous and uneasy situation of Poland in Eastern Europe and the Communist orbit. About a third of the volume is devoted to developments since October 1956.

THE SEYM AND PEOPLE'S COUNCILS IN POLAND. By Stefan Rozmaryn. Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1958, 153 p.

PREMISES OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN POLAND 1956–1960. By Kazimierz Secomski. Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1958, 88 p.

Two brief discussions, in English, of the organization of representative bodies in the Polish People's Republic, and of the current five-year plan. Dr. Rozmaryn is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Warsaw; Dr. Secomski is Professor at the Central School of Planning and Statistics.

JOURNEY TO POLAND AND YUGOSLAVIA. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, 118 p. $3.00.

A diary of a leading economist's recent lecture tour in the two countries.

TITOISM IN ACTION: THE REFORMS IN YUGOSLAVIA AFTER 1948. By Fred Warner Neal. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958, 331 p. $6.50.

A good description of Tito's Jugoslavia, theory and practice, as it has developed its own "road to socialism" since the break with Moscow in 1948, with a concluding

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chapter on foreign policy. Both factual and critical, it is based on a wide range of Jugoslav material and on the author's personal observations on the scene.

YUGOSLAVIA'S WAY: THE PROGRAM OF THE LEAGUE OF THE COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA. New York: All Nations Press, 1958, 263 p. $4.50.

A translation, by Stoyan Pribechevich, of the program adopted by the Seventh Congress of the Jugoslav League of Communists in April 1958.

THIS IS COMMUNIST HUNGARY. Edited by Robert Finley Delaney. Chicago: Regnery, 1958, 260 p. $4.50.

Eight essays on life and society in Communist Hungary. The contributors are Hungarians who escaped in 1956.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. VOLUME III: THE EMPIRE-COMMONWEALTH 1870–1919. Edited by E. A. Benians, Sir James Butler and C. E. Carrington. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959, 948 p. $19.50.

This authoritative third volume, covering the years 1870–1919, completes the series of general histories of British overseas expansion and imperial policy. The five other volumes in the series deal with the principal Commonwealth countries.

NATIONALISATION IN BRITAIN. By R. Kelf-Cohen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 310 p. $5.50.

A quite critical review of the recent nationalization program in Great Britain. As the author observes at the end of his study, "To the Socialists, nationalisation was a cure-all and a substitute for painful hard thought; ten years later it is more than ever necessary to embark on the hard thinking—free from all dogma."

THE BRITISH COMMUNIST PARTY. By Henry Pelling. New York: Macmillan, 1959, 204 p. $3.75.

A brief history of the rather dismal record of the British Communist Party which "had a knack of being caught facing in the wrong direction when the signal of opportunity was given."

SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS: PROBLEMS OF WARTIME CO-OPERATION AND POST-WAR CHANGE, 1939–1952. By Nicholas Mansergh. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 469 p. $10.10.

This survey treats three main subjects: the impact of the Second World War on the Commonwealth, postwar changes in the composition of the Commonwealth, and the domestic and external problems confronting the Commonwealth members in the early 1950s.

AUSTRALIAN HOPES AND FEARS. By Colin Clark. London: Hollis, 1958, 322 p. 30/.

After a brief general survey for the benefit of the non-Australian reader, Mr. Clark, for many years in the Queensland public service, points out with much vigor and conviction what he finds wrong in recent Australian politics and economics. In general terms a plea against protectionism and against the rigid party system.

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AUSTRALIA'S OUTLOOK ON ASIA. By Werner Levi. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958, 246 p. $5.00.

An analysis of Australian attitudes toward the peoples and problems of Asia—attitudes combining an aloofness and reluctance to become involved with a growing sense of need for some form of participation in the future of the region.

The Middle East

DOUBTS AND DYNAMITE: THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY. By Emile Bustani. London: Wingate, 1958, 159 p. 18/.

A prominent Lebanese, who is an Arab nationalist but hopeful of good relations with the West, reviews the problems of the area and pleads with the Western world to accept the Arab world as a whole. As he puts it, "There is little point in extending hands of friendship to the separate tentacles of a political octopus."

BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 123 p. $2.00.

This report by a Chatham House Study Group attempts to assess British interests in, and to suggest appropriate policies for, the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas. A sober appraisal of the vicissitudes and defeats of recent years.

EGYPT. By Tom Little. New York: Praeger, 1959, 334 p. $6.50.

This general survey of modern and contemporary Egyptian history is in the "Nations of the Modern World" series. The author, a British journalist, has been the general manager of the Arab News Agency.

YOUNG EGYPT. By Desmond Stewart. London: Wingate, 1958, 198 p. 18/.

An amiable view of Egypt by an author who belongs—so the book jacket says—"in that select and curious coterie of Englishmen who feel less at home in their own country than they do among the Arabs."

DEUX MISSIONS EN MOYEN-ORIENT (1919–1922). By General Catroux. Paris: Plon, 1958, 241 p. Fr. 795.

An account of the author's missions in the Hejaz and Damascus in the troubled aftermath of the First World War.

SYRIA AND LEBANON UNDER FRENCH MANDATE. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1958, 404 p. $6.75.

Brigadier Longrigg, who has had long experience in the Middle East, here reviews the successes and failures of the French Mandate from 1920 to 1945. While praising the material achievements he finds the French handling of political issues "surprisingly maladroit."

IRAQ. By Stephen Hemsley Longrigg and Frank Stoakes. New York: Praeger, 1959, 264 p. $6.50.

A general survey of history, economics and politics, in the "Nations of the Modern World" series.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ: 1950–1957. By Fahim I. Qubain. New York: Praeger, 1959, 277 p. $6.00.

An inquiry into the development of agriculture, oil, industry and human resources in Iraq since 1950.

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South and Southeast Asia

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF INDIA. Edited by Percival Spear. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, 898 p. $6.75.

This third edition of a standard one-volume history by the late Vincent A. Smith has been largely revised, rewritten and expanded to cover the period to 1947.

INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN INDIA. By George Rosen. Glencoe (Ill.): Free Press, 1958, 243 p. $5.00.

An exploratory study of industrial growth in India, based on the expansion of five specific industries since 1937: cement, paper, iron and steel, cotton textile and sugar.

INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. By Asok Chanda. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, 274 p. 25/. (New York: Macmillan, $5.75.)

The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India here reviews the development of the Indian administration and indicates the improvements and reforms he regards as necessary for the future.

COMMUNISM IN INDIA. By Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959, 603 p. $10.00.

This massive study of the Communist Party of India both traces the origins and history of the Party as a part of the Third International and describes Communist policies and practices in India. A welcome addition to the growing number of serious studies on Communist Parties in different countries.

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF INDIA'S PROSPECTS. By Ansley J. Coale and Edgar M. Hoover. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 389 p. $8.50.

This study, sponsored by the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, is directed to the question: What difference would it make in economic terms if the birth rate—in India but by implication in other underdeveloped countries—instead of remaining unchanged, should be cut drastically in this generation?

CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE: THE GANDHIAN PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT. By Joan V. Bondurant. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, 269 p. $5.00.

As the author observes, this is less an essay on Gandhian political philosophy than an effort to find "by abstracting from the Gandhian experiments a theoretical key to the problem of social and political conflict." In the course of her very interesting and stimulating discussion the author deals with such issues as the relation of Gandhian *satyagraha* to certain strands in Western political philosophy and its adequacy in a totalitarian setting.

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI. I (1884–1896). Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1958, 404 p.

This is the first volume of an extensive chronological compilation, which is expected to consist of over 50 volumes. A project of the Government of India.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU'S SPEECHES. VOLUME THREE: MARCH 1953–AUGUST 1957. Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, 1958, 527 p.

This third collection of the Indian Prime Minister's speeches is arranged topically.

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Principal themes are the progress of economic development, electoral issues and foreign policy.

THE VICEROYALTY OF LORD IRWIN, 1926–1931. By S. Gopal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, 152 p. $3.40.

An excellent account, based on Indian Government archives, of the critical viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, later Lord Halifax.

THE PATHANS, 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957. By Olaf Caroe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959, 521 p. $12.50.

A friendly but not uncritical history of the Pathan peoples of the North-West Frontier, by a leading student of the Middle East and Central Asia.

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By Ruth Savord

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

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Of Choh-Ming Li's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA, subtitled "An Appraisal of the First Five Years of Industrialization," the *Wall Street Journal* said, "This is definitely a book for anyone who wants a thorough, unbiased, scientific study of Red China's economy—without adjectives, frills or padding." Mr. Li, who studied economics at the University of California, taught in several Chinese universities, and served as Deputy Director-General of the Chinese Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, is now Professor of Business Administration at the University of California, Berkeley. He has subjected the Peiping figures to careful tests for reliability and consistency, and provided original estimates of the growth rate of agriculture, net national product and capital formation, amount of Soviet aid, and other crucial economic indexes. There are 48 tables in the text and 36 in the Statistical Appendix, including an Addendum bringing the data up to 1958; they represent the most concentrated collection of economic data on Communist China in print. As Mr. Li points out in his Preface, the volume may be taken as a case study of economic development of a low-income, agricultural country which has adopted a program of rapid and concentrated expansion of heavy industry. It is also, of course, one of the few solidly based research studies about Communist China. 300 pages, $7.50

Ever since the Communist Party came to power in the State of Kerala, increasing attention has been given to the Party in India. COMMUNISM IN INDIA, by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, is a dispassionate and very detailed account of the Party in both its international and domestic aspects. The volume describes the history of Communism in India from 1920 to the present and examines the special problems the Party has encountered in India. It discusses its structure, front organizations, role in Parliament, treatment of Indian cultural diversity and the challenge of Gandhian ideas, and its troubled relations with international Communism. The authors have drawn on many new sources, and their work may well become the definitive study in its field. It includes a biographical directory of Indian Communist leaders. 540 pages, $10.00.

In a time when international law, especially in wartime, is dismissed by many as nonexistent, it is perhaps a little reassuring to know that THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE, by Morris Greenspan, codifies the many

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ways in which persons and property are protected by international agreements. A well-documented, exhaustive, systematic exposition of the laws of land warfare today, the volume incorporates the Geneva Conventions, the war crimes trials, and other postwar developments. Nuclear methods of war are considered, as are civil wars. The author is a lawyer and a realist. 752 pages, $10.00.

In spite of a state of all-quiet on the news front, loyalty oaths continue to be a major feature of American political life. To TRY MEN'S SOULS, by Harold M. Hyman, is an ingenious and delightful new approach to the swearing and forswearing of oaths. (George Washington, he points out, was perhaps the most prominent early American to take and break a loyalty oath—to King George III.) Far from being a novelty, loyalty oaths have been with us from the time of the first English-speaking settlements. Mr. Hyman traces the history of oaths in general, and also presents some special material on Northern oaths and Southern security operations during the Civil War. Coming in June. 440 pages, illustrations, $6.00.

Americans have often prided themselves on living in the "land of opportunity." Sociologists Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix have just written a treatise called SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY which turns a cold and scientific eye on comparative mobility rates in the world's societies. They find that upward mobility is no monopoly of ours and that in fact it seems to depend fairly straightforwardly on degree of industrialization. Utilizing a combined psychological and sociological approach, they also develop other interesting theses. 332 pages, $5.00.

Among other books we have published recently are several more which have a special interest for students of foreign relations, but we can only note them briefly here. CITY LIFE IN JAPAN, by R. P. Dore, is an incipient classic in urban anthropology; it is a detailed study of how modern Japanese actually live, and a welcome antidote to the largely faddish and antiquated ideas about Japan now circulating here. (482 pages, $6.75). PILOT PROJECT, INDIA, by Albert Mayer *et al.*, describes the immensely important rural development work at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh, a model of democratic utilization of existing traditions (392 pages, $5.50). TITOISM IN ACTION, by Fred Warner Neal, is a firsthand study of the Yugoslavs' attempts to develop a "new type of society" (348 pages, $6.50). NIGERIA: *Background to Nationalism,* by James S. Coleman, is an excellent introduction to what will become, in 1960, the most populous nation of Africa and the twelfth largest state in the world (524 pages, $7.50). RUSSIAN FAR EASTERN POLICY, 1881–1904, by Andrew Malozemoff, is an astute and objective history, giving a new perspective on Russia's supposed drive for a warm-water Pacific port (368 pages, $5.00). A companion volume in our new "Russian and East European Studies" series is TSARIST RUSSIA AND BALKAN NATIONALISM, by Charles Jelavich, a study of Russian Near-Eastern policy (318 pages, $4.50).

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

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

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

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Dividends are important to the Smiths and the Browns and the Joneses and all the other A. T. & T. share owners. They are important to telephone users too.

Without dividends on stock and interest on bonds there would be no investors. And without investors there would be no telephone service as you know it today. The money they entrust to us goes into more and better service for you.

The distribution of the A. T. & T. dividend to so many people in 22,000 communities is in itself a factor in the over-all economy of the country. Yet the total, though considerable, is small compared to other sums that flow out from the business.

Last year, for example, the Bell System paid more than twice as much in taxes as it paid A. T. & T. share owners in dividends. It thus provided nearly a billion and a half dollars for the support of city, state and federal governments.

Wages, of course, are the biggest item. In the Bell System they are billions of dollars more than the entire net income of the business. In 1958 Bell System wages totaled over $3,700,000,000 . . . the nation's largest business payroll.

THE POSTMAN RINGS 1,625,000 TIMES with A. T. & T. dividend checks. Women are the largest group of share owners and own the most stock. . . . In addition to direct owners of A. T. & T. securities, millions of other people have an important, beneficial interest through the holdings of their insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, unions, savings banks, etc.

Thousands of other jobs in other companies were made possible by our large purchases from outside sources.

Last year the Bell System's manufacturing and supply unit, the Western Electric Company, bought from more than 30,000 firms throughout the country. Nine out of ten were small businesses, each with fewer than 500 employees. This year again we expect to buy over a billion dollars worth of raw materials, parts and services from other companies.

It is altogether natural and logical to expect big figures in a business that serves more than 55,000,000 telephones and handles over 200,000,000 calls a day.

The important thing is to relate the size of the figures to the size of the need and the job. And to realize how the very size of the business contributes to the prosperity of millions of people and the economy of the whole country.

It is an example of free enterprise at work for the good of all.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM

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

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

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

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

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Hans Reichenbach ... on physics

"If one knows physics only from a distance, it may appear to be merely strange names and mathematical formulae, and one may come to believe that it is an affair of the learned alone, ingeniously and wisely constructed, but without significance for men of other interests and problems. And yet one could do no worse injustice to physics than to turn away, repelled by this hard shell of technical terms with which it has surrounded itself. Whoever succeeds in looking behind this wall ... will find there a science full of living problems, full of inner motion, full of the intense endeavor to find answers to the questions of the truth-seeking spirit."

— *Atom und Kosmos, 1930*

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
SUDAN (page 19)
1958 Nov 9
Amin el Sayed, President of the Sudanese Senate, and Ali Abde
Party and Sudanese Minister of Commerce, confer in Cairo
Republic. — "Contacts are being made [in Cairo]..
SUDAN
Sudan and the United Arab Republic as a preliminary to off
standing between the two countries, especially that of a ne
Unionist leader, Ismail el Azhary, is also among the Sudan
11-11-58)
Lieut. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud, Commander-in-Chief of Sudane
1958 Nov 17
Government, proclaims state of emergency, suspends
and closes all newspapers and printing shops, "to put an en
security for all." Gen. Abboud declares that he wishes to
our sister Arab states in particular" — a blow to the U.S.

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

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

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

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